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| Identifier: | 05BAGHDAD2538 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05BAGHDAD2538 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Baghdad |
| Created: | 2005-06-16 07:41:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL PGOV MOPS MASS PTER IZ Kuristan Regional Government Kurdistan Democratic Party KDP |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002538 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2015 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, MASS, PTER, IZ, Kuristan Regional Government, Kurdistan Democratic Party KDP SUBJECT: KURDS CAN'T CONCEIVE OF LIFE WITHOUT PESH Classified By: Classified by David M. Satterfield, Deputy Chief of Miss ion, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 1. (C) SUMMARY. Key Kurdish leaders told DCM and MNF-I Political Military and Economic Affairs Chief on June 13-14 they could not condone disarming the Kurdish pesh merga forces, or its total dissipation into the Iraqi army. They realized the sensitivity of Iraq having ethnically-based forces, but said Baghdad must establish a solid record of good intentions and actions before Kurds would feel safe with a fully integrated army. Some felt the pesh merga could be transformed into a National Guard equivalent. The leaders differed on the wisdom of the pesh merga assuming a role in border security (Kurdish PM Nechirvan Barzani felt it would be almost impossible, given reservations of neighbors), and on concepts for depoliticizing the forces. END SUMMARY. 2. (C) DCM Satterfield and MNF-I Commander for Political, Military and Economic relations MG Hank Stratman discussed possible options for the Kurdish paramilitary force (pesh merga) with senior KDP and PUK officials in the Kurdistan Region June 13-14. RC Kirkuk (notetaker) and DCM assistant also attended the meetings. Pesh to Remain until Kurds Trust Baghdad ---------------------------------------- 3. (C) KDP leader (and newly sworn in President of Kurdistan-Iraq) Massoud Barzani, Prime Minister of the Kurdish Regional Government in Irbil, and PUK leaders Noshirwan Mustafa, Kosrat Rasul, and Omar Sayid Ali told DCM and MG Stratman in meetings June 13-14 that the pesh merga must remain until the Iraqi government is able to convince Kurds that Baghdad will not again turn against them. Democracy was more than words; it would take years to rebuild trust, given the bad blood between the Iraqi government and the Kurds. 4. (C) For the same reason, PM Barzani said he could not foresee the pesh coming under control of Baghdad. Both he and his uncle Massoud said any future arrangement must be jointly agreed between the Kurds and the central government. Massoud -- whose new role as president also confers command of a still-to-be unified pesh merga force -- said he could consider some kind of integration, but only within an established legal framework. Pesh merga could be deployed to other regions, some individuals could be integrated into Iraqi Army units outside the north, and entire units could be deployed outside the region. He was willing to discuss these options with Baghdad. Other pesh merga could be retired, some could be moved into the regular army, some could take civil service jobs. But some element must remain as pesh merga to maintain security. 5. (C) Omar Said Ali, a senior PUK politburo member, told DCM that the pesh merga defended the Kurds from Arab and Islamic movements bent on oppressing minorities. He said that the Kurds were "uncertain about the future of Iraq and how its army will evolve. The Kurdish nation is small, its neighbors always want to control us, and quash Kurds' rights. After 10-15 years, the Kurds may trust the Arabs again, and Iraq's neighbors, then the people might be comfortable without the pesh merga." After the constitution was ratified, the Kurds could reassess. The DCM stressed that the U.S. did not favor the "ethnicization" of security forces. Ali said he understood, but the change could not occur now. PUK Leaders Foresee Different Options ------------------------------------- 6. (C) DCM and General Stratman probed interlocutors on whether the two parties needed so many forces. Kosrat Rasul, a famous PUK pesh merga commander (head of the party politburo executive committee) told DCM that some pesh merga were already serving in the Iraqi Army in Kurdistan. Rasul said others could be reformed as border guards or national guard units. PUK Deputy Secretary General Noshirwan Mustafa and Rasul also agreed that the forces could be drawn down and integrated into something other than a purely party structure, but they differed on context and approach. 7. (C) Rasul defended the current pesh merga structure, which he said was a professionally trained force as compared to the Badr Corps "militia." Perhaps the pesh merga could be renamed, but they could not be entirely mixed into a pan-Iraqi body. Only the Kurds were able to maintain security in the mountains, because they knew the area. Furthermore, Kurds would play an anti-terrorism role, protecting Kurdistan, and helping the Iraqi Army when needed. 8. (C) Mustafa, on the other hand, while agreeing the pesh could not disband, said they must cease existence as party militias. The forces both take orders from party leaders, and are not loyal to government. As such, they posed the main threat to democracy. They stymie political dialog, as no one dares to speak out because the threat of arms lies behind all words. 9. (C) Mustafa said the pesh could become like a U.S. national guard unit, part of the Iraqi Army, funded by Baghdad, but still distinct. They must be loyal to both Kurdistan and Baghdad, not political parties. Meanwhile, Baghdad should show the Kurds it was willing to put the Iraqi Army under civilian control, and keep military spending low, perhaps no more than 5% of the budget. The non-Kurdish units of the army should not have an automatic right to enter Kurdistan. U.S. Protection Would Allow Pesh Reductions ------------------------------------------- 10. (C) Mustafa said that a U.S. presence in the north would allow the Kurds to draw down forces as it would convince the Kurds that neither the Iraqi nor Iranian armies would intervene in Kurdish affairs, it was a major desire of most Kurds. Ali felt that the Kurds should receive some kind of U.S. protection similar to that provided to Israel. Kurds Fill Security Vacuum on the Borders, but Formal Role a Problem for Neighbors ------------------------------------------ 11. (C) MG Stratman asked if the two parties would be receptive to the idea of pesh merga providing border security in the north, a move that would make non-Iraqi forces there redundant. The DCM noted that such a role would be coordinated with Turkey. President Barzani said that if appropriate arrangements were made, a border security role might be possible. He said the pesh merga were aleady filling a vacuum in the mountainous north. 12. (C) When MG Stratman asked whether pesh merga deployments along the border were currently coordinated with the Ministry of Interior in Baghdad, which had line authority for this function, President Brzan sad that Baghdad has no capability on the northern borders. He said the new constitution should work this out. Thereafter, the KRG MOI or pesh merga ministry and Baghdad MOI would have a legal framework to determine their respective roles. 13. (C) Nechirvan Barzani said that a pesh merga border force likely would not be accepted by Iran or Turkey. On that note, he said it was important for Turkey to understand the Kurds were serious about fighting the PKK. He said without exception Iraqi soil should not be used to harm its neighbors. 14. (C) It is no surprise that the Kurds wish to retain some capacity to repel aggression, given their history with Baghdad. How this can be resolved without unduly entrenching ethnic divisions nationwide remains to be seen. In Iraq, where money is a frequent precursor for loyalty, perhaps Mustafa's option of a national guard type unit, paid by Baghdad yet distinct, is worth exploring further. (in Iraq, money is a frequent precursor for loyalty) 15. (U) REO HILLA, REO BASRA, REO MOSUL, and REO KIRKUK, minimize considered. Jeffrey
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