US embassy cable - 05CAIRO4360

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 004360 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, EAID, PHUM, EG, SU, ER 
SUBJECT: SUDAN:  NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE AND THE 
GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN CLOSE TO REACHING A FINAL DEAL 
 
REF: UNDERINER-HEGADORN JUNE 1 E-MAIL 
 
 
Classified by ECPO Counselor John Desrocher for reasons 1.4 (b) 
and (d). 
 
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Summary 
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1.  (C) National Democratic Alliance (NDA) officials confirmed 
June 7 that negotiations would commence June 12 in Cairo between 
the NDA leadership and senior Government of Sudan (GOS) 
officials.  The negotiations will cover political and security 
issues and are scheduled to be completed by June 18, when 
President Mubarak plans to host Sudanese Vice Presidents Taha 
and Garang, along with NDA leader Mirghani, for a public signing 
ceremony in Egypt.  NDA lead negotiator General Saeed believes 
that an NDA-GOS agreement will pave the way for resolution of 
separate Darfur negotiations and will allow for the return to 
Sudan by August of senior NDA officials.  Nevertheless, Saeed 
sought USG assistance in pressing both the GOE and the GOS to be 
fair and flexible in reaching an agreement with the NDA by June 
18.  As for the East and the ongoing conflict between the GOS 
and Beja opposition groups, Saeed said that separate GOS-Beja 
talks are possible after the June 18 ceremony, but he predicted 
Khartoum would seek to quell disturbances in the East by force 
once it had signed separate agreements with Darfur rebels and 
the NDA.  End summary. 
 
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Negotiations Set to Commence 
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2.  (C) Poloff met June 7 with NDA Leadership Council member 
(and lead negotiator in talks with the GOS) General Abdel Rahman 
Saeed, and separately the same day with NDA senior negotiator 
Faruq Abu Issa, to discuss progress on talks with the GOS 
following the latest Cairo visit by Sudanese Vice President John 
Garang.  Saeed said that Garang had "initiated contact with the 
NDA" to encourage finalization of pending negotiations which had 
stalled after a January 29 preliminary agreement had been 
reached in Cairo between the NDA and the GOS.  During meetings 
on June 2-3, Garang, NDA leader Mirghani, and Egyptian 
Intelligence Chief Omar Soliman agreed to convene a 
"five-plus-five" political committee negotiation in Cairo 
beginning June 12.  Sudanese Vice Presidents Taha and Garang are 
scheduled to meet Mirghani in Cairo June 15 to review the 
progress of the talks and to address any sticking-points, Saeed 
said.  If all goes according to schedule, Egyptian President 
Mubarak is to host a formal, public signing ceremony June 18.  A 
separate "Security Committee" meeting will address the issue of 
NDA troops being absorbed into the national military, and will 
conclude an agreement for signature at the June 18 ceremony. 
 
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Trust But Verify;  NDA Wants Fair Mediation 
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3.  (C) Offering background on the talks between the NDA and the 
GOS, Saeed criticised Egyptian mediation efforts for 
contributing to the long delay in bringing the negotiations to a 
close.  When an interim agreement was signed between the NDA and 
the GOS in Cairo on January 16, Saeed said, the negotiators 
announced to the media that a final agreement would be signed on 
February 11 in the presence of President Mubarak.  However, when 
neither Taha nor Garang would commit to convening negotiating 
teams to implement the January 16 interim agreement (i.e., 
Section 12 referring to the creation of a "Five-Plus-Five 
Working Committee"), the NDA told Egypt that it would not sign 
before the committee was activated and had met.  The Egyptians, 
he said, were angered by what they considered an insult to 
Mubarak, as a public commitment had been made.  Egypt, accoring 
to Saeed, responded to the NDA that "negotiations could not be 
re-opened" and remained aloof regarding plans to convene the 
final talks.  Saeed accused the GOS of bad faith in not carrying 
out its commitments on "implementation modalities" for the 
January 16 agreement, and said Egypt was not interested in 
holding Khartoum's feet to the fire. 
 
4.  (C) Citing additional examples of what he termed GOS bad 
faith, Saeed said that lead GOS negotiator Nafie had told the 
NDA in January that the composition of the national Constitution 
Committee would be one-third GOS, one-third SPLM, and one-third 
opposition groups.  By April, however, the GOS position was that 
the composition of that committee should reflect the 
power-sharing percentages described in the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (i.e., giving the NDA and opposition groups far less 
representation and influence).  Saeed also accused the GOS of 
insisting since April that the only way it would engage in final 
peace talks with the NDA was if the latter committed first to a 
specific date for final signature of a negotiated deal.  Given 
the NDA's deep distrust of GOS tactics and objectives, however, 
its leadership refused to make such a commitment without the GOS 
showing any flexibility on key NDA demands, Saeed said. 
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The East and the Eritrea Connection 
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5.  (C) Asked if the conflict in the East and incipient strains 
with the Beja were to be addressed in coming negotiations, Saeed 
said that talks on the East had been delayed indefinitely, but 
that the Beja Congress and their allies - the Free Lions - were 
closely watching what their NDA colleagues would achieve in 
talks with Khartoum.  Saeed said that the Beja Congress and Free 
Lions intended to pursue separate negotiations in the track 
discussed in the January 16 preliminary agreement with the GOS. 
(Note:  Beja Congress representative Mahmoud Ghabbour arrived at 
the NDA main office for a senior-level strategy meeting as 
poloff was departing.  During a brief hallway exchange, Ghabbour 
was scornful of what he called Washington's passivity on the 
"coming military conflict in the East."  He used the opportunity 
to encourage USG intervention to press Khartoum and Cairo to 
address Beja concerns fairly.  End note.) 
 
6.  (C) Saeed said that Eritrea had no intention of either 
releasing control over its "buffer" Beja allies in Eastern 
Sudan, or making progress in easing bilateral tensions with 
Khartoum.  Despite the recent summit meeting in Tripoli between 
Presidents Bashir and Afeworki, Saeed said relations between the 
two states remained fundamentally unchanged.  Egypt, Saeed 
added, could be helpful by urging Khartoum to take Eastern 
demands for fairness and autonomy seriously and to continue 
working to ease strains between Khartoum and Asmara.  Saeed 
believed Khartoum's strategy with the East would be to first get 
the Darfur and NDA talks under control, after which it would 
send troops to the East to quell the conflict there militarily. 
 
7.  (U) Khartoum minimize considered. 
 
 
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GRAY