US embassy cable - 05PARIS4119

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 004119 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, FR 
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED MEETING WITH FRENCH OPINION LEADERS 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT, FOR REAS 
ONS 1.4 B/D 
 
1. (C) Summary: Assistant Secretary of State for European 
Affairs Daniel Fried met a small group of French opinion 
leaders June 7 to discuss next steps following France's 
rejection of the European constitution.  A/S Fried emphasized 
that, although the U.S. did not have a position on the 
Constitution, it clearly was in favor of a strong Europe and 
therefore, the USG was not happy with the recent results in 
France and the Netherlands.  Among the opinion leaders, some 
believed that certain foreign policy aspects of the 
Constitution - such as a Foreign Minister - could be 
implemented without having to approve the Constitution, while 
others believed this type of piece-meal approach was 
impossible in current circumstances, and that the EU would 
have to focus on saving what had already been implemented, 
such as the euro and the common market.  In general, the 
opinion leaders were pessimistic regarding the opening of 
negotiations with Turkey in the fall, believed that future 
enlargements, to include the Balkan states, would likely be 
delayed, at the very least, and expressed general gloom about 
French (and European) politics in general.  End summary. 
 
2. (C) On June 7, Assistant Secretary Fried met with French 
opinion leaders in Paris, France.  Participants included: 
 
U.S. 
---- 
 
A/S Fried 
Charge Alex Wolff, Embassy Paris 
Kathy Allegrone, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary 
Renee Earle, Minister-Counselor for Public Affairs, Embassy 
Paris 
Peter Kujawinski, Embassy Paris (notetaker) 
 
France 
------ 
 
Thierry de Montbrial, Director, French Institute of 
Interntional Relations 
Nicole Gnesotto, Director, Institute for Security Studies 
Sylvie Goulard, CERI researcher 
Laurent Cohen-Tanugi, Partner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher 
and Flom 
Amaya Bloch-Laine - Director, German Marshall Fund of the 
U.S., Paris office 
 
3. (C) In a lunch with French opinion leaders June 7, 
Assistant Secretary Fried explained that he had decided to 
travel to Europe following the rejection of the EU 
Constitution by French and Dutch voters in order to get a 
sense of what people were thinking and to reassure the 
Europeans that the U.S. wanted a strong Europe as a partner. 
Although the USG did not have a position on the Constitution, 
it clearly was in favor of partnership with a strong Europe. 
President Bush, said A/S Fried, did not like weak 
institutions or governments, and therefore, the USG was not 
happy with the results of the two recent referendums.  Our 
fear, said A/S Fried, was that a weakened EU would turn 
inward and be more reluctant to engage with the U.S. on 
pressing international matters.  In addition, the USG hoped 
that a weakened EU would not search for a scapegoat, with two 
possible candidates being Turkey and the U.S. 
 
4. (C) Nicole Gnesotto, director of the Paris-based Institute 
for Security Studies, said she believed the EU would turn 
inward in reaction to the probable defeat of the 
Constitution.  EU policymakers will want to spend money 
within the EU instead of turning to problems outside the EU 
borders, said Gnesotto.  This is bad news for the U.S., which 
has now (belatedly, in her view) come to see Europe as a 
partner.  Gnesotto believed that the priority for the EU will 
be saving the accomplishments of previous years: the euro, 
the common market, and other social and economic programs. 
Once those are saved, said Gnesotto, EU policymakers can 
again turn to strengthening Europe.  Laurent Cohen-Tanugi, a 
partner at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher and Flom, said he 
believed the French rejection of the referendum was also a 
rejection of past enlargements, the euro and the common 
market.  Therefore, it was of great importance to fight 
against the renationalization of Europe.  He feared that EU 
countries would fight amongst themselves, with each 
individual member country needing to show its respective 
population that it defends national interests. 
 
5. (C) Gnesotto agreed that Europeans will be tougher against 
each other in the aftermath of the Constitution,s failure 
and that European solidarity was in doubt.  Thierry de 
Montbrial, director of the Paris-based French Institute of 
International Relations (known by its acronym, IFRI), said 
that the next several months were important to muddle through 
and that he hoped governments would avoid swerving towards 
narrow national interests.  He believed that a key problem 
was the weakness of European leaders and noted that President 
Chirac was currently at the lowest approval rating (26 per 
cent) of any French president in the Fifth Republic (since 
1958). 
 
6. (C) Montbrial speculated that, despite the rejection of 
the Constitution, some of the proposals, such as increasing 
diplomatic cooperation within the EU and the institution of a 
EU Foreign Minister, might still be possible via a piecemeal 
approach.  Gnesotto and prominent researcher Sylvie Goulard 
disagreed, saying that any attempt to implement the 
Constitution through what would be perceived as a back-door 
method was impossible, given the current political climate 
within the EU. 
 
7. (C) In general, the opinion leaders believed that 
Turkey,s EU candidacy was in danger following the 
Constitution,s rejection.  Montbrial said he thought Chirac 
had committed an enormous error in pledging that all future 
enlargements would be the subject of referendums, in that he 
outsourced a core foreign policy decision to voters. 
Europeans still held to the idea that Turkey was not 
European.  It was a paradox, said Montbrial, that those who 
so vociferously argued against inclusion in the Constitution 
of language referring to Europe,s Christian heritage at the 
same time believed Turkey should not be a member because it 
wasn,t European, i.e., Christian.  Gnesotto said she thought 
the EU would decide not to begin negotiations with Turkey in 
October, despite pledges to do so.  Goulard said EU 
populations continue to believe that Turkey is too big, too 
poor and too foreign to become a member of the club.  A/S 
Fried replied that it would be a mistake to straight-line 
current political dilemmas or to draw strategic conclusions 
from them.  In the 1980s, Poland,s potential membership in 
the EU was regarded as the subject of fantasy.  In the 
Balkans, in Ukraine and in Turkey, the prospect of EU 
membership, said A/S Fried, was one of the West,s most 
durable and powerful tools to encourage democratic 
transitions and economic openness.  Without the prospect of 
EU membership for Turkey and the Balkan states, the EU would 
be faced with the potential of great insecurity on its 
borders.  Goulard agreed, but said that the EU would always 
prioritize its own internal stability even if that meant that 
the stability of neighboring countries might be damaged.  In 
the current context, she believed that opening negotiations 
with Turkey would damage internal EU stability.  The European 
interlocutors approached these issues in a gloomy spirit, 
concerned about the electorate's rejection of the core values 
that had animated the European Project for a generation.  All 
agreed that France was in no condition to pick new fights 
with the United States ("We would look even more absurd than 
we do now," whispered Gnesotto to Fried.) 
 
8. (U) A/S Fried cleared this cable. 
WOLFF