US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD2466

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002466 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KDEM, KISL, IZ, UN, Sunni Arab 
SUBJECT: CHARGE URGES SCIRI'S AL-HAKIM TO CLOSE DEAL ON 
SUNNI ADDITIONS TO CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITTEE 
 
Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Henry S. Ensher for 
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: The Charge on June 10 made a firm 
presentation to SCIRI leader 'Abd al Aziz al-Hakim to end the 
drift and close a deal on adding Sunnis to the constitutional 
committee.  Charge noted that his presentation reflected the 
concern of the highest level of the USG.  Charge and DCM went 
over the same points described below with PM Jafari in a 
separate meeting June 10. The Charge suggested 15 Sunnis 
would be an appropriate compromise for all sides; there 
should not be conditions on or vetos on the names the Sunnis 
propose.  Al-Hakim agreed that the numbers were not 
important, noting only the difficulty of getting the Sunnis 
to agree among themselves.  He said the same principle of 
consensus that prevailed during earlier Iraqi political 
negotiations would prevail.  Constitutional Committee Chair 
Humam Hammudi said proposed individuals must meet the same 
criteria as TNA members.  Hammudi also expressed his 
displeasure at the recent presentation of a UN advisor who 
had referred to MNF-I as an occupation force and who had 
suggested an additional 25 Sunnis would be appropriate. 
Charge noted that the Committee should take only the advice 
it thought appropriate.  Post contacted the UN Constitutional 
adviser on this point.  He said there had been a 
misunderstanding of the UN position because of a bad 
translation and would correct the misunderstanding as soon as 
possible.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) The Charge and DCM visited SCIRI and United Iraqi 
Alliance (UIA) leader 'Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim at the SCIRI 
headquarters June 10.  Joining al-Hakim were his deputy and 
constitutional committee leader Humam al-Hammudi, 
Transitional National Assembly (TNA) member Akram al-Hakim, 
and Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim's son Ammar al-Hakim. 
 
3. (C) The Charge stressed the need to finalize the 
composition of the constitutional committee now.  The Charge 
praised the outreach efforts of the Shia towards the Sunnis, 
especially given that the Shia are the elected members of the 
government.  The next step is to close a deal on Sunni 
participation in the constitutional process.  Charge noted 
his presentation reflected the concerns of the highest level 
of the USG.  The Charge said we would be urging compromise on 
all sides.  The Sunni demand for 25 committee members seems 
excessive to us; 15 is a compromise for all sides.  Moreover, 
the Charge suggested that other groups not place conditions 
on or veto the members the Sunnis choose, since the Sunnis 
need to feel the individuals represent them.  In addition, 
the USG expects the spirit of consensus rather than voting 
will guide the committee's decisions.  Charge and DCM made 
the same points to PM Jafari in a separate meeting June 10. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
NUMBERS "NOT IMPORTANT"; SUNNI DIVISION COMPLICATES 
EFFORT--AS IS THE UNITED NATIONS 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
4. (C) Al-Hakim responded that the numbers of Sunnis are "not 
so important, whether 13 or 15".  Al-Hakim assured the Charge 
the Shia will practice the same principles in the 
constitution that they did with forming the government. 
Al-Hakim noted the generosity of the Shia who, although they 
constitute 60-65 percent of Iraqi population, according to 
U.S. studies (NFI), had afforded the Sunnis many prominent 
posts in the government. 
 
5. (C) Al-Hakim noted the difficulty in dealing with the 
Sunnis because they are divided.  Al-Hakim complained of the 
meeting between the constitutional committee and Sunni groups 
June 9 to discuss Sunni inclusion, which nearly descended 
into near physical confrontation between the Sunni IIP and 
National Dialogue (INDC) who accused each other of not truly 
representing Sunnis.  Al-Hakim noted the positive role the 
USG could play to temper the Sunnis.  Choosing Sunni 
candidates should not be so difficult, al-Hakim said, but the 
process should not entirely depend on Constitutional 
Committee Chairman Adnan al-Janabi, who is not widely 
accepted. 
 
6. (C) Transitional National Assembly constitutional 
committee head and SCIRI deputy Shaykh Humam Hammudi claimed 
that most groups had been in favor of adding 15 Sunnis, but a 
UN advisor had complicated the process by proposing an 
additional 25 Sunnis.  The UN is "ruining the process", 
complained Hammudi, who also complained of a recent instance 
in which a UN member greeted Hammudi by expressing sympathy 
for Iraq living under MNF-I occupation.  Moreover, the UN had 
suggested the constitutional committee be the ultimate 
authority on the Constitution draft without any role for the 
TNA, ignoring the Transitional Administrative Law.  Charge 
said that the Committee is free to take or leave any advice 
it wants.  He suggested that Hakim and Hammudi might consider 
the greater weight of advice from friends, such as the U.S., 
that were sharing with Iraqis the sacrifices of the fight 
against terrorists.  Hakim agreed.  Post contacted UN 
constitutional adviser Haysom on June 10 to seek an 
explanation for the reported UN position.  Haysom said a bad 
translation in a UN non-paper might have caused a 
misunderstanding and the UN was neither advocating a 
particular number of Sunnis nor a process that would undercut 
the TNA.  He undertook to clarify the UN's views with Hammudi 
as soon as possible. 
 
7. (C) COMMENT: The meeting with Hakim was the first of a 
round of calls to key representatives of all parties to the 
constitutional inclusion process.  We will press them all, as 
they have indicated they wished us to do, to finalize the 
composition of the constitutional committee.  SCIRI seemed 
very amenable to adding 15 Sunnis.  We tend to agree with 
them that much of the difficulty and delay lies with the 
Sunnis themselves and their inability to agree on candidates. 
 We will press Sunnis with the same message of flexibility 
and compromise.  END COMMENT. 
 
8. (U) REO HILLA, REO BASRA, REO MOSUL, and REO KIRKUK 
minimize considered. 
Jeffrey