US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI4434

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 004434 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, MASS, ECON, CE, IN, India-SriLanka 
SUBJECT: INDIA SUPPORTS SRI LANKA'S JOINT MECHANISM AND AIR 
CAPABILITIES 
 
REF: A. NEW DELHI 7497 
 
     B. CHENNAI 1203 
 
Classified By: CDA Bob Blake, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: During Sri Lankan President Chandrika 
Kumaratunga's visit to New Delhi on June 2-3, PM Singh gave 
GOI conditional support for the Post-Tsunami Operational 
Management Structure (P-TOMS), discussed concerns about the 
LTTE's air capability, and offered to upgrade Sri Lankan Air 
Force capabilities without signing the Defense Cooperation 
Agreement.  Kumaratunga came to thank India for its help 
after the Tsunami, but also hoped to clear up Indian 
ambiguity on and gain backing for the P-TOMS in order to 
shore up support for the mechanism at home.  In an interview 
after the meetings, NSA Narayanan complicated the message by 
stating that support was conditional upon the inclusion of 
non-LTTE Tamil parties, leading to some speculation about GOI 
intentions.  The message Chandrika took home was of GOI 
support for the joint mechanism and Sri Lanka's defenses, 
thus furthering the post-Tsunami feel-good relations with 
India's most agreeable neighbor.  End Summary. 
 
Public Thanks from Chandrika 
---------------------------- 
 
2.  (U) President Kumaratunga used the occasion of her first 
visit to India since the Tsunami to "thank the Government and 
people of India for their generous assistance" since 
December.  PM Singh reiterated that India was committed to 
reconstruction, and stated that GOI assistance included a 
grant of almost USD 25 million for relief projects, a 
moratorium on debt repayments for three years and possible 
changes to lines of credit to accommodate post-reconstruction 
priorities. 
 
Singh Backs the P-TOMS... 
------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Most Delhi-based analysts speculated that the real 
reason for Chandrika's visit was to gain GOI support for the 
P-TOMS, also commonly known as the Joint Mechanism (JM).  The 
P-TOMS is the formal international and multilateral 
instrument for coordinating Tsunami aid distribution between 
the GOSL, LTTE and Muslim groups throughout the island. 
India's silence on the issue had fed rumors that the GOI 
disliked the mechanism for, as one expert put it, "needlessly 
giving the LTTE a status they didn't deserve in areas they 
shouldn't control."  Singh addressed the subject by 
expressing his "understanding of and support for these 
ongoing efforts," which was widely perceived as an 
endorsement.  MR Narayan Swamy, an editor for the Indo-Asian 
News Service and Prabhakaran biographer, noted that India 
felt pressure to take a public position "in line with all of 
the major countries and aid organizations who support the 
P-TOMS." 
 
...But NSA Narayanan Says Support Is Conditional 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
4.  (C) After the bilaterals, NSA Narayanan clarified GOI 
support in a thinly-reported interview with TV news channels, 
stating that "We have agreed to the proposal, as long as it 
is not with the LTTE alone but with other Tamil parties too." 
 Dr. Anupam Ray, MEA Deputy Secretary for Sri Lanka stressed 
the language of support in the joint statement, but told 
Poloff that Indian support was "only theoretical until the JM 
is signed."  Although the press also focused on GOI support, 
one Indian reporter speculated that Narayanan's statement had 
"scuttled the proposal."  Most Delhi-based experts agreed 
that the LTTE would not accept other Tamil party involvement, 
but differed on the importance of Narayanan's statement. 
Swamy argued that the GOI actually "doesn't want to back the 
mechanism, but also doesn't want to sound negative" in light 
of international support and the close relationship with 
Kumaratunga, leading to intentional vagueness in the official 
language. 
 
5.  (C) Professor Sahadevan from Jawaharal Nehru University 
(JNU) noted to Poloff that Indian policy is to "encourage all 
of the Tamil parties to get involved in democracy," so 
Narayan's statement was "not a precondition, just a policy 
statement."  The real question of "how much the GOI stressed 
this condition is unknown," but he expects the statement to 
play out in the details of India's aid, speculating that the 
GOI may not send aid or aid workers directly to 
LTTE-controlled areas unless other Tamil parties were 
included. 
 
6.  (C) N. Manoharan, a Senior Fellow at the Institute of 
Peace and Conflict Studies, refuted the importance of 
Narayanan's statement, saying that "there is no point to 
whether India backs it" because the greatest challenge to the 
JM was the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) Party, and GOI 
support would not influence their opinion.  On the contrary, 
Professor Sahadevan argued that India's support has huge 
political significance.  If the GOI opposed the JM, they 
would be the only outside dissenting voice, which the "JVP 
would make use of to oppose the mechanism."  By dissenting, 
India would run the risk of "demonstrably refuting the need 
for tsunami reconstruction."  According to Sahadevan, the PM 
knows that Chandrika's regime is struggling with the JM, and 
"doesn't want to make it any harder" and upset the 
improvement in relations that has resulted from greater 
economic cooperation and India's Tsunami aid (Ref A). 
 
