US embassy cable - 05CARACAS1805

C O N F I D E N T I A L  CARACAS 001805 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NSC FOR C. BARTON 
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, KDEM, VE 
SUBJECT: VENEZUELA'S SUMATE AFTER THE WHITE HOUSE 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Abelardo A. Arias for reason 1.4 (d) 
. 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C) Venezuelan pro-democracy NGO Sumate has been 
strengthened by the meeting between President Bush and 
Sumate's Maria Corina Machado May 31.  The meeting riled 
supporters of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and gave his 
opponents a much-needed moral boost.  For the latter, in 
fact, the meeting practically defibrillated them into renewed 
action. GoV officials and other Chavez supporters resorted to 
personal, sometimes sexist, attacks against the NGO leader, 
also repeating that she is under indictment for receiving USG 
money and being investigated in connection with the April 
2002 "coup."  Although it would be risky, the GoV will likely 
invigorate the pending criminal cases against Machado and 
other Sumate representatives, or perhaps move against other 
opponents as a reminder that the GoV still maintains the 
judicial sword over their heads.  Sumate is well positioned 
to ride this surge of favorable publicity on its own. Our 
position should be somewhat distant, but not neglectful.  We 
should expedite the assistance Sumate has requested such as 
funding for the review of Venezuela's electoral registry. 
With two electoral contests scheduled before the end of the 
year, a  timely response can readily complement the 
confidence Sumate volunteers are enjoying after the May 31 
boost.  End Summary. 
 
 
2.  (C) President Bush's May 31 White House meeting with 
Maria Corina Machado, leader of Venezuelan pro-democracy NGO 
Sumate, catalyzed Venezuela's political scene.  Prior to the 
meeting, opponents of President Hugo Chavez had largely grown 
resigned to several more years of his government.  Their 
resignation, in fact, almost bordered on helplessness in 
light of Chavez's apparent control of all branches of 
government.  Divisions over whether to participate in the 
elections, given the evident partisan control of the National 
Electoral Council (CNE), contributed further to the 
opposition quagmire. On the government side, Chavez was 
attempting to explain away the allegations of corruption and 
mismanagement in state oil company PDVSA, while the Supreme 
Court President's lament over the revocation of his U.S. 
raised questions about just how committed the Bolivarian 
leadership is to revolution.  Unresolved squabbling between 
Chavez's Fifth Republic Movement and allied parties over 
candidacies also nagged at the President's leadership. 
 
3.  (C) Nearly two weeks after the fact, President Chavez 
himself has not responded publicly to the May 31 meeting. 
Rumors abound that he was furious.  His supporters, however, 
quickly came out publicly, with tirades from MVR deputies 
Iris Varela and Cilia Flores.  Sexist comments from various 
GoV officials were part of the fare.  The Chavez camp also 
repeated that Machado is under indictment for receiving USG 
money and being investigated in connection with the April 
2002 "coup."  In an unexpected June 2 press conference 
regarding preparations for the August parochial elections CNE 
President Jorge Rodriguez took shots at Sumate, practically 
using the same script he used to criticize the NGO during the 
run-up to the August 2004 referendum.  Rodriguez questioned 
Sumate's status as a civil association, repeatedly referring 
to it as a business and a franchise. 
 
4.  (C) Opponents of President Chavez greeted the May 31 
meeting with high fives for poking Chavez in the eye, and 
momentarily put aside differences, reveling in having one of 
their own being received at such a high level.  Machado told 
the Ambassador June 13 that the meeting had had a "profoundly 
positive" effect.  She noted that the U.S. recognition 
immediately sparked greater interest in Sumate among other 
diplomatic missions in Caracas.  While the May 31 meeting may 
have been a cold splash of water for Chavez, one analyst told 
PolCouns June 8, it was a warm, soothing bath for Chavez 
opponents.  The meeting, in the opinion of the analyst, 
helped validate an important institution at a crucial time as 
the conditions for elections are debated. Sumate's new 
prominence thus broadened the opposition debate over 
elections, from whether or not to participate, but to the 
perhaps more productive discussion over what conditions are 
necessary for free and fair elections. 
 
5.  (C) While the meeting has been hailed by committed Chavez 
 
opponents, its effect on "regular" Venezuelans is not yet 
clear.  If one result is helping opposition sympathizers 
overcome the fear of GoV intimidation, the meeting may boost 
the stock of Sumate volunteers.  The intimidation effect has 
been noted by Machado in conversations with the Ambassador 
and Emboffs as a factor inhibiting Sumate's efforts.  In a 
conversation with PolCouns, a banker whose operations are 
centered in Caracas' poor and lower middle class sectors was 
not sanguine about the meeting being universally well 
received.  He noted, for example, that the government would 
no doubt proceed to reinforce the message that it has been 
pushing all along: Sumate is an organization in the hands of 
the United States. 
 
6.  (C) Four of Sumate's leaders, including Machado still 
face charges for having received NED funding.  Machado and 
Alejandro Plaz returned to Caracas in time for a court date 
scheduled for June 10 and postponed the day before.  Although 
it would be risky, the GoV will likely invigorate the pending 
criminal cases against Machado and other Sumate 
representatives.  We cannot discount the possibility of 
incarceration, but we do not have indications that the 
government is leaning in that direction.  It is also possible 
that the government might choose to move against other 
opponents, given the NGO's "new" profile, as a reminder that 
the GoV still maintains the judicial sword over their heads. 
 
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COMMENT 
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7.  (C) Machado and her cohorts have demonstrated remarkable 
acumen in developing their organization and carrying it 
through some difficult periods.  We have little doubt that 
they will continue to function effectively at the new level 
to which the May 31 meeting has brought them.  On balance, in 
our judgment, the attention the White House meeting brought 
Sumate has been exceptional.  It is important now to let the 
organization ride this surge largely on its own.  A 
continuing, too evident, public identification with the U.S. 
could now be counterproductive.  At the same time, however, 
we need to ensure that Sumate has the resources it needs to 
exploit this new vantage point it enjoys.  There are a number 
of proposals, including for example one to review Venezuela's 
electoral registry,  that the NGO has submitted for USG 
funding.  The President has directed that $3 million in FY 
2005 ESF be made available for Venezuela.  Timely programming 
of these funds can help us continue to catalyze Sumate's 
efforts. 
 
8.  (C) On another front, if the GoV bores in on Sumate 
again, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) may have to 
engage as it did in 2004.  We believe it would be appropriate 
under such circumstances for the NED then to make a public 
statement and have members of its board visit Venezuela, or 
at least to offer a visit.  In pursuing this, NED reluctance 
may be encountered.  Machado, for example, attributed 
Sumate's recent failure to obtain new NED funding in part to 
a colder NED perspective and internal board politics. 
Additional support for Sumate could also come in the form of 
a  Congressional resolution such as the one contemplated by 
some members of the House of Representatives last year. 
Sumate believes that the visit of several recent codels to 
Venezuela have created some stronger support in the U.S. 
Congress. 
Brownfield 
 
 
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      2005CARACA01805 - CONFIDENTIAL