US embassy cable - 05TAIPEI2596

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 002596 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS AIT/W 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, CH, TW, Cross Strait Politics 
SUBJECT: TAIWAN POLICY ELITES DIVIDED OVER FUTURE CONTACTS 
WITH BEIJING 
 
REF: A. TAIPEI 2565 
     B. TAIPEI 2521 
     C. TAIPEI 2479 
 
Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason: 1.4 (B/D) 
 
1. (S) Summary: Taiwan National Security Council (NSC) Senior 
Advisor for cross-Strait affairs Chen Chung-hsin asserted 
that senior policymakers remain deeply skeptical over 
Beijing's willingness to engage in official discussions with 
the Taiwan government.  Chen told former U.S. NSC Asia 
Director Bob Suettinger that he personally disagrees with 
this assessment, but thus far has been unable to convince 
more senior policymakers otherwise.  Chen offered his 
assessment that PRC President Hu Jintao's activism on 
cross-Strait policy over the past several months was aimed at 
solidifying his own internal political base rather than 
weakening Taiwan's government.  Despite the generally 
negative view held by senior NSC officials and the Taiwan 
intelligence community, there are signs that President Chen 
Shui-bian is personally more optimistic over PRC flexibility 
and is actively seeking to open a direct communications 
channel with the Hu Jintao administration.  Chen's efforts 
have provoked concerns among many Pan-Green policy 
specialists that Chen's eagerness to visit Beijing before 
leaving office may distract attention from more pragmatic 
working level cross-Strait contacts.  End Summary. 
 
The Cup Half Empty 
------------------ 
 
2. (S) During a private meeting with visiting former NSC Asia 
Director Bob Suettinger Taiwan NSC Senior Advisor Chen 
Chung-hsin expressed disagreement with the Taiwan NSC's 
generally negative assessment of recent PRC actions.  Chen 
said that analysis provided to (and thus far accepted by) the 
NSC from Taiwan's National Security Bureau (NSB) has 
consistently portrayed recent PRC actions, including the 
Anti-Secession Law (ASL) and invitation to opposition party 
leaders, as aimed at isolating the Democratic Progressive 
Party (DPP) government and weakening Taiwan's internal 
cohesion.  Chen said that this assessment does not track with 
his own soundings among Mainland experts or his assessment of 
current PRC internal dynamics.  Chen blamed the NSB's 
over-reliance on unreliable classified intelligence sources 
and the DPP's natural distrust of PRC motives for the current 
negative view of Beijing among top officials, including NSC 
Secretary General Chiou I-jen.  However, he also noted that 
 
SIPDIS 
clumsy PRC handling of its relationship with the Pan-Blue and 
poor PR work have also fueled suspicions within Taiwan. 
 
Minority Report 
--------------- 
 
3. (C) Chen said he will continue to press for a reassessment 
of Taiwan's assumptions on PRC actions, arguing that Hu's 
recent internal successes present a unique, and limited, 
opportunity for real cross-Strait progress.  Chen said that 
it is his understanding that PRC hard-liners, especially 
within the People's Liberation Army (PLA), viewed the final 
text of the ASL as a major victory for PRC moderates, 
including Hu.  Chen noted that, in contrast to his 
predecessor, Hu appears to be trying to spread responsibility 
for decisions on Taiwan policy to a wide segment of the power 
structure in order to minimize risk to his own power base. 
In addition to codifying the PRC's cross-Strait policy via 
the ASL, Hu has also made sure that all of the nine members 
of the CCP's Politburo, not just those on the Taiwan Leading 
Group, receive official reports on Taiwan policy.  Chen said 
that Hu is thus far succeeding in his delicate balancing act 
of keeping control over the pace of PRC economic reform, but 
he is well aware that any external incident could bring the 
whole house down.  Chen added that one normally 
ultra-nationalistic quasi-official scholar contact of his 
recently admitted that the PRC economy and the Communist 
Party's grip on power could not survive a military 
confrontation in the Taiwan Strait. 
 
