US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI4531

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 004531 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/2015 
TAGS: PREL, MASS, IN, NP, India-Nepal 
SUBJECT: GOI SATISFIED WITH KOIRALA VISIT, BUT NOT HOPEFUL 
FOR FUTURE 
 
Classified By: Charge Bob Blake for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: As former Nepalese PM GP Koirala prepared to 
depart New Delhi after his meetings with GOI officials and 
politicians, MEA Under Secretary (Nepal) Manu Mahawar told 
Poloff on June 14 that the visit was a success for the GOI, 
allowing frank exchange of views on the political impasse in 
Nepal.  The GOI reiterated to Koirala its opposition to 
Nepalese political parties forming a common front with the 
Maoist insurgency, and explained that the resumption of 
non-lethal military assistance was intended to encourage the 
King to make progress in restoring civil liberties and 
democracy.  The GOI is working on an assessment of the RNA's 
ammunition needs, and looks forward to an exchange of views 
with the USG on this issue.  End Summary. 
 
Koirala's and GOI's Assessments 
------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Mahawar declared that Koirala's ten-day visit to New 
Delhi was "very successful," as it incorporated meetings with 
the PM, Congress Party President Sonia Gandhi, FM Natwar 
Singh, Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee, NSA MK Narayanan, 
FS Shyam Saran and BJP leader AB Vajpayee.  In these 
meetings, Koirala assessed the Nepalese political situation 
as "worrying," saying that he saw no signs of rapprochement 
between the King and the parties.  The parties insist that 
the King take the first step, Mahawar observed, and do not 
believe he is interested in a compromise. 
 
3.  (C) The GOI message to Koirala was that ultimately there 
must be a political solution to the turmoil in Nepal, Mahawar 
said.  The first step requires reconciliation between the 
King and parties, followed by the presentation of a unified 
face for talks with the Maoists to bring them into a 
political settlement.  Although the Palace and parties are 
currently at odds, the parties have remained in touch with 
the Maoists, Mahawar noted, adding that any eventual 
representative government would need to maintain 
communication channels with the Maoists as a prelude to 
negotiations.  However, the parties are cautious in their 
interactions with the insurgents, Mahawar said, and recognize 
the dangers of compromising with Maoists still willing to use 
violence.  Koirala told the GOI that senior political leaders 
are restraining younger cadres who have a more radical view 
and are more apt to recommend joining with the Maoists in 
calling for a republic, Mahawar reported. 
 
Pressuring the King 
------------------- 
 
4.  (C) Koirala emphasized the role that the international 
community should play to press the King to accept multiparty 
democracy and constitutional monarchy, the Under Secretary 
said.  However, Koirala stated that the pressure must come 
from the Nepalese people.  In this regard, the parties were 
continuing their demonstrations in an effort to show the King 
that the people demand democracy. 
 
5.  (C) Mahawar observed that the political parties feel they 
cannot back down and compromise on their demands lest they 
lose the respect of the Nepalese population.  Previous 
compromises have delivered less than the Palace agreed to, 
and the parties recognize that both the King and the Maoists 
now see them as powerless.  They are convinced that they must 
continue their agitation to regain credibility.  Moreover, if 
a political solution to the Maoist insurgency is necessary, 
healthy political parties will be essential, Mahawar 
observed.  However, if progress to democracy is delayed too 
long, the parties will become so estranged from the monarchy 
that they will have no choice but to join the Maoists. 
 
Military Assistance and Ammunition 
---------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) The GOI explained to Koirala its rationale for 
resuming non-lethal military assistance, Mahawar stated, 
adding that Koirala heard that India's release of aid was 
intended as both a reward to the Palace for partial progress 
on restoring civil rights and encouragement for more. 
However, the GOI emphasized that the release of assistance 
did not "dilute" India's support for the political parties. 
Koirala indicated that the parties understand the GOI's 
concern about Maoists, but complained that any military 
support gives the King the impression that he is on the right 
path. 
 
7.  (C) Mahawar stated that India plans to give only what 
military assistance it believes to be necessary to hold back 
the Maoists, recognizing that an RNA military victory over 
the Maoists is unlikely regardless of what aid is given.  He 
reported that the GOI is "finalizing" its assessment of the 
RNA's ammunition needs in preparation for comparing views 
with the US, noting that India would prefer to wait until the 
RNA is "desperate" before providing ammunition. 
 
Party Leaders Returning to Kathmandu 
------------------------------------ 
 
8.  (C) Koirala was scheduled to return to Kathmandu on June 
15.  Mahawar told us that now that there is a "little bit" of 
freedom, "most" of the Nepali Congress leaders who had been 
staying in New Delhi since February 1 will be accompanying 
Koirala to Nepal, and many of the other parties' leaders here 
are also returning to Kathmandu. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
8.  (C) The GOI's warning to Koirala to avoid dalliances with 
the Maoists is reassuring, as is the continued interest in an 
exchange of views on RNA ammunition requirements.  MEA has 
not proposed a mechanism for exchanging assessments of 
ammunition requirements.  While MEA expects that the upcoming 
monsoon season will suppress overt agitation for a few 
months, it remains worried that without a plan for resolving 
the impasse, the political party dissatisfaction will boil 
over into an alignment with the Maoists. 
 
9.  (C/NF) On June 9, Naval Attache provided Indian Defense 
Intelligence Agency (IDIA) with several JICPAC reports on 
Nepal and suggested that the situation in Nepal was an 
appropriate subject for intelligence exchange under the 
Morning Dew agreement.  Informal comments from IDIA Liaison 
Officer indicated there is interest in pursuing the subject, 
but IDIA is not able to respond positively until cleared by 
the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW).  If this approach is 
accepted by the GOI, it will provide an appropriate channel 
for exchange of analysis on RNA ammunition status. 
BLAKE