US embassy cable - 05ANKARA3413

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TURKEY SEEKS TO CONTRIBUTE ROBUSTLY TO AFGHANISTAN FOLLOWING ISAF VII

Identifier: 05ANKARA3413
Wikileaks: View 05ANKARA3413 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2005-06-15 15:49:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL MARR AF TU NATO
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 003413 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2015 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, AF, TU, NATO 
SUBJECT: TURKEY SEEKS TO CONTRIBUTE ROBUSTLY TO AFGHANISTAN 
FOLLOWING ISAF VII 
 
 
Classified By: Counselor for Political-Military Affairs Timothy A. Bett 
s for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) PolMilCouns and PolMilOff met with MFA officials June 
14 and 15 to follow up on PM Erdogan's comments in the U.S. 
the week of June 5 that Turkey wants to do more to ensure the 
stability of Afghanistan after it relinquishes command of 
ISAF VII in August.  Both MFA Deputy Director General for 
Security Policy Fatih Ceylan (June 14) and MFA DDG for South 
Asia Aydin Evirgen (June 15) confirmed that Erdogan misspoke 
when he said Turkey wanted to lead a PRT in Kabul.  They 
clarified that Turkey seeks to take command of ISAF's Kabul 
Multinational Brigade (Central Region) when this command 
comes into being (the Turks believe it will be next year). 
 
2. (C) Evirgen explicitly asked for strong U.S. support 
within the Alliance for Turkey to be appointed to this 
command.  He emphasized that after two failed and difficult 
attempts to get Ankara to take a PRT, the GOT may not again 
be in a position to offer significant military assets to 
Afghanistan stability efforts in the future.  (NOTE: Evirgen 
was a strong advocate in the Turkish bureaucracy in favor of 
taking a PRT.  END NOTE.) 
 
3. (C) PolMilCouns noted that our informal communication with 
Brussels and Washington indicated that the French have also 
expressed an interest in taking command of the ISAF central 
region.  He added that we understand that there may be a 
discrepancy over whether this command will come into being in 
Phase III or Phase IV of ISAF.  Evirgen replied that he 
understood these issues, and reiterated the GOT's request for 
U.S. support and also clarification on what our thinking was 
on the timing issue. 
 
4. (C) Evirgen noted that PM Erdogan's recent trip to 
Afghanistan was the main catalyst in the GOT's desire to 
continue its support for Afghanistan.  Erdogan was deeply 
moved by the plight of the Afghan poor, and ordered that 
Turkey's aid for Afghanistan be increased ten-fold, to U.S. 
$100 million.  Evirgen believes that he now has the full 
backing of the GOT in his efforts to promote a prominent 
Turkish role in assuring the future of Afghanistan.  He 
worried, however, that if a decision on the central region 
was not taken by NATO soon, enthusiasm for a robust, 
continuing Turkish contribution could wane, particularly 
within the Turkish military. 
 
5. (C) Comment: Turkey's desire to maintain a robust force in 
ISAF is laudable, and the MNB Brigade command may be the way 
to accomplish just that.  Evirgen's warning that if this 
initiative fails Turkey may be inclined to walk away from 
Afghanistan stability efforts was not a threat: It was a 
well-intentioned statement of fact.  To prevent this, we will 
need a coherent, unified USG position regarding the Turkish 
offer.  End comment. 
EDELMAN 

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