4. (C) In a separate meeting, Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) 
Chief Secretary Jan Jyh-horng offered a similar assessment 
over the domestic drivers of Beijing's Taiwan policy.  Jan 
noted that Hu is aware that his legitimacy could be 
challenged at any time by forces within and outside of the 
Communist Party power structure.  Jan said that senior Public 
Security Bureau (PSB) officials told Taiwan journalists in 
May that the media coverage of KMT Chairman Lien Chan's visit 
saved them from a possible crisis over how to handle 
anti-Japanese protests around the country.  Jan said that PRC 
officials told reporters that they were close to losing 
control over the anti-Japan protests, stating that the PSB 
would not dare resort to the same tough tactics employed in 
the past to put down nationalist protests.  Jan cited this 
example to emphasize that, despite appearances, stable 
cross-Strait relations are as important to the PRC 
leadership's internal cohesion as they are for the Chen 
administration. 
 
President Taking His Own Course? 
-------------------------------- 
 
5. (S) Perhaps for different reasons, President Chen himself 
appears to be taking a similarly upbeat assessment of Hu 
Jintao and is seeking avenues to move ahead on cross-Strait 
contacts.  In late May, former KMT Premier Vincent Siew told 
the AIT Director that President Chen asked to see him for the 
first time in over a year to solicit advice on how to open 
dialogue with Beijing.  Former NSC Deputy SecGen Chang 
Jung-feng told AIT he was asked on May 11 by Presidential 
Office Deputy SecGen (and close Chen confidante) Ma 
Yung-cheng to help the President secure a communications 
channel to Beijing.  Chang, who formerly managed backchannel 
communications with the PRC for both Presidents Chen and Lee 
Teng-hui, told AIT that he declined Ma's request, citing the 
risk that Chen would do or say something that would derail 
the initiative and then blame Chang for it.  Chang noted that 
when he suggested that the President assign the mission to 
NSC SecGen Chiou, Ma reacted negatively.  Chang said that 
this was the first time he had seen Ma express reservations 
over Chiou's reliability.  He added that Ma was scathing of 
MAC Chair Joseph Wu's inability to lead (or even follow) 
cross-Strait policy. 
 
6. (S) Chang echoed concerns expressed by other Pan-Green 
policy officials (especially members of Chiou's New Tide 
faction) over Chen's rumored eagerness to seek a major 
political breakthrough in his second term in office.  Chang 
said he urged Ma not to start contacts with Beijing by 
pushing for an agreement on a Chen visit.  "There needs to be 
a process leading up to high level direct contacts," Chang 
said, "but I worry that Chen is putting the summit meeting 
first."  Institute for National Policy Research (INPR) 
Executive Director Lo Chih-cheng told the AIT Director that 
while Chen clearly wants to visit Beijing, Chen has no real 
options for securing PRC approval short of using the USG as a 
matchmaker.  Over the past two weeks, Chen himself has 
publicly urged the United States to play an active role in 
establishing official contacts.  Chen's public appeals 
notwithstanding, Lo discounted both Washington's willingness 
to play the role of active intermediary and the possibility 
that Beijing would take the risk of engaging Chen directly. 
 
Comment: Differing Interpretations 
---------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Chen Chung-hsin's assessment of the current thinking 
inside of the NSC on cross-Strait policy tracks with formal 
policy decisions being made by the Taipei government. 
Despite promises that Taipei would move quickly with 
cross-Strait economic liberalization following the May 14 
National Assembly (NA) election, the government has spent 
most of its effort trying to dampen the "China fever" created 
by the Lien/Soong visits, throwing up barriers to recent PRC 
initiatives on fruit, pandas, and tourism (Reftels). 
Nevertheless, recent feelers by President Chen and his close 
political aides suggest that the President himself is more 
forward leaning on PRC policy than his top cross-Strait 
advisors are.  Public statements notwithstanding, President 
Chen has thus far not formally asked for the USG to play an 
active role in establishing direct channels to Beijing. 
However, if his attempts to use intermediaries like Siew and 
Chang fail to produce results, Chen may ask for a more active 
U.S. role in cross-Strait contacts. 
PAAL