US embassy cable - 02AMMAN4379

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USINT BAGHDAD CHIEF BERNACKI GETS OUT OF TOWN, FINALLY

Identifier: 02AMMAN4379
Wikileaks: View 02AMMAN4379 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Amman
Created: 2002-08-06 15:17:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL IZ JO
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 004379 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/07/2012 
TAGS: PREL, IZ, JO 
SUBJECT: USINT BAGHDAD CHIEF BERNACKI GETS OUT OF TOWN, 
FINALLY 
 
REF: WARSAW 2654 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Edward Gnehm.  Reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
 1. (C) PolCouns and Poloff met August 6 with Krzysztof 
Bernacki, Chief of USINT Baghdad, as he transited Amman for 
home leave in Poland.  Bernacki, who had not been able to 
depart Baghdad for four months, was visibly relieved to be 
out of Iraq.  He departed the Iraqi capital August 4, one day 
after the arrival of a USINT consular officer who will be the 
sole staff of the interest section for the remainder of 
August (other USINT personnel -- including Bernacki -- will 
return to Baghdad at the beginning of September). 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
The Mood on the Street; Speculation Among Diplomats 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
2. (C) Bernacki reported the mood in Baghdad as increasingly 
tense, with an expectation that "something is going to 
happen."  The exchange rate for Iraqi dinars against the 
dollar (a bellwether of tension) has steadily eroded in 
recent weeks and is now back to levels of early May, before a 
20 percent jump.  Bernacki noted that while "no one knows" 
how large the opposition is within the country, the consensus 
among Baghdad-based diplomats is that most Iraqis would 
support a U.S.-led invasion, the regular army would not 
resist, and fighting would be centered solely on the 
Republican Guard and other units fiercely loyal to Saddam. 
However, "no one except diplomats is asking 'what comes 
next'," he stated.  The sense he perceives is that "Iraqis 
are tired and are waiting for change." 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
Full RJ Flights Out Of Baghdad, But Not So Regular As Before 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
3. (C) Bernacki said that Royal Jordanian (RJ) Airlines' 
flights out of Baghdad continue to be full, including the 
flight he put his family on in early July.  That said, the 
airline has taken some steps to dampen the view that it is 
providing a regularly scheduled, commercial service.  The 
number of flights per week has decreased, RJ will not confirm 
a flight until the day before or the day of departure, and 
significant delays have become routine in recent weeks. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
GRL List Notwithstanding, Pentium 4's Available Everywhere 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
4. (C) Bernacki also passed on that even with the 
implementation of the GRL, holes in the net are clearly 
visible.  As an example, he noted that Pentium 4 computers -- 
prohibited under the GRL -- are readily available from 
numerous computer stores in Baghdad, and at prices that are 
much more competitive than in Amman. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
They Will Only Act If Faced With An Ultimatum 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Turning to the international community's overall 
policy toward Iraq, Bernacki offered that the recent drama 
involving his own inability to depart Iraq by land is 
instructive in understanding the broader Iraqi way of viewing 
the world.  The GOI was completely intransigent and 
unresponsive regarding Bernacki's travel by land for weeks on 
end.  The situation only resolved itself after the U.S. 
presented an ultimatum to the GOI -- threatening to close 
USINT and, correspondingly, the Iraqi Mission in Washington 
on a certain day if Iraq's land travel ban was not rescinded. 
 The clarity of this imminent action, he emphasized, was the 
only thing that forced the GOI's hand. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
But Even Then, Yes Does Not Always Mean Yes 
------------------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) Bernacki cautioned, however, that even if you think 
you have agreement from the Iraqis, you often do not.  The 
international community should keep this in mind and remain 
very wary of "Iraqi games" regarding the return of weapons 
inspectors. "Test them and judge them by the results," he 
said, "they will never deliver on their promises."  Recent 
GOI promises to allow him to travel up to 40 km from the 
center of Baghdad proved to be empty (ref). When he sought to 
test this Iraqi offer last week (and had conveyed to  the 
Iraqi authorities the full information on his prospective 
journey -- including time, road to be used, license plate and 
car make), he was turned back at a checkpoint 24 km from the 
city -- the same place he has been barred from crossing 
before.  Using this specific instance to again more generally 
depict official Iraqi behavior, Bernacki noted "you have to 
understand, in Iraq yes does not always mean yes." 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
Concern For His Family's Safety and That He Not Be Forgotten 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
7. (C) As the meeting drew to a close, Bernacki expressed 
concern -- given public speculation of impending U.S. 
military action -- that perhaps his family should not return 
to Baghdad with him in September.  He also made clear that he 
would like more regular communication from Washington and 
from Embassy Amman, both to check on his situation, and to 
task him with projects that could be of assistance to the 
U.S.  We promised to pass on his concerns to the Department 
and would seek to keep in more regular contact with him in 
the months ahead. 
Gnehm 

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