US embassy cable - 05NDJAMENA933

C O N F I D E N T I A L  NDJAMENA 000933 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
ABUJA PASS TO YATES, ELMORE; DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, 
AF/SPG, D, DRL, H, INR, INR/GGI, PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W 
FOR DAFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA 
FOR CAMPBELL, ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREF, KAWC, CD, SU, Darfur Policy and Rebels 
SUBJECT: CHADIAN MEDIATION TEAM VIEWS ON ABUJA TALKS 
 
REF: A. WALL-SNYDER TELEPHONE CALL OF MAY 30 
     B. 2005 
 
Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Kathleen FitzGibbon for reaso 
ns 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary: Chad's non-attendance for the opening days 
of the peace talks in Abuja stems from the mediation team's 
misgivings over the preparedness of the rebel movement 
delegations to negotiate and suspicions of Libyan maneuvering 
to close a deal outside the Abuja process.  Ambassador Wall 
and P/E officer met with General Mahamat Ali Abdullah on June 
13 and 14 to urge Chad's participation in the current round 
of talks.  The Ambassador emphasized the importance of all 
the players working within the Abuja peace process.  Ali and 
Deby's Special Advisor for International Relations Ahmad 
Allam-mi will likely arrive in Abuja on June 15.  In other 
news, the SLM's field commanders are planning a meeting on 
June 25 in Darfur to discuss a number of issues, including 
leadership and command and control.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C)  On June 13, P/E officer met with General Mahamat Ali 
Abdullah, the Chairman of the Joint Commission on the 
N'Djamena Humanitarian Cease-fire and the leader of Chad's 
Mediation Team, to discuss Chad's non-participation in the 
current round of talks in Abuja.  Ali had spent the weekend 
making funeral arrangements for a relative and said that he 
would likely travel to Abuja on June 15.  Ali expressed his 
concern about the lack of U.S. participation in the 
verification commission effort.  He said that this led 
European partners to balk at participating.  P/E officer 
explained our understanding (ref) that at the time of the 
mission, the U.S. lacked qualified personnel to join the team 
and preferred to wait until an assessment team arrives this 
summer to identify a U.S. representative. 
 
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CHADIAN VIEWS ON PROGRESS 
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3.  (C)  Chad believes that the rebel movements internal 
problems will scuttle any document signed at this time, 
according to Ali.  He is particularly concerned that the bulk 
of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) could disavow 
Khalil Ibrahim's faction.  Ali believes that Khalil is now 
cooperating with the Government of Sudan because he lacks a 
presence on the ground.  He suspects that Khalil's faction 
fears it has lost its legitimacy and decided to cut a deal in 
exchange for representation in the government.  The Sudan 
Liberation Movement's (SLM) problems are more important, in 
Chad's view.  SLM must be pushed to overcome its internal 
divisions, according to Ali, because it is clearly more 
numerous on the ground than JEM.  He noted that there are 
other players in the SLM now, some of whom do not support 
either Abdelwahid or Mini. 
 
4.  (C) Ali outlined Chad's perspective on a reasonable 
timeline for the peace process.  First, the SLM holds its 
conference to sort out its leadership problems and names a 
negotiating team.  The JEM also must hold a reconciliation 
meeting to deal with its division between Khalil and Mohammed 
Saleh.  Second, the verification of positions on the ground 
is the logical next step.  This will also confirm that the 
actual leaders of the movements are also represented on the 
ground.  Third, the plan for the separation of forces is 
designed and the cease-fire begins to take effect.  Fourth, 
the international community provides the African Union enough 
logistical assistance to prevent the rebel movements from 
coming under attack in their zones.  Fifth, there is a need 
to begin laying the groundwork for inter-communal 
reconciliation.  The international community could help by 
facilitating contact between the rebel movements, local 
communities and traditional leaders, and government 
authorities on the ground.  These steps will help consolidate 
the cease-fire and create the necessary conditions for 
durable negotiations. 
 
