US embassy cable - 05BOGOTA5619

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 005619 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2020 
TAGS: PGOV, KJUS, PHUM, CO, AUC 
SUBJECT: OBSERVATIONS REGARDING PARAMILITARY INFLUENCE OVER 
CONGRESS 
 
REF: BOGOTA 4467 
 
Classified By: Charge Milton K. Drucker, Reasons: 1.4 B & D. 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  During the week of June 6, the press 
focused on the long-standing rumor that 30-35 percent of 
Congress is beholden to the paramilitaries.  Our best and, in 
our estimation, "cleanest" Congressional interlocutors 
believe that figure is roughly on the mark.  Overt support 
for the AUC is expressed by only a handful of members of 
Congress (MOCs).  However, a larger number take the line that 
the AUC played a major role in filling the public security 
void left by the GOC for nearly two decades.  Larger still is 
the group of MOCs from AUC-dominated areas motivated by fear 
and intimidation.  While there is widespread support in the 
Congress for the bilateral extradition relationship, some 
members continue to believe that a genuine peace process with 
the AUC cannot be attained without the GOC (and, clearly, the 
USG) ceding some ground on extradition.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (U) Vicente Castano, brother of the disappeared Carlos 
Castano, rekindled national debate the week of June 6 by 
stating in a press interview that the AUC controlled roughly 
35 percent of the Colombian Congress.  Fellow AUC member 
Salvatorre Mancuso had started a similar rumor in late 2002. 
President Uribe immediately challenged Castano's assertion, 
and called on the AUC to reveal names and the Prosecutor 
General (Fiscal) to charge the implicated. 
 
3.  (C) The issue is complicated and nuanced and it is 
difficult to provide a numerical breakdown.  We estimate the 
House to be more problematic than the Senate.  Overall, three 
general "categories" of MOCs can be identified and described. 
 A first group is a handful of MOCs who openly and repeatedly 
support the AUC, and are willing to expose themselves on the 
floor of either house of Congress and in the media.  The most 
prominent of this group are Senator Carlos Moreno de Caro and 
Representatives Rocio Arias Hoyos and Eleonora Pineda Arcia. 
They greeted and escorted AUC leaders when they addressed the 
Congress in July 2004.  They are believed to receive funding 
from the AUC and reportedly meet with AUC members often. 
 
4.  (C) A second group is larger, and can be described as 
those sympathetic to the AUC on the grounds that the 
paramilitaries "did a service to the nation" by battling the 
FARC and/or ELN in the absence of GOC public security forces. 
 Emboffs have been repeatedly fed such a line by numerous 
MOCs.  Often the comments are along the lines of "you gringos 
don't understand - the AUC will never fully dismantle and 
respect the peace process unless extradition is negotiated in 
its favor."  While we have detected widespread support for 
the bilateral extradition relationship in the Congress as it 
applies to obvious drug traffickers, the issue is more 
divisive when applied to paramilitaries (who in general also 
traffic in illicit narcotics). 
 
5.  (C) A final group, probably the largest of the three, 
includes MOCs from AUC-dominated areas in which fear and 
intimidation are motivating factors.  MOCs from the 
departments of Antioquia, Cordoba, Sucre, Magdalena, Bolivar, 
and La Guajira are found in this group.  Even prominent MOCs 
from Bogota, like Reps. Armando Benedetti, Gina Parody, and 
Telesforo Pedraza -- all outspoken on the Justice and Peace 
bill and GOC dealings with the AUC -- have told us privately 
that it is fairly easy for them to speak out against the AUC 
from the relative safety of Bogota.  It is not the same, they 
continue, for MOCs from AUC-controlled areas, where the level 
of intimidation and permeation of department and municipal 
entities is considerable.  There are indications, for 
example, the AUC had a role in the March 2005 assassination 
of a member of the House from Caldas Department, and AUC 
leader "Don Berna" is accused of having a local legislator 
killed in Cordoba Department weeks ago. 
 
6.  (C)  A near-term area of concern is upcoming elections 
for Congress in March 2006.  Many incumbent MOCs believe 
their reelection in the March 2006 elections depends on how 
much patronage and/or benefits they obtained for districts or 
persons that support them or financial backing from a major 
benefactor.  The GOC under Uribe has fought against providing 
such benefits or patronage in many cases, and strongly 
resists supporting MOCs on both grounds.  Uribe's refusal to 
supply benefits to MOCs who have supported him leaves them 
vulnerable to competitors with better funded political 
campaigns.  Given the AUC's ability to fund campaigns or 
encourage others to do so, AUC support may be important for 
many MOCs. 
 
7.  (C) The Uribe Administration's failure to do more to 
support friendly MOCs may now be painful.  The implications 
for Congressional action on legislation are obvious and 
cannot be ignored as Uribe considers how to get support for 
bills he desires.  And since legislators are now elected from 
well-defined constituencies (see reftel), the need for 
campaign funding is relatively large and the sources diffuse. 
 "AUC legislators" with good funding may come out of the 
March 2006 elections even stronger. 
DRUCKER