LTTE's Air Tigers 
----------------- 
 
7.  (C) Following press reports about LTTE air capability and 
its potential to affect South India, most Delhi-based 
analysts say the fear of a suicide attack or bombing is 
overblown but that the Air Tigers are nevertheless a cause 
for concern.  A recent report in the "Asian Age" pointed out 
that the two aircraft have a range of 1,000 km-plus and are 
capable of flying directly to Chennai and back.  In response 
to a "possible threat by the LTTE," the "Asian Tribune" 
reported on May 30 that intelligence agencies put a red alert 
on Cochin International Airport through June 7.  Professor 
Sahadevan observed that after the backlash from Rajiv 
Gandhi's assassination, the LTTE will "never again threaten 
India" because they won't want to risk "changing the military 
balance by unduly antagonizing New Delhi."  IPCS's Manoharan 
agreed that a suicide attack was unlikely, and that the LTTE 
would be more interested in a threat with either less human 
casualties, more economic power or a public figure target. 
 
8.  (C) Although there was "no need to worry now," Manoharan 
saw this development as one which Delhi will need to closely 
monitor as the LTTE builds up the force and accumulates more 
powerful technology and more aircraft.  The Observer Research 
Foundation Chennai-based analyst RS Vasan told Poloff 
recently that the Air Tigers are "at the moment not a threat, 
but certainly a future worry" because the size of the runway 
makes it apparent that the LTTE is "looking toward the 
future."  Stronger aircraft could strengthen the LTTE by 
allowing them to bring in supplies from all over Southeast 
Asia.  The "Asian Age" reported on June 4 that the PM offered 
to "upgrade capabilities of the Lankan Air Force," an offer 
FM Natwar Singh emphasized during his June 8-10 visit to Sri 
Lanka. 
 
Defense Agreement Buried 
------------------------ 
 
9.  (C) The two leaders reportedly did not focus on the 
Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), which was widely 
expected to be signed during Chandrika's last visit in 
November 2004 but continues to face opposition from pro-Tamil 
parties in South India.  In its 2004-2005 annual report 
released in May, the Home Ministry described the LTTE as 
"extremely potent, and the most lethal and well organized 
terrorist force in Sri Lanka" that "has strong liaisons in 
Tamil Nadu and certain pockets of Southern India."  Without 
this formal agreement, New Delhi already assists the GOSL 
with military supplies, training, intelligence and naval 
cooperation against the LTTE. 
 
10.  (C) Although the GOI has strong anti-LTTE leanings, UPA 
coalition partners and pro-Tamil parties MDMK and PMK oppose 
the DCA, and the PM stalled the agreement to avoid upsetting 
them, particularly in advance of Tamil Nadu state elections 
expected before May 2006.  According to "The Hindu," MDMK 
General Secretary Vaiko met with the PM on June 5 to protest 
the DCA as direct Indian assistance against the LTTE and an 
interference in Sri Lanka's internal affairs.  Since both the 
MDMK and the PMK were also coalition partners under the 
previous NDA government, IPCS Manoharan told Poloff that "as 
long as pro-Tamil parties are in the coalition, the defense 
agreement won't be signed."  Sahadevan stressed that PM Singh 
is less likely than Vajpayee to ignore Tamil politics and 
sign the agreement because "his leadership is not strong 
enough to withstand the tension in the coalition."  Despite 
coalition pressures, the Bangalore-based "Deccan Herald" 
reported that FM Natwar Singh said on June 10 in Sri Lanka 
that the agreement is "in the process of being finalized." 
Whether or not the DCA is signed, Manoharan argued that it is 
largely a symbolic gesture telling the LTTE that "India is 
with us," and defense cooperation has been and will continue 
to rise without a formal agreement in place. 
Economic Cooperation 
-------------------- 
 
11.  (C) Looking forward to FM Natwar Singh's June 8-10 trip 
to Sri Lanka to discuss the Joint Economic Commission (JEC), 
economics reportedly figured prominently in the PM's 
discussions with President Kumaratunga.  The two leaders 
noted bilateral trade reached USD 1.8 billion in 2004 and set 
a deadline for the negotiations on a Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership Agreement (CEPA) to conclude by the end of 2005. 
The meetings came just days after the Indian parliament 
passage of the Sethusamudram channel in between the 
countries, which strategists such as C. Raja Mohan saw as a 
lost opportunity for economic integration and a bow to Tamil 
politics (Ref B).  Calling the CEPA the "next stage of 
cooperation" after the Free Trade Agreement (covering only 
trade in goods) was signed in 1998, Professor Sahadevan told 
Poloff that it will focus on cooperation in the service 
sector and increase bilateral investment.  Manoharan stressed 
the importance of this agreement in "institutionalizing 
recent increased economic linkages and paving the way for 
greater bilateral cooperation." 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
12.  (C) Despite NSA Narayanan's statement placing conditions 
on Indian support, Chandrika still took home the prize of GOI 
backing for the JM.  Just as Sri Lanka has chosen not to make 
a public spat out of the Sethusamudram channel, the GOI kept 
its disagreements with the JM mostly quiet and stressed its 
support for Tsunami reconstruction.  The stalling of the DCA 
is a testament to the small, but still influential, power 
that pro-Tamil coalition partners hold in Indian coalition 
governments, but will not prevent further Indian assistance 
to counter what New Delhi sees as the continuing threat of 
the LTTE.  PM Singh was careful not to introduce any 
dissonance into India's model relationship by giving support 
for the JM, and will continue to use tsunami reconstruction 
aid, economic cooperation and defense assistance to further 
the positive trend in Indo-Sri Lankan relations. 
BLAKE