US embassy cable - 05PARIS4141

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 004141 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, FR, EUN 
SUBJECT: POLICY PLANNING CHIEF LEVY ON WHY AND WHAT NEXT OF 
EU CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY DEFEAT IN FRANCE 
 
REF: PARIS 4119 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah B. Rosenblatt for re 
asons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: In a June 10 discussion with visiting acting 
NIC Chairman David Gordon and NIO for Europe Ambassador 
Richard Kauzlarich, Pierre Levy, the head of the MFA's policy 
planning staff, offered his assessment of the reasons for and 
implications of France's "no" vote on the EU constitutional 
treaty on May 29.  Emphasizing that he was still in the 
process of analysing the situation, Levy nevertheless 
presented a thoughtful, balanced picture of where he sees 
France now.  Levy noted that in the realm of public opinion, 
there had always been the radicals or fringe who would have 
said no.  The new category, he said, was the category of 
people who voted "no" for/for Europe.  Levy said the biggest 
issue for French leaders in the European arena now was to 
assess whether this was a crisis of maturity -- a growing 
pain in the Union's development -- or a deeper crisis of the 
European model itself.  Levy characterized the June 16-17 
European Council, as "crucial."  He also echoed Chirac's 
calls to continue the treaty ratification process, saying, 
"We need a global picture of the problem."  He acknowledged, 
however, that doing so risked another round of "no"s that 
could spiral Europe deeper into crisis.  END SUMMARY 
 
2.  (C)  Nearly two weeks having passed since the French said 
no to the EU constitutional treaty, Levy told his guests that 
he wanted to talk about the referendum -- first, he said, how 
to understand what happened, and second, what the French 
should do now.  He said it was not easy to understand the 
"no" votes in France and the Netherlands -- because there 
were a mixture of issues behind people's votes.  Levy noted 
that in the realm of public opinion, there had always been 
the radicals or fringe who would have said no -- he cited 
Charles Pasqua, Jean-Pierre Chevenement, and Philippe de 
Villiers as examples.  The new category, he said, were the 
people who voted "no" for/for Europe.  While some of them are 
not sincere, Levy said, some are. 
 
3.  (C)  Citing Zbigniew Brzezinski's adage that France seeks 
its reincarnation in Europe, and Germany its redemption, Levy 
said that for many years, "Europe" was a "bigger France" but 
that now French people are saying, "We don't recognize Europe 
-- it doesn't look French any more."  Describing this as a 
French "pathology," he noted many French voters were so upset 
Europe did not appear to be French any more that they felt 
the need to express themselves at the ballot box. 
 
4. (C) Levy noted that the EU has reached a certain level of 
maturity -- with the single market, the euro, and the charter 
of fundamental rights -- and that people appeared to be upset 
they had not been consulted along the way, and had 
determined, as he put it, "that it's time to say something." 
 
 
5. (C) Levy said the biggest issue for French leaders in the 
European arena now was to assess whether this was a crisis of 
maturity -- a growing pain in the Union's development -- or a 
deeper crisis of the European model itself, of how Europe 
should be constructed.  Levy characterized the coming days, 
with the GAERC and, especially, the June 16-17 European 
Council, as "crucial," and he restated President Chirac's 
point that it is important to keep the ratification process 
going -- European leaders have to take into account the 10 
states that have already ratified the treaty, he pointed out. 
 "We need a global picture of the problem," he said.  He 
acknowledged, however, that continuing risked another round 
of "no"s that could spiral Europe deeper into crisis. 
 
6.  (C) On the question of enlargement, Levy said that 
European leaders "can't act as if nothing has happened." 
They have to be careful, he said, to show the public that the 
process is "under control."  The decision in March not to let 
Croatia begin its talks as scheduled was important in this 
vein, he said.  Levy said that he did not know whether Turkey 
would be ready to start negotiations in October as planned. 
He also noted that ratification of the Bulgarian and Romanian 
accession treaties will now come before the French parliament 
-- which he found ironic.  Here is a question, he said, that, 
like the constitutional treaty itself, would normally be 
passed handily by the Parliament.  Given the referendum 
results, however, and the message that French voters had 
sent, he was not sure that the French ratification would be 
trouble-free.  In answer to a question from Ambassador 
Kauzlarich about the damaging effect that the possible loss 
of the impetus for reform that derives from a realistic 
aspiration from EU membership, Levy assured: "We're deeply 
committed on the Balkans." 
 
7.  (C) Regarding the upcoming 2007-2013 budget negotiations, 
Levy said that they presented an opportunity for the 
Europeans to assess what they want as their priorities. 
"There is a stupid way and a clever way to look at the budget 
negotiations," he said.  "The stupid way is to look only at 
the numbers, at the euros.  The smart way is to discuss 
content of common policy."  In response to the question of 
whether the crisis and apparent desire of EU public to focus 
on domestic problems would mean a drawdown in funds for EU 
external action, Levy responded that people wanted a Europe 
that was active on the international scene.  The EU's role on 
the world stage would not be diminished.  Levy also asserted 
that the EU has a "real problem of governance" on economic 
issues, which contributes in part, he believes, to the weak 
economic performance in many of the EU's big economies. 
"We've done monetary union but not economic union," he said. 
 
8. (C) COMMENT:  Levy, who served as chief of the MFA's 
Common Foreign and Security Policy unit from 2002 until 
earlier this year and as deputy director of the cabinet of 
then-Minister for Europe Pierre Moscovici from 1997 until 
2002, acknowledged at one point that France's European policy 
planners are at something of a loss to know how to proceed in 
the wake of the referendum defeat. As architects of a policy 
they believed would benefit France and Europe, they are still 
attached to many of the institutional innovations contained 
in the constitution.  The rejection of this very constitution 
by French voters, however, has left them wondering what it is 
the French want from Europe.  Increasingly, they are 
concluding that their countrymen want to protect French jobs 
and social welfare benefits, and to move much more 
deliberately on future enlargements.  END COMMENT. 
WOLFF