US embassy cable - 05ANKARA3387

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003387 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2015 
TAGS: PREL, EPET, ENRG, ECON, TU, UP 
SUBJECT: UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT YUSHCHENKO VISITS TURKEY 
 
(U) Classified by Political Counselor John Kunstadter; 
reasons: E.O. 12958 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  President Yushchenko's June 6-8 visit to 
Turkey, his first since becoming President, focused mainly on 
commercial issues.  The two sides signed six agreements, 
including on energy, transport, and combating crime. 
Although Turkey claims to support Ukraine's EU and NATO 
aspirations, the GOT -- consistent with its Moscow-centric 
policies -- did not pursue the subjects of democratization, 
open markets and military assistance during the visit.  End 
Summary. 
 
2.  (U) Yushchenko met in Ankara with PM Erdogan, President 
Sezer, and Turkish parliament Speaker Arinc.  Turkish Foreign 
Trade Minister Tuzmen presided over a meeting of the 
bilateral joint economic council in Ankara, and Yushchenko 
met in Istanbul with Turkish business representatives and the 
Ecumenical Patriarch.  MFA Energy Department Tug 
characterized the Ukrainian approach as one of presenting a 
long list of "off-the-shelf" ideas and projects.  The Turkish 
side committed to general cooperation on energy, including 
natural gas, but, contrary to media reports, she asserted 
that the two sides did not agree to any specific project, 
such as transshipping Iranian gas through Turkey to Ukraine. 
 
Six Agreements Signed 
--------------------- 
 
3.  (U) During the visit, the two sides signed agreements on 
energy, nuclear energy, railroads, scientific cooperation, 
combating crime, and readmission of persons.  According to 
media reports, the energy agreement covered petroleum, gas 
and electricity.  MFA energy expert Tug described the energy 
agreement as a general framework covering operation and 
construction of power plants and energy networks, and 
exchange of energy expertise.  The nuclear agreement covered 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but no specific project. 
 
4.  (U) According to media reports, the two sides reportedly 
agreed to discuss cooperation in transporting Iranian natural 
gas to Europe.  On the Odessa-Brody pipeline, Akinci said the 
Turks thanked Yushchenko for the Ukrainian decision to 
re-reverse the route away from the Black Sea, restoring the 
original plan for the pipeline to transport oil from the 
Black Sea to Poland.  The Turks welcomed this decision as 
helping to keep down tanker traffic through the Bosphorus. 
 
Democratization Not Discussed 
----------------------------- 
 
5.  (U) During his May 2005 visit to Ukraine, PM Gul promised 
Turkish support for Ukraine's democratization process and 
attempts to build a more open economy.  However, starting 
with the 2004 election campaign in Ukraine, Turkey's support 
has been a day late and a dollar short, remaining purely 
verbal, according to two of the handful of Turkish analysts 
who follow Ukraine. 
 
6. (U) In a June 10 briefing for diplomats. Turkish MFA 
Eastern Europe Department Head Solendil claimed that Turkey 
is committed to Ukraine's democratization, free market 
orientation, and integration with Western institutions. 
Yushchenko welcomed what he termed Turkey's support for 
Ukraine's democratization in November-December 2004 and 
European aspirations during his June 7 remarks at a meeting 
sponsored by the paranoid nationalist think tank ASAM. 
However, obviously weary he spoke without conviction in 
slurred Ukrainian (by contrast, his interpreter's Ukrainian 
was as clear and melodious as a bell).  He also tried to 
balance his pro-democracy and Western-oriented remarks by 
stating that Ukraine values its relations with Russia, a 
point which the Russian political counselor later told us was 
greeted with great pleasure by his embassy. 
 
7. (U) Turkey and Ukraine have a "joint action plan" for 
bilateral relations.  However, because it was signed in 2004 
before the Orange Revolution, the plan includes no items 
related to democratization, according to MFA Europe DG 
Akinci, who briefed together with Solendil.  Akinci 
dismissively glossed over our question about Turkey's support 
for democratization by stating that the subject of Ukrainian 
democratization did not come up in any of Yushchenko's 
meetings:  "The Ukrainians did everything themselves.  They 
did not need our help."  Akinci added condescendingly that 
since both countries are trying to become EU members, Turkey 
stands ready to share its EU experience with Ukraine. 
Democratization in other areas, including the Caucasus, Iran 
and Iraq was not discussed because "we concentrated on 
bilateral issues." 
 
8.  (U) Likewise, the two sides did not discuss any concrete 
cooperation to help Ukraine's NATO membership aspirations. 
Akinci asserted that Turkey "definitely" would support 
Ukraine if it asked for help.  BLACKSEAFOR also was not 
discussed, according to Akinci, because it is "too detailed" 
to be discussed at that level. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
9. (C) The absence of any discussion of democracy or 
integration with the West with the President of 
newly-democratizing Ukraine is striking.  It reflects a 
Turkish foreign policy still unused to and uncomfortable with 
democratic change in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and 
Central Asia, and focused on strengthening political as well 
as economic relations with Moscow while concentrating only on 
seeking economic benefits from countries it sees as lying in 
a Russian sphere of influence.  The MFA briefing once again 
underscored what we have experienced time and again when 
engaging Turkish interlocutors in Akinci's bailiwick on ways 
to support the Euro-Atlantic avocation of Eastern Europe and 
the Caucasus.  Akinci, who is reportedly slated to be 
appointed Turkish ambassador in Kyiv, has consistently 
emerged in our discussions as a Moscow-centric devotee of 
what a pre-eminent American analyst of the region calls 
"stabilnost' uber Alles".  End Comment. 
EDELMAN