US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD2505

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MODIFICATIONS BUT NO BREAKTHROUGH ON SUNNI ARAB CONSTITUTIONAL INCLUSION

Identifier: 05BAGHDAD2505
Wikileaks: View 05BAGHDAD2505 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Baghdad
Created: 2005-06-14 11:28:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL KDEM KISL IZ Sunni Arab National Assembly
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002505 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KDEM, KISL, IZ, Sunni Arab, National Assembly 
SUBJECT: MODIFICATIONS BUT NO BREAKTHROUGH ON SUNNI ARAB 
CONSTITUTIONAL INCLUSION 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires James F. Jeffrey for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: June 13 was another day of negotiations on 
Sunni Arab inclusion on the Constitution Committee. 
Negotiators modified their positions, but did not resolve 
their disagreements.  Deputy Constitution Committee Chairman 
Adnan al-Janabi told the Charge that he felt "plus 15" (i.e., 
total of 17 Sunni Arabs) was a reasonable number of additions 
but complained that irresponsible statements from President 
Talabani and the Sunni Waqf had driven the number up.  He 
requested that Talabani retract his support for 25. We spoke 
to Talabni's chief of staff who pointed to his statement to 
the media on June 12 as having clarified that Talabani was 
not committed to any particular number.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) leader Muhsin Abd al-Hamid 
reduced his demand to 20 representatives in a separate June 
13 meeting with Charge.  He said that he feared that going 
any lower would open his party to charges that the IIP was 
selling out Sunni Arab interests.  Abd al Hamid agreed to 
discuss the issue with his colleagues.  Charge emphasized, 
and Hamid agreed, that a quick resolution of the issue would 
speed the path to Iraq's next elections.  End Summary. 
 
----------------------------- 
JANABI SAYS HE'S "DEADLOCKED" 
----------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Adnan al-Janabi said that felt "deadlocked" between 
hardline stances by the Shia leadership and his own Sunni 
Arab colleagues.  Shia leaders who publicly called for adding 
only 11 Sunni Arabs to the committee provoked Sunni Arabs for 
no reason he said.  That led leaders like Adnan Dulaymi to 
announce an unrealistic goal of some 25 additional members, 
he said.  Meanwhile, President Talabani's public statement 
June 8 indicating support for 25 additional Sunni Arabs only 
hardened their position.  Janabi warned that continued delays 
on the issue had brought the matter near a "crisis" point and 
Sunni Arab leaders were considering publicizing their 
grievances and withdrawing from the process. 
 
4. (C) Janabi said he considered 15 additional Sunni Arabs to 
be a reasonable number but would need help pressuring the 
Sunni Waqf and Iraqi Islamic Party.  He also asked the USG to 
weigh in with Talabani and ask him to retract or moderate his 
support for 25 additional Sunni Arabs, a stance that was 
complicating negotiations.  He claimed that he saw the 
possibility that Talibani would push all sides to add 16 
Sunni Arabs, for 18 total.  In any event, Janabi urged the 
USG to consider statements that would help Sunni Arabs agree 
"without losing face."  He specifically mentioned the idea of 
emphasizing the principle of consensus and allowing 
additional Sunni Arabs join the process as non-voting 
consultants and experts. 
 
------------------------------------- 
TALABANI WITHDRAWS HIS SUPPORT FOR 25 
------------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) After the Janabi meeting, we contacted Presidential 
Chief of Staff Kameran Qaradaghi who pointed out that his 
June 12 public statement had distanced the president from the 
demand for 25.  Qaradaghi said that Talibani's previous 
statement was "misunderstood."  He added that Talibani was 
most concerned that all members of the Committee be equal and 
was not in a position to set numbers. 
 
------------------------------- 
IRAQI ISLAMIC PARTY DROPS TO 20 
------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) Iraqi Islamic Party leader Muhsin Abd al-Hamid stuck 
hard to 25 representatives in a separate June 13 meeting with 
Charge but had dropped to 20 by the end of the meeting.  IIP 
Secretary General Tariq al Hashemi acknowledged that Talabani 
 
SIPDIS 
had changed his position.  Abd al Hamid claimed that if he 
went any lower, competing Sunni groups would attack him for 
selling out their community's rights.  He claimed that even 
the call for 25 representatives was less than the Sunni Arabs 
deserved.  He made the familiar specious argument that the 42 
percent of Iraqis who did not vote in January were all Sunni 
Arabs, meaning that their community should have 
representation of that proportion on the Constitution 
Committee. 
 
7. (C) Abd al Hamid said that he strongly supported meeting 
the August 15 deadline and believed that new elections were 
the surest path to improving Sunni Arab participation in 
politics.  He warned that Shia politicians would try to miss 
the deadline so as to extend their own time in power.  Hamid 
said his party had only nominated legal experts to the 
Constitutional Committee, consenting to add one political 
representative, Ayad al-Samarai, only at the insistence of 
the Shia leadership. 
 
8. (C) COMMENT: We now have heavy Sunni hitters like TNA 
Speaker Hasani and Janabi both pushing for an additional 15 
Sunni Arabs, and the gap between them and the Iraqi Islamic 
Party crowd has narrowed to five.  All parties are discussing 
this relentlessly and we will keep communications ongoing. 
What is behind all of this of course are decades of 
misunderstanding and distrust, horrific Ba'athist rule, and a 
perceived need by all parties to score points in a 
particularly rigid zero sum game.  Thus even when we resolve 
the numbers dispute, the names themselves may be another 
issue.  We will continue to urge The Iraqi Islamic Party and 
National Dialogue Council to improve their communications to 
resolve the numbers argument.   We anticipate further 
developments over the next two days as the TNA convenes and 
the Constitution Committee meets.  END COMMENT 
 
9. (U) REO HILLA, REO BASRA, REO MOSUL, and REO KIRKUK, 
minimize considered. 
Jeffrey 

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