US embassy cable - 05ROME1979

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 001979 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2015 
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, IT, NATO 
SUBJECT: EUR A/S FRIED'S ROME CONSULTATIONS, JUNE 6-7, 2005 
 
 
Classified By: PolMinCouns Tom Countryman, for reasons 1.5 (B)(D). 
 
1.  (C)  Summary:  EUR A/S Dan Fried met with Italian 
officials and 
press June 6-7 to stress our commitment to a strong 
U.S.-European 
partnership working through NATO and with the EU ready to 
tackle 
worldwide challenges.  Italians viewed the "no" votes in 
France and 
the Netherlands on the EU Constitution not as a crisis but as 
an 
opportunity to improve EU institutions and better explain EU 
actions 
to European publics.  This was also a chance for Italy to 
take 
the lead in strengthening trans-Atlantic relations (at French 
expense, as an ancillary effect).  Rome also wants to prevent 
the "no" votes from derailing progress on enlargement and 
engagement.  Italy is inclined to provide C-130 support for 
Darfur but has yet to decide if/how (to EU or NATO) to deploy 
these assets. In response to Rome's renewed pitch against 
G-4 proposals on UNSC reform, Fried said the U.S. was 
stepping 
back to await a broader consensus.  Fried suggested now would 
be a good time for Italy to reaffirm support for a vulnerable 
Lebanese interim government and urged Italy to fully fund 
commitments for Iraq at the June 21-22 Conference.  See septel 
for discussions on Kosovo/Balkans/Ukraine septel.  End 
Summary. 
 
2.  (U)  EUR A/S Dan Fried, accompanied by Acting EUR DAS 
Kathy Allegrone met in Rome June 6-7 with MFA Secretary 
General Umberto Vattani (plus Americas DG Bisogniero, D/DG 
for Europe Mancini, D/DG for Middle East del Balzo and Dept 
for European Integration Office Dir Grassi), Gianni 
Castellaneta, Diplomatic Advisor to PM Berlusconi/Ambassador 
-designate to Washington (with PM Diplomatic Advisor 
Scarante, 
Americas DG Bisogniero, and PM Advisor Francesco Talo), and 
U/S for Political Affairs Giulio Terzi (with NATO DG Brauzzi 
and G-8 DG Cantini). Fried also held a lunch with senior 
newspaper editors and a roundtable discussion with 
journalists 
and met with tri-mission and (via DVC) consulate employees in 
a town hall. A/S Fried's meeting with Vatican Deputy