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DOUBTS ABOUT LIBYAN AND ERITREAN AGENDAS 
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5.  (C)  Ali stated that Libya wants the parties to sign a 
 
declaration of principles so that it can push them to sign a 
peace agreement at the African Union summit in Tripoli. 
Libya's agenda is it to take the negotiations out of the 
hands of the African Union.  The Libyans have given the rebel 
movements access to aircraft, hotels, and money.  Libya also 
facilitated Dr. Khalil Ibrahim's "deal" with the Government 
of Sudan, according to Ali 
 
6.  (C) Ali confirmed the rumors of a confrontation between 
the Presidents of Chad and Eritrea in Tripoli.  President 
Deby apparently had a heated debate with Eritrean President 
Isais in which Eritrea accused Chad of not being a neutral 
mediator and Deby accused Eritrea of funding and re-arming 
JEM's Dr. Khalil Ibrahim.  Deby and the Chadian mediators 
apparently believe that Eritrea is giving weapons to Khalil 
to rebuild his presence on the ground in Darfur to legitimize 
him as JEM's representative in negotiations. 
 
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FAST, DURABLE PEACE 
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7.  (C) On June 14, Ambassador Wall met with Ali to urge 
Chad's participation in Abuja.  Ali stated that both Chad and 
the United States are paying a lot for the crisis in Darfur 
in humanitarian and security assistance.  He described his 
visits to several internally-displaced persons camps in Sudan 
and said that the IDP's are clearly suffering worse than the 
refugees in Chad.  He urged the United States to keep 
pressure on the Government of Sudan to seek a peaceful 
resolution.  He also noted that need for inter-communal 
reconciliation. 
 
8.  (C) He then outlined Chad's concerns about the rebel 
movement's deep internal problems, particularly Libyan 
manipulation of Khalil, Mini Minawi, and Abdelwahid.  The 
Libyans and others want a fast peace, but the path they are 
on may produce an agreement but not a lasting peace.  He said 
that Chad wants a fast, but durable peace.  He also 
reiterated Chad's problems with the African Union's mediation 
efforts and its unfamiliarity with the rebel movements.  The 
AU and others work only with the heads of the movements, but 
not the entire body, according to Ali.  This has contributed 
to a lack of understanding of the profound nature of the 
movements' divisions.  Nonetheless, Ali said Chad hopes that 
Salim Salim's involvement gives the process direction. 
 
9.  (C)  Ambassador Wall emphasized that the African 
Union-led talks is the only credible venue for mitigating the 
competing interests of all of the players.  Chad need to 
remain committed to the AU process.  Chad can express its 
opinion on the situation at the negotiations and remain part 
of the equation.  However, Chad's arguments cannot be heard 
from N'Djamena.  Ali agreed and said that he will likely 
travel to Abuja on June 15. 
 
10.  (C) Ifeanyi Nwosu, Political Counselor, Nigerian Embassy 
in N'Djamena, told P/E officer on June 13, that President 
Olusegun Obasanjo has asked Deby to come to Abuja for this 
round of talks.  Nwosu stated that Nigeria sees Chad as the 
country in the region bearing the brunt of the Darfur crisis. 
 Therefore, Obasanjo wants Chad to be represented.  Nigeria 
also is concerned about Libyan meddling and desire to move 
the negotiations to Tripoli. 
 
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SLM FIELD COMMANDERS TO MEET JUNE 25 
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11.  (C) Another development that may or may not affect the 
current round of talks is the organization by SLM field 
commanders of a meeting among themselves in Darfur beginning 
on June 25.  According to a non-governmental organization, 
the SLM field commanders act relatively independently of 
either Mini or Abdelwahid.  They are capable actors who have 
independent means of securing resources.  In interviews with 
23 of SLM's commanders (out of 50 or 60), the NGO stated that 
the field commanders are tired of both Mini and Abdelwahid. 
Mini has very little support on the ground, despite his 
arguments to the contrary, according to the commanders in 
North and West Darfur.  The field commanders do not expect 
either Abdelwahid or Mini to show up.  The meeting will 
 
discuss better internal communication, cease-fire violations, 
and accountability mechanisms. 
 
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COMMENT 
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12.  (C) Chad's representatives are not expecting much in 
Abuja.  They argue for pushing harder to lay the groundwork 
with the SLM, JEM, and their forces in the field before 
attempting negotiations on a political settlement.  Having 
delayed their arrival in Abuja, Chad appears now to believe 
that it has made its point.  We expect Ali and Allam-mi to 
depart N'Djamena early morning on June 15. 
 
13.  (U) Khartoum and Tripoli Minimize Considered. 
WALL 
 
 
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