US embassy cable - 05PARIS4106

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 004106 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2015 
TAGS: PREL, XF, IZ, IR, LE, FR 
SUBJECT: STAFFDEL TALWAR DISCUSSES LEBANON/SYRIA, 
IRAN/EU-3, AND IRAQ WITH SENIOR FRENCH OFFICIALS 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary: Visiting SFRC Professional Staff Member 
Puneet Talwar met separately with MFA NEA A/S-equivalent 
Jean Francois-Thibault and Presidential Middle East/Americas 
advisor Dominique Boche June 3 and discussed Lebanon/Syria, 
EU-3 negotiations with Iran, and Iraq.  Thibault expressed 
concern over the assassination of journalist Samir Kassir, as 
well as the tendency for Lebanese politicians to return to 
old habits.  Thibault stressed the French commitment to UNSCR 
1559 and asserted that Hizballah's disarmament could result 
only from its political integration.  Both Thibault and Boche 
credited Iran for its moderating stance on Hizballah, with 
Thibault describing Iranian officials as surprisingly 
negative towards Syria's leadership.  French officials 
offered little detail on the package which the EU-3 will 
present Iran in two months, but instead stressed the 
importance of continued U.S. support and speculated that a 
Rafsanjani victory could herald a more constructive Iranian 
position.  On Iraq, Thibault expressed worry over increasing 
sectarianism and questioned the decision to exclude Iraq's 
neighbors from the June 1-2 preparatory meetings for the 
U.S.-EU conference, for which the GoF wants greater 
consultation on the draft communique.  Without calling for a 
U.S. withdrawal date from Iraq, Thibault and Boche stressed 
that giving Iraqis a better "perspective" towards an eventual 
MNF-1 withdrawal could be the key to attracting greater Sunni 
politicalp articipation.  French officials also expressed 
reticence over an expanded NATO role in Iraq, and voiced 
concern over the dwindling Iraqi Christian community, citing 
a recent visit by the Chaldean Patriarch.  End summary. 
 
LEBANON 
------- 
 
2. (C) Thibault commended close U.S.-French cooperation on 
Lebanon while expressing worry over the current situation 
there, especially after the June 2 assassination of "Al 
Nahar" journalist Samir Kassir.  Thibault described Kassir, 
a dual French-Lebanese national, as a fighter for Lebanese 
democracy and independence, and suggested that the slain 
journalist had crossed a line in his work, while not directly 
implicating Syrian or Lebanese security services in the 
assassination.  In response to a query from Talwar,  Thibault 
conceded that the question remained open whether the March 14 
"counter-demonstration" marked a new era in Lebanese 
politics.  Thibault described the debate over the 2000 
electoral law and the decision to retain that law as 
"unfortunate," and having opened the door to traditional 
Lebanese political habits of back-room deals and trading 
advantages.  The composition of the next parliament and the 
degree to which the opposition won a clear majority would be 
important, he observed, in determining whether or not the 
next government was merely transitory.  Thibault added that 
the younger political generation in Lebanon was looking for a 
new political direction.  There appeared to be a certain 
level of disappointment in the first round of legislative 
elections in Beirut, given the low level of voter 
participation, though the GoF would not dwell on the 
participation levels publicly and had issued a positive 
message in support of the elections. 
 
3. (C) On Hizballah, Thibault stressed the GoF's commitment 
to UNSCR 1559 and its clear objective of disarming Hizballah 
and Palestinian militias.  At the same time, he stressed that 
Hizballah disarmament could come about only 
through a positive political evolution, not via military 
means.  For this reason, the GoF would continue to push for 
democracy and inclusiveness in Lebanon, similar to its 
approach in Iraq.  Talwar agreed with Thibault's assessment 
that Hizballah disarmament remained a sensitive issue in 
Lebanon and needed a Lebanese approach.  Thibault suggested 
that Hizballah forces needed to be presented with 
alternatives, such as joining the Lebanese army or taking up 
new occupations.  At the same, the international community 
needed to be sensitive to the appearance of foreign 
interference and advise the Israelis, in particular, against 
unhelpful moves. 
 
4. (C) On the issue of foreign interference, Talwar raised 
Hizballah's support for Hamas and Islamic Jihad, noting that 
PA President Abbas and Israeli officials had raised concerns 
over the issue during an earlier Codel Biden visit 
to the region.  Thibault did not respond to Talwar's comment 
directly and instead cited Iran's moderating influence on 
Hizballah and in Lebanon in general.  Thibault said that in 
discussing Lebanon with Iranian officials, including Iranian 
Ambassador to France Sadegh al Kharazi, the GoF found the 
Iranian judgment on Syria and its political leadership to be 
surprisingly negative.  Iranian officials, he added, were 
extremely cautious in discussing Hizballah and stressed the 
need for it to behave cautiously.  Iran had also deplored the 
Hariri assassination, and, like France and others, viewed it 
as a crime from another era.  Elysee advisor Boche, in a 
separate conversation with Talwar, also commended Iran's more 
constructive stance in Lebanon, describing it as one of the 
benefits generated by the ongoing EU-3 negotiations.  Boche 
asserted that Iran had passed many moderating messages at 
French request to Hizballah, which in turn helped gain 
Hizballah support for the electoral process in Lebanon. 
 
IRAN 
---- 
 
5. (C) On EU-3 negotiations with Iran, Boche stressed that 
the GoF shared U.S. nonproliferation concerns with respect to 
Iran, and that renunciation of all Iranian military 
application of nuclear technology and suspension of Iranian 
enrichment activities remained essential, immutable elements 
of the EU demarche.  Boche described the U.S. and EU as 
having similar goals but different tactics, with the 
U.S.-preferred approach of UNSC referral and possible 
sanctions offering uncertain prospects for success.  Boche 
described the EU approach as more pragmatic and seeking to 
make Iran understand that if it renounced military use of 
nuclear technology, the EU would help Iran achieve greater 
integration into the world economy and recognition as a 
responsible, regional power.  The U.S. had made two important 
concessions in support of the EU-3 effort, by lifting its 
opposition to Iran's entry into the WTO and to the sale of 
spare aircraft parts to Iran.  Boche noted that the initial 
Iranian reaction to the U.S. policy shifts had been negative, 
as Iran misinterpreted the U.S. moves as "fake concessions" 
designed to rally the EU-3 behind UNSC referral.  He noted 
that the Iranian attitude had shifted somewhat, however, 
since the WTO decision to start membership negotiations with 
Iran, a development of significant interest to Tehran. 
 
6. (C) Boche acknowledged that in the run-up to the May 25 
meeting between the Iranians and EU-3 foreign ministers in 
Geneva, the Iranians had put forth a number of "ingenious" 
proposals which crossed the line on enrichment, which many 
Iranian officials seemed to view as a fundamental human 
right.  The EU-3 had been firm in telling the Iranians that 
their  proposals were "off track," so it was decided at 
Geneva that the EU-3 would present the next proposal, by the 
end of July.  Boche said the EU-3 was beginning work to make 
its proposal attractive, but offered no further details. 
Asked what further gestures the U.S. could make to support 
the process, Boche stressed the need to wait until after 
Iran's presidential elections, to see if a new Iranian policy 
configuration emerged.  He noted that Rafsanjani appeared to 
be the electoral front-runner, and described him as a 
hard-liner on domestic policy, but a realist, with 
respect to Iran's external relations.  Boche added that 
Rafsanjani understood U.S. determination on Iran and had 
expressed himself on the topic.  One potentially helpful U.S. 
gesture after Iranian elections, Boche noted, would be 
to clarify publicly that the U.S. was not seeking regime 
change in Iran. 
 
7. (C) Overall, Boche stressed the need to offer Iranians 
incentives for cooperation, and was less enthusiastic on 
using the threat of UNSC referral as a means to induce better 
Iranian behavior.  Repeated public references to UNSC 
referral or the prospect of sanctions, in Boche's view, would 
undermine the ongoing EU-3 negotiations and run counter to 
Iranians' national pride and their resistance to bending to 
external pressure.  He added that we needed to address the 
psychological aspects of the nuclear issue in Iran; while we 
could not bend on the nuclear issue, it would be important to 
satisfy Iran on other issues related to its national pride, 
such as by recognizing Iran as a useful partner in the Middle 
East.  Boche was positive when asked to assess prospects for 
continued U.S. and EU-3 cooperation on Iran.  He cited close 
cooperation between the U.S. and Europe on Iran during the 
past few months, and said he had the impression, since 
Secretary Rice's and the President's visits to Europe earlier 
 
SIPDIS 
this year, that the U.S. was taking into consideration what 
the Europeans had to say.  The GoF had the impression that 
the U.S. was reassessing its Iran policy cautiously and 
realistically, and that the current U.S. approach differed 
from that of six months ago. 
 
8. (C) Thibault offered comments similar to Boche's on the 
need for continued U.S. support for EU-3 negotiations and the 
prospect of a Rafsanjani election victory having a positive 
impact on the negotiations.  Thibault stressed that the 
longer the EU-3 kept Iran in dialogue the better, as the more 
time passed with suspension in place, the more difficult it 
would be for the Iranians to resume enrichment.  Thibault 
also stressed that the Iranians, in addition to playing a 
relatively responsible role in Lebanon, were playing their 
cards cautiously in Iraq, and could have played far more of a 
nuisance role, given long-standing ties to Iran among most of 
Iraq's Shi'a political leadership.  MFA Iraq desk officer 
Renaud Salins added that Iraqi FM Zebari, during a discussion 
with GoF officials at the recent World Economic Forum meeting 
at Dead Sea, had described the Iranians as behaving properly 
in Iraq, while harshly criticizing Syrian interference in 
Iraq. 
 
IRAQ 
---- 
 
9. (C) Further on Iraq, Thibault described the GoF as very 
concerned by increased sectarianism, and suggested that 
Iraqis were identifying more with their respective 
communities than the prevailing national identity.  Thibault 
questioned the Iraqi government decision to exclude its 
neighbors from the June 1-2 Cairo preparatory meeting for the 
June 22 U.S.-EU-hosted ministerial on Iraq, noting that the 
move had generated a negative reaction from Iraq's Arab 
neighbors and gave the impression that Iraq was trying 
separate itself from its Arab surroundings.  Thibault noted 
that the GoF had not heard much from the European Commission 
or Luxembourg EU Presidency about conference preparations, 
and hoped to have time to review and comment on the draft 
conference declaration before the planned June 21 senior 
officials meetings in Brussels. 
 
10. (C) Talwar asked Thibault for an update on the French 
offer to train some 1500 Iraqi gendarmes in France, noting 
that Codel Biden had recently raised the issue with Iraqi PM 
Ja'fari, who was not responsive on the issue.  Thibault 
reported that the GoF was still waiting for Iraq to send a 
mission to France to further discuss gendarme training 
programs, and reiterated the French red-line against sending 
any troops to Iraq.  Thibault added that EU members 
were ready to help Iraq via the European Commission and 
member states' bilateral assistance, and that the EU wanted 
the Iraqi government to be at the center of donor activities. 
 The GoF, for its part, hoped to have official Iraqi 
interlocutors ready to discuss their needs, which had not 
been the case up to now.  The GoF also hoped that the Iraqi 
Transitional Government (ITG) would see the value of having 
the UN serve in a "clearinghouse" role on international 
assistance, and recognize the important support which Europe 
could offer, especially in capacity-building.  Boche, in his 
separate discussion with Talwar, stressed that French 
assistance to Iraq had doubled since the previous year (to 
2.5 million euros in 2005), that the GoF had played an 
important role on Iraqi debt reduction, and that the GoF was 
ready to train Iraqi gendarmes outside the country.  When 
Talwar asked whether France would oppose expanding the NATO 
training mission in Iraq, even though French troops were not 
involved, MFA Iraq desk officer Salins responded that the GoF 
opposed a greater NATO role in Iraq, as the current 
configuration was the maximum President Chirac could accept. 
Presidential Advisor Boche offered a more nuanced, but 
negative answer when asked about expansion of NATO efforts in 
Iraq, and noted that the GoF was always reticent about 
planting the NATO flag in the region. 
 
11. (C) Both Thibault and Boche made a linkage between the 
continued MNF-1 presence and inclusion of Sunnis in the 
political process, and suggested that giving a greater 
"perspective" on an eventual troop withdrawal could bring 
more Sunnis to the table.  Thibault cited French Ambassador 
to Iraq Bertrand Bajolet as concluding that as long as there 
was no perspective for a troop withdrawal, it would be 
difficult to have all Sunni groups included in the 
political process.  Thibault clarified that the GoF was not 
seeking a specific withdrawal date, or to accelerate a U.S. 
departure, but simply wanted to provide a better perspective 
on an eventual departure of foreign troops, such as a 
condition-based timetable.  Elysee advisor Boche noted that 
the GoF understood that MNF-1 could not withdraw until Iraqi 
security forces fulfilled certain conditions.  He added, 
however, that if the U.S. could make clear that its troops 
would not be in Iraq for eternity, this would help associate 
more Sunnis with the political process.  Talwar responded to 
Thibault and Boche's points by observing that, in contrast, 
since Iraq's January elections, he had heard fewer calls for 
troop withdrawal from Sunni Iraqis, who appeared to view 
their non-participation in elections as a mistake and were 
more fearful of a potential U.S. pull-out. 
 
12. (C) Thibault also raised GoF concerns on Iraq's dwindling 
Christian community, and cited a mid-May visit to France by 
Iraqi Chaldean Patriarch Emmanuel Delly, during which the 
Patriarch met with President Chirac and senior 
MFA officials.  Thibault reported that the Patriarch's 
essential mission was to seek visas from friendly European 
powers to help Iraqi Chaldeans flee the country.  Thibault 
described the GoF as a bit surprised by the directness of 
the Patriarch's message, and said French officials, in 
response, sought to stress the importance of the continued 
Christian presence in Iraq.  He concluded that one of 
Christianity's oldest communities was in danger of 
disappearing due to migration, and that unfair treatment of 
Iraqi Christian voters by Kurdish authorities during the 
January 30 election had added to Iraqi Christians' overall 
sense of despair. 
 
13. (U) Staffdel Talwar did not clear this message. 
WOLFF