US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD2468

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002468 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2008 
TAGS: IZ, MARR, MOPS, ECON, PREL, ENGR, Petrolium, Energy Sector 
SUBJECT: NATIONAL ENERGY COMMITTEE ASKS, "WHAT'S IMPEDING 
IRAQ'S OIL FLOW?" 
 
Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL-MILITARY COUNSELOR JEREMIAH HOWARD FOR 
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  The sixth meeting of the National Energy 
Committee (NEC) was 
held on June 6 at the Ministry of Oil, where a discussion on 
issues currently 
impeding the flow of oil throughout the country took place. 
The primary 
subject discussed was costs associated with providing 
protection to strategic 
parts of the infrastructure.  Possible alternatives to 
current infrastructure 
security methods were also discussed and included adjusting 
battalion sizes, 
forming additional battalions and using technology to assist 
with area 
surveillance.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY COSTS:  Major General Heine, 
Acting Director of 
Iraqi Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO), attended the 
NEC at the Ministry 
of Oil to discuss what Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) Chalabi 
referred to as 
"outrageous" infrastructure security costs.  DPM stated 
security costs 20 
percent of allocated project budgets, and said he is 
considering the 
termination of outside security contracts.  He said Iraq 
cannot afford to 
continue spending so much on security and reminded attendees 
that Iraq has its 
own security forces, which should be able to provide the 
necessary protection 
of sites.  As an example, DPM said the country currently 
employs 22,000 
security contractors at $1,000 per day, or $22 million daily. 
He pointed out 
that this is more than Kirkuk's daily oil proceeds.  DPM also 
stated $40 
million of the $190 million Iraq received from the Unites 
States Agency for 
International Development goes to security.  DPM briefly 
touched on 
infrastructure hardening, stating that the original plan to 
dig tunnels for 
pipelines has been reduced to digging ditches designed to 
conceal strategic 
infrastructure areas.  DPM stated the goal is "just to move 
the oil" and feels 
these ditches are sufficient to accomplish the objective. 
 
3. (C) THREATS AND INTIMIDATION:  Discussions regarding 
troops included the 
possible deployment of an additional 2 battalions to be 
trained by coalition 
forces - to the Al Fatah Bridge crossing.  (NOTE: Although a 
plan to train the 
oil security battalions has been discussed, no commitments 
have been made.) 
Iraqi Lieutenant General (LTG) Abdul Qadar, Commander of the 
Iraqi Field Army, 
said he has a group of trusted colonels who regularly survey 
the strategic 
infrastructure sites and report back to him on ways to 
improve security.  LTG 
Qadar said he would submit to DPM Chalabi an updated report 
that addresses the 
current and future needs of the battalions. 
 
4. (C) PROTECTING STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE AREAS:  The 
discussion progressed to 
improving Al Fatah Bridge protection, which the committee 
believed could be 
accomplished by eliminating equipment shortages like night 
vision goggles. 
Committee members also discussed possibly adjusting battalion 
numbers, and 
improving command and control by bringing battalions under 
Ministry of Defense 
control so as to benefit from the support of both the Iraqi 
air force and navy. 
Other methods of protecting the strategic areas of 
infrastructure discussed 
included: increasing battalions from 17 to 20, adding barbed 
wire to strategic 
infrastructure areas, erecting additional observation points 
and installing 
motion-detecting radar systems.  The most aggressive idea was 
to install land 
mines around such areas, though most agreed this would be a 
dangerous measure. 
 
5. (C) PENDING UPDATE FROM LTG Qadar:  LTG Qadar stated acts 
of sabotage took 
place near the pipelines after the most recent reconnaissance 
mission, and he 
hoped to give an update in a few days.  LTG Qadar also stated 
he would give an 
update on troops, as the new force members are locals and 
need to be trained. 
 
 
6. (C) COMMENT:  Continuing discussions of oil infrastructure 
protection are 
important, but have produced no decisions yet.  The interim 
government gave 
responsibility for oil infrastructure protection to the 
Ministry of Defense in 
February, and the NEC meeting held May 23 confirmed this. 
However, this 
decision on responsibility also required the transfer of 
resources to 
accomplish the mission. A clear Iraqi government commitment 
needs to be made 
and appropriate resources allotted if Iraq's oil 
infrastructure is to be 
adequately protected and allow a freer flow of oil. It is not 
clear the DPM has 
the will or authority to deliver the resources. END COMMENT 
Jeffrey