US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD2467

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002467 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, IZ, Sunni Arab 
SUBJECT: SUCCESSFUL DAMAGE CONTROL AFTER RAID ON LEADING 
SUNNI PARTY LEADER 
 
Classified By: Classified by David M. Satterfield, Deputy Chief of Miss 
 
ion, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: In the aftermath of the mistaken arrest of 
Iraqi Islamic Party leader Dr. Muhsin Abdal Hamid, Post and 
MNF-I took steps to repair relations with the most prominent 
Sunni political party.  Hamid was detained in an early 
morning operation on May 30 and released that same day after 
it became apparent he was incorrectly targeted.  Charge 
Satterfield met IIP Secretary General Tariq al-Hashimi on 
June 1, to clarify the incident and convey our apologies. 
Acting Political Counselor visited IIP headquarters on June 5 
to present a written apology directly to abd al-Hamid.  Later 
that day abd al-Hamid had a lunch meeting with both the 
Charge and MNF-I Commanding General Casey.  On June 6, 
MNF-I/Pol/Mil/Econ Deputy Commander and PolOffs again visited 
IIP headquarters to present compensation for damages and 
missing items from the home.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) U.S. military forces detained Dr. Muhsin Abdal Hamid 
in the early hours of May 30.  Hamid is the leader of the 
Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), Iraq's most prominent Sunni 
political party.  MNF-I continues to investigate the causes 
leading to the targeting of the former Governing Council 
President's home, but it appears it was simply a case of 
misdirection.  Hamid's detention created a stir among 
Baghdad's political class and the first 45 minutes of the 
Transitional National Assembly (TNA) session on May 31 was 
devoted to denunciations of the detention and offers of 
support for the IIP leader.  Though abd al-Hamid was released 
within 12 hours of the raid, Post and MNF-I took special 
measures to clarify the mistake and make amends with this 
sensitive, perhaps pivotal organization. 
 
3. (C) Charge Satterfield met with IIP Secretary General 
Tariq al-Hashimi on June 1 to express regret over the 
detention and persuade party leaders that the incident was 
not deliberate.  Hashimi insisted the U.S. issue a written 
apology.  He queried whether the U.S. considers the IIP to be 
directly connected with insurgency.  If so, he demanded the 
U.S. bring any accusations to his party's intention so they 
might be allowed to refute any charges.  He added the party 
is in a very difficult position, and that the insurgents are 
"killing us before they kill you".  He noted the "Zarqawis" 
had burnt down the IIP headquarters in the western town of 
Hit.  Charge Satterfield assured Hashimi that the U.S. does 
not have any bias against his party and urged them to 
continue their positive role in the Iraqi political process. 
Hashimi closed by urging the Charge to visit IIP headquarters 
and to keep the lines of communication open. 
 
4. (C) Acting PolCouns visited IIP headquarters on June 5 to 
explain the incident directly to abd al-Hamid and convey a 
written letter of apology, as is commonly expected in Iraqi 
society.  Secretary General Hashimi expressed appreciation 
for the letter and committed himself to improving relations 
with the U.S.  He, nonetheless, argued that such raids and 
mass arrests are incomprehensible to the party and its 
constituents.  He added that large-scale detentions are 
"undermining our credibility".  He also presented A/PolCouns 
a list of damaged and missing items from the Hamidi home. 
 
5. (C) A/PolCouns urged the IIP leadership to use their 
influence with their constituents to cooperate and share 
intelligence about the terrorists with security forces.  This 
would be the best method of improving the precision of raids 
and targets for detention.  IIP leader Dr. Ayad Samarra'i 
emphasized there is no higher priority for the party than 
establishing a representative Constitutional Drafting 
Committee in a timely manner. 
 
6. (C) Dr. abd al-Hamid recounted the raid to A/Polcouns.  He 
claimed the soldiers disregarded his attempt to present his 
current second tier International Zone badge and former 
President of the Governing Council identification and threw 
him to the floor, pressing a boot on his neck.  (NOTE: A knee 
to the upper back was the method used; apparently perceived 
to be a boot.  END NOTE)  He commented that this incident was 
neither in the IIP's interests nor in the USG's.  Hamid 
railed that his detention was an insult to him and his 
family.  He reiterated Hashimi's point that if the Coalition 
has suspicions of any IIP party members, we should approach 
the party with the charges and the IIP would strip the guilty 
member of his party membership. 
 
7. (C) In a lunch given by Charge Satterfield and General 
Casey, the Charge again emphasized to abd al-Hamid that his 
detention was not a deliberate attack on his person, party or 
the role his party is playing in building a democratic Iraq. 
Abd al-Hamid summarized his reasons for believing he was 
indeed the target of the operation.  He insisted that if the 
Coalition ever wants to interrogate him on specific ties to 
the insurgency, all they had to do is send a car for him and 
he would appear for questioning.  He accepted the Charge's 
apology and expressed hope that such incidents would not be 
repeated.  General Casey reported he had assigned a general 
officer to investigate the erroneous detention and explained 
the unit involved had been seeking an individual with a 
similar name.  The unit had been to two prior locations and 
was finally misdirected to the Abd al-Hamid,s household by a 
bystander.  He appeared to accept this explanation. 
 
8. (C) Abd al-Hamid related the IIP's role in the current 
effort to form a representative Constitutional Drafting 
Committee.  He said his party had put forward 30 names for 
the enlargement of the committee and all are specialists of 
the law.  His noted that Iraqis simply have to write a 
constitution by August 15 to ensure the December elections 
are not delayed.  Regarding election security, Secretary 
General Hashimi postulated that security cannot be improved 
through the use of excessive force.  He drew a distinction 
between terrorists (who pursue an international agenda) and 
"nationalists" who have a sincere desire to join the 
political process.  He urged the USG support confidence 
building measures to include: controlling the borders; 
opening a dialogue with the "nationalists"; releasing 
detainees who have no charges brought against them; and 
declaring a "reasonable" timeline for withdrawal of Coalition 
forces.  Charge Satterfield responded that the USG is doing 
all it can both militarily and diplomatically to address the 
issue of border security.  He told the IIP leadership that 
any use of violence as a political tool should be condemned 
as terrorism. 
 
9. (C) Politically the situation appears to be resolved.  IIP 
leaders took PolOffs, phone calls on June 8 and the media 
furor seems to have died down.  On June 8 a CF officer in 
Baghdad (in the vicinity of the IIP headquarters) witnessed 
two Iraqis putting up anti-American posters with the IIP 
logo.  He spoke to them and took the placards.  One read, 
"The arrest of Dr. Mushin Abdal Hamid will not divert us from 
our path of liberating the country and throwing out the 
occupier", the second, "The arrest of Dr. Mushin is terrorism 
American-style".  On June 9, poloff returned a copy of the 
second placard to the IIP SecGen, who commented that all such 
placards have been removed.  Dealing with Sunni political 
groups will continue to be a challenge. 
 
10. (U) REO HILLA, REO BASRA, REO MOSUL, and REO KIRKUK, 
minimize considered. 
Jeffrey