US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD2509

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 002509 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, KDEM, KISL, IZ, UN, Sunni Arab 
SUBJECT: CHARGE MEETING WITH UNAMI SRSG QAZI: SUNNI OUTREACH 
REF: BAGHDAD 2480 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires James F. Jeffrey for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) Charge had a long one-on-one exchange with UNAMI SRSG, 
Ambassador Ashraf Qazi, on June 14.  The main subject was 
aspects of Sunni outreach, both the immediate problem and the 
longer-term aspects of the Sunni insurgency.  Charge 
explained our position on the Constitutional Commission in 
considerable detail, urging Qazi to support, including the 
total of 17 Sunni Arab members in an expanded Commission. 
Qazi played his cards close to his chest, but indicated he 
would meet later today with Sunni leaders and suggested that 
he would try to be helpful.  He did not challenge the 
premises of our position. 
 
2. (C) Qazi did go on at length about the difficulties 
dealing with the Sunnis here, and their failure to recognize 
that they are facing a fundamentally changed Iraq.  He 
appears to think highly of many of the Shia political 
leaders, and compares the Sunnis with the Muslim population 
of South Asia, which simply could not grasp that they were no 
longer the ruling class--until the denouement of the 
Pakistan-India split.  Still, he lamented that no Shia 
leader, including the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, has won 
the mantle of "spokesperson for the entire population," a 
problem that haunted Gandhi as well. 
 
3. (C) Obviously fishing for concessions for the Sunnis, Qazi 
asked about MNF-I accepting a "timeline" for withdrawal. 
Charge explained in detail why this was tantamount to 
declaring us an illegal occupation, would lose the point that 
Coalition forces are in Iraq for a purpose, and would 
demoralize our allies.  We were ready to agree to a gradual 
pullback of forces as part of a condition-based strategy; as 
those goals for which we are fighting would be achieved, such 
as standup of Iraqi forces and/or a drop in levels of 
violence, we could carry such a strategy out. 
 
4. (C) Qazi kept coming back to the "timetable" idea 
(COMMENT: In fairness, it is much loved by Sunni Arabs of all 
stripes. Kurds hate the idea, and the Shia are torn between 
their minds--keep the Coalition here, and their hearts--out 
with the foreigners.  END COMMENT)  He asked if there were 
some way to "meld" both a timetable and a set of conditions. 
Charge pointed out that this would only be a disguised 
timetable, that all including American citizens would see 
through immediately. 
 
5. (C) COMMENT: There is no telling what Qazi will discuss 
with the Sunni Arabs, but he is well disposed towards us and 
goes into any Middle Eastern negotiation or debate with his 
eyes wide open.  He is feeling some heat from New York, as he 
complained in particular of the strong ties that senior UN 
officials Brahimi and Benomar still maintain with Iraqi 
figures.  END COMMENT 
Jeffrey