US embassy cable - 05MANAMA839

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 000839 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS NSC FOR FFTOWNSEND 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PHUM, KTFN, BA 
SUBJECT: BAHRAIN "POSTPONES" AL QUDS CONFERENCE, WORRIES 
ABOUT OPPOSITION 
 
REF: A. MANAMA 811 B. STATE 103714 C. MANAMA 823 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William T. Monroe.  Reason: 1.4 (B)(D) 
 
1. (U) This is an action message -- see para 8. 
 
2. (S) Summary. Bahrain has decided to "postpone" an Al Quds 
Institute conference planned for next week, and the MFA has 
assured us that postponement really means cancellation.  In 
delivering that welcome news, MFA MinState Abdul Ghaffar at 
the same time passed on his concern that Embassy contacts 
with boycotting opposition societies were sending the wrong 
message and strengthening their resolve against the 
government, rather than encouraging them to participate in 
upcoming elections.  Ambassador took the opportunity to 
reiterate our hope that an amicable solution could be found 
to the government's dispute with the dissolved Bahrain Center 
for Human Rights (BCHR).  Abdul Ghaffar reiterated past 
criticism of BCHR, focusing especially on Abdul Hadi 
Al-Khawaja, whom he called a dangerous man who should be on 
our terrorist list.  While it is U.S. policy to encourage 
oppositionists to participate in the political process, the 
Embassy has discovered that prominent members of several 
opposition societies, including leading Shia boycotter 
Al-Wifaq, and four members of Parliament were recently placed 
on a Washington "VGTO" list of those ineligible to enter the 
United States.  Embassy requests guidance on this action. End 
Summary. 
 
3. (S) Following Assistant to the President for Homeland 
Security and Counterterrorism Frances Fragos Townsend's June 
10 phone call to the Crown Prince, MFA Minister of State 
Mohammed Abdul Ghaffar requested a meeting with the 
Ambassador June 11 to advise that the government had decided 
to "postpone" the conference that the Al Quds Institute had 
planned to hold in Bahrain June 18-20.   He said they were 
using the word "postpone" but in fact had no intention of 
letting it take place in Bahrain at a later date.  He said 
that the Foreign Ministry would never have let the conference 
be scheduled if they had known about it; the Ministry of 
Islamic Affairs had simply not focused on who would be 
involved.  (Note: Bahrain newspaper "Al-Akhbar Al-Khaleej" 
reported on its front page June 12 that the organizing 
committee, in coordination with the Al Quds Institute, had 
decided to postpone the conference, saying that due to 
current and unsuitable circumstances some prominent figures 
had been unable to attend.) 
 
4. (C) Noting that Bahrain had canceled the event at the 
request of the U.S. (the Ambassador interjected that he hoped 
Bahrain likewise considered the cancellation to be the right 
thing to do, given the invited participants), Abdel Ghaffar 
said that, on the other side, he hoped the U.S. would 
cooperate with the Government of Bahrain in its efforts to 
deal with the boycotting opposition societies.  "When you 
meet with them," he said, "or when visitors like DAS 
Carpenter meet with people like Jawad Asfoor (board member of 
the dissolved Bahrain Center for Human Rights (BCHR), who 
attended a dinner hosted by the Ambassador for DAS 
Carpenter), "it sends the wrong message."  Instead of 
encouraging them to work with the government and participate 
in the system, he said, it does the opposite.  They tell 
people that they met with American officials, who support 
what they are doing.  Be careful, he said.  They tell you one 
thing, but tell others something completely different. 
"Strengthening these people," he added, "is bad for reform." 
He cited Abdul Hadi Al-Khawaja as a particular concern, 
labeling him a "terrorist" trained in Iran who has his own 
agenda which has nothing to do with participation in 
parliamentary politics.  He should be on your terrorist list, 
he stated. 
 
5. (C) The Ambassador said that embassies, as a matter of 
course, meet with a range of people, and that our aim in 
meeting with representatives of opposition or boycotting 
societies is to encourage participation in the upcoming 
elections.  The Ambassador then raised the BCHR, noting 
Minister of Social Affairs Dr. Al Belooshi's recent 
statements that it must stop its activities or face 
prosecution.  He hoped that an amicable solution could be 
reached with the BCHR and its members; heavy-handed action 
against them would invariably generate international, 
including U.S., criticism. 
 
6. (C) Abdul Ghaffar said that the government very much wants 
to encourage the boycotters to participate in next year's 
elections.  The problem is that some of these people, even if 
they say they believe in the system and say they want to 
participate, in fact do not.  Al-Khawaja, who is associated 
with the BCHR, is a dangerous man.  People are reporting, he 
said, that Al-Khawaja was behind the violence that took place 
on the weekend over a wall built by a royal family member in 
the Shia village of Malkiya.  (Note: Others have said the 
same, including Mansour Al-Jamry, editor of the independent 
newspaper Al-Wasat, who has been publicizing the Malkiya wall 
issue and participated in the weekend demonstration. 
Al-Jamry says that Al-Khawaja is determined to provoke the 
government to arrest him.  End note.)  Regarding the BCHR in 
general, Abdul Ghaffar said that that it had burned its 
bridges, especially through its association with Al-Khawaja 
and his supporters.  The first president, Abdul Aziz Abul, 
quit because of the activities of Al-Khawaja within the BCHR, 
he said.  BCHR members, when they first approached the King 
about establishing the Center, were very clear in stating to 
the King that their intent was to document human rights 
concerns.  However, they have continually gone far beyond 
what they agreed to do and what they were licensed to do. 
 
7. (C) Comment. The Crown Prince told Frances Townsend that 
he would welcome Embassy help to encourage boycotters to 
participate in next year's elections.  The next day, Adbul 
Ghaffar -- seemingly contradictorily -- indicated that 
Embassy engagement with the boycotters would have the 
opposite effect of our intent: strengthening their resolve to 
oppose the government and not participate.  The Ambassador 
will seek to engage the CP on exactly how he sees us helping 
to encourage their participation. 
 
8. (S) Action request.  A major element of Abdul Ghaffar's 
line of reasoning is that at least some of the boycotters 
have dangerous connections to Iran and Hizbollah.  While U.S 
policy has been to reach out to boycotters and encourage 
their participation, the fact that, according to post 
consular section research, on May 7 at least seven boycotters 
from Al-Wifaq and other opposition societies were placed on 
the "VGTO" hit list as ineligible to travel to the U.S. 
presents a conflicting position of what exactly the USG 
position is towards the boycotters (four sitting members of 
parliament were placed on the list the same day).  Embassy 
requests guidance on why these boycotters were deemed 
ineligible to travel to the U.S., and what implications this 
may have for our relations with and outreach to such 
opposition societies as Al-Wifaq. 
MONROE