US embassy cable - 05COLOMBO1065

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SRI LANKA: PRESIDENT REVIEWS OPTIONS AS DEADLINE DRAWS NEAR

Identifier: 05COLOMBO1065
Wikileaks: View 05COLOMBO1065 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Colombo
Created: 2005-06-15 13:06:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PTER CE Political Parties LTTE
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001065 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
USPACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, CE, Political Parties, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA:  PRESIDENT REVIEWS OPTIONS AS DEADLINE 
DRAWS NEAR 
 
REF: A. COLOMBO 1056 
 
     B. COLOMBO 1052 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: CDA JAMES F. ENTWISTLE.  REASON:  1.4 (B,D). 
 
-------------------- 
POLITICAL OVERTURES 
--------------------- 
 
1.  (U) As of COB June 15, Government coalition partner 
Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) was sticking to its ultimatum 
to President Chandrika Kumaratunga to abandon plans to sign a 
"joint mechanism" on tsunami aid with the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) by midnight June 16 or face the 
dissolution of the alliance (Reftels).  After the junior 
coalition partner spurned a June 13 overture by Prime 
Minister Mahinda Rajapakse to modify its position (Ref A), 
two other Cabinet Ministers sent a letter to JVP Secretary 
Tilvin Silva on June 15 urging the JVP to withdraw its 
deadline.  As of COB June 15, the Embassy had no information 
that the JVP had replied.  (Note:  Party propagandists and 
wordsmiths may have been otherwise occupied with assorted 
rallies and protests.  See paras 2-3 below.) 
 
--------------------- 
POLITICAL POSTURING 
--------------------- 
 
2.  (U) At the JVP's rally in Colombo on June 14 (Ref A), 
Tilvin Silva assured the party faithful (several thousand of 
whom converged near the Town Hall) that even if the JVP quit 
the alliance, the Marxist party would never allow 
"reactionaries" like the opposition United National Party 
(UNP) to assume the reins of government.  Instead, he pledged 
the formation of a new alliance of "all the progressive 
masses"--including possible defectors from the President's 
Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP).  JVP Propaganda Secretary and 
MP Wimal Weerawansa blamed "NGO agents" for forcing the joint 
mechanism on the nation and accused unidentified presidential 
confidants of plotting a conspiracy to plunge the nation into 
anarchy.  He ended by emphasizing his party's readiness to 
sacrifice lives (he did not specify whose) to safeguard the 
unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation. 
 
3.  (SBU) As promised, the JVP followed up its June 14 rally 
with a June 15 protest in Colombo by members of the 
JVP-affiliated government employees union.  Assistant 
Superintendent of Police Champika Siriwardena told us that he 
estimated 80 percent of government employees in the downtown 
area participated in the lunch-hour rally, an indication, if 
true, that anti-mechanism sentiment may be spreading beyond 
JVP boundaries.  While Siriwardena reported that the labor 
protest was generally peaceful and well organized, he 
expressed concern at the worsening condition of Ven. Dambila 
Amila Thero, who began a hunger strike to protest the joint 
mechanism at the main railway station in downtown Colombo on 
June 10 (Ref B).  Siriwardena reported that when police tried 
to carry out a court order to remove him to a hospital on 
June 15, the monk refused to move, and the supporters around 
him (whom Siriwardena estimated to number about 1,000) 
objected vehemently.  Police were hoping, the police official 
said, that the JVP would intervene to convince the monk to 
abandon his fast.  (Note:  We have not heard that the JVP is 
contemplating any such move.)  Siriwardena said that he 
feared the situation could quickly turn violent if the monk 
took a turn for the worse. 
 
--------------------- 
POLITICAL PARALYSIS? 
--------------------- 
 
4.  (C) In addition to (so far fruitless) efforts to win 
support from opposition parties like the UNP, Tamil National 
Alliance (TNA) and Sri Lanka Muslim Congress, the President 
is reportedly considering a variety of options available to 
her, by virtue of her extensive executive powers, to weather 
the impending political storm.  Besides the possibility of 
proroguing Parliament on June 22 (Ref A), TNA MP Joseph 
Pararajasingham told us on June 15 that he understands 
Kumaratunga may also be considering introducing the mechanism 
as a bill in the next Parliamentary session. 
Pararajasingham, who had just returned the previous day from 
briefing LTTE politicos in Kilinochchi on latest developments 
in the south, expressed dismay at this prospect--a sentiment 
he said the LTTE leadership shared.  Bringing the bill before 
Parliament would almost certainly doom its timely passage, he 
said, especially since any Sri Lankan citizen has the right 
to challenge the legality of a proposed bill in the Supreme 
Court.  According to Pararajasingham, the LTTE believes that 
the President cannot withdraw support for the mechanism, 
especially since the Co-chairs' public statement of June 13 
supporting it, but the Tigers "have doubts" that, given the 
JVP's opposition, the initiative will ever see the light of 
day.  Submitting the bill to Parliament--and thus consigning 
it to the inevitable long, drawn-out legislative and legal 
wrangling that would surely accompany it--might be the 
President's way of punting on the nettlesome issue, he 
speculated.  On possible scenarios should the JVP stick to 
its deadline and quit the government on June 16, the TNA MP 
predicted no immediate breakdown.  Even in the event of a 
vote of no confidence, he said, the legislative timeline can 
be so long--the vote must be entered on the agenda, presented 
to the party leaders, listed on Parliamentary "order papers," 
and moved for debate on the floor--that the whole process 
could be spun out over several months--during which interval 
Kumaratunga may think of some way of extricating herself from 
this dilemma. 
 
------------- 
JVP IN KANDY 
------------- 
 
5.  (SBU)  After COB June 15 JVP party leaders were 
reportedly in Kandy for an anti-mechanism rally and to meet 
with the Malwatte and Asgiriya "Mahanayakes," or chief 
Buddhist prelates.  There was some speculation (and perhaps 
some wishful thinking) that the former Marxists might be 
seeking political cover from the prelates for a possible 
compromise with the President. One theory held that the 
Mahanayakes might request the JVP to postpone its June 15 
deadline, giving the party a comfortable and culturally 
palatable way out from the impending showdown, at least for 
the time being, and some time to reassess the situation. 
 
 
--------- 
COMMENT 
--------- 
 
6.  (C) A few weeks ago, there was much speculation among 
Colombo political observers that the President would sign the 
joint mechanism on June 15, a date purportedly chosen by 
astrologers as auspicious.  So far, however, the day has 
proven anything but lucky for the beleaguered Kumaratunga. 
With the midnight deadline fast approaching, the JVP has 
given no indication that it intends to back down from its 
ultimatum to the President.  While we do not know the subject 
of the sudden meeting in Kandy, if the JVP leadership is 
rethinking next steps, getting the Mahanayakes' blessing on 
any about-face makes good political sense for a party that 
has ordained itself the savior of Sinhalese Buddhist 
nationalism.  Failing an eleventh-hour JVP change-of-heart, 
however, the likely scenarios the President faces are not 
pleasant.  Without the support of either the JVP or the UNP, 
the President simply cannot maintain a majority government. 
The options bruited about over the past few days, e.g., 
proroguing Parliament, submitting a joint mechanism bill to 
Parliament, are short-term fixes that will not prevent the 
meltdown of her majority.  Astrologers' predictions 
notwithstanding, for right now, it is hard to identify any 
auspicious omens on the immediate political horizon. 
ENTWISTLE 

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