US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD2479

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UPDATE ON OUTREACH TO IRAQIS ON CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION STANDUP

Identifier: 05BAGHDAD2479
Wikileaks: View 05BAGHDAD2479 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Baghdad
Created: 2005-06-13 06:49:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV KDEM IZ Sunni Arab National Assembly
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002479 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, IZ, Sunni Arab, National Assembly 
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON OUTREACH TO IRAQIS ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
COMMISSION STANDUP 
 
Classified By: Classified by Charge d'Affaires James Jeffrey for reason 
 
s 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Some Sunnis are digging in to get 25 
additional Sunni representatives on the Constitution 
Committee, although when pressed senior leaders will drop to 
20 fairly quickly, including Talabani and Committee Deputy 
Chair Janabi.  Shi'a contacts universally support 15 as a 
maximum; Barzani appears to be in the Shi'a camp.  Next 
steps: Much of the action will shift to Irbil, where many 
political figures will attend Barzani's swearing in as KRG 
President on June 14.  The DCM will be present. Charge will 
continue to press the need to close the deal with additional 
contacts June 13. As the parliamentary factions have 
seemingly agreed to the conditions for Sunni inclusion, the 
only issue is numbers, where the Sunnis maybe trying to 
create demographic facts, or are raising a demand they know 
(and some hope) will be rejected, potentially raising UN (and 
even US) ire toward the Shia-dominated National Assembly. 
 
Sunni Waqf Director 
------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Sunni Waqf Director Adnan al-Dulaymi backed down 
"personally" on his demand for 25 Sunni Arab additions to the 
Constitution Committee in June 11 meeting with the Charge, 
but he would not go lower than 20.  He said that Sunni Arabs 
would call for U.N. arbitration if pressured to take accept 
15.  He said Sunnis would also consider boycotting the 
process altogether.  Dulaymi passed Charge a list of 25 
candidates for the committee that appeared to have been 
written in concert with the Iraqi Islamic Party, but excluded 
the National Dialogue Council.  Dulaymi has prepared a 
separate list of some 53 individuals he recommended be 
consulted as experts and advisors but not brought on as 
voting members.  Charge stated that our soundings had 
indicated that 15 additional Sunnis was as far as the 
parliament was likely to go; Delaymi lamely argued that the 
Sunni percent of the population (he claimed 30-40 percent, 
most objective figures range around 20 percent) and the 42 
percent of 'no votes' (sic) in the election required a large 
Sunni group to represent the unrepresented.  Charge urged 
Dulaymi to rethink his position on numbers and take advantage 
of the opportunity to participate as equals in this process. 
Charge stressed that US would go to bat for equal status for 
new Sunnis, and the right for Sunnis to pick their own 
candidates, but we would not press for more than 15 Sunni 
representatives. 
 
TNA Speaker Hassani 
------------------- 
 
3.  (C) TNA Speaker Hachim al-Hasani agreed with Charge that 
15 additional Sunni Arabs was a reasonable number in a June 
11 meeting.  Hassani said he would meet with Dulaimi 
privately later that day to convince him to accept that 
number. 
 
VP Abd al Mahdi 
--------------- 
 
4.  (C) Abd al Mahdi was supportive of the Charge,s 
presentation.  He said as well that 15 additional Sunnis was 
all the traffic was likely to bear.  He said he would back 
Sunni requests for equal status (the 'consensus' rule for 
decisions) and the right for the Sunnis to pick their own 
representatives.  He however pushed for a Sunni contact now 
in Washington, Tahar Jabr Alwani, whom he said is well known 
to US officials, to be given one of the Sunni slots.  Charge 
made no commitment. 
 
President Talabani 
------------------ 
 
5.  (C)  In response to the Charge,s presentation, Talabani 
said that he had pushed for 25 Sunnis, because he wanted 
representatives from four different groups including 
'liberals,' members of the communist party, and others (whom 
one could describe as 'anti-clerical' Sunnis. ( Clearly 
Talabani wants to water down the nationalist/clerical color 
of most of the Sunni interlocutors.)  When Charge asked if 
Talabani could deliver the parliament on 25, he backed down 
immediately.  He admitted that even Barzani (who is 
particularly miffed at the Sunnis right now, according to 
Talabani) would not go that far, let alone the Shi'a.  He 
then put forward the possibility of '20' additional Sunni 
slots. Charge said that 15 appeared to us both as reasonable 
and as the most that the traffic would bear.  Talabani said 
he would try to work all this in Irbil at the KRG 
swearing-in, now scheduled for June 14. 
National Dialogue Council 
------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) On June 11, Mahmoud Mashadani did most of the talking 
with A/Polcouns.  He said 25 was the minimum number to 
represent the Sunni demographic, which was defined by the 
percentage of non-voters.   Fifteen would not be accepted by 
the Sunni community and would expose anybody who agreed to to 
great pressure to withdraw from the political process and 
physical danger.  He then added that if Waqf head Dulaymi 
would publicly agree to 15, this would increase that 
number,s acceptability, even though Dulaymi, as a government 
official, was not seen as completely representative if the 
Sunni community.  NDC Salafist representative Abd al Nasir al 
Janabi claimed that former UN rep to Iraq Jamal Benomar had 
been in recent contact with him and other members of the 
Council and had told them that even the Secretary of State 
had recognized their importance in the community. 
 
PM Jafari 
--------- 
 
7.  (C) Jafri's top political staffer told us June 11  that 
Jafari strongly believed 15 was the maximum, and urged that 
we press our contacts on that number.  The PM,s office has 
also confirmed that the Council of Ministers has decided to 
remove Dulaymi as head of the Sunni Waqf, as well as the head 
of the Shia Waqf.  Although the putative replacement for 
Dulaymi may have broad support in the Sunni community, we 
have urged the PM,s office and the Presidency to go slow on 
making these changes at this delicate political moment. 
Jeffrey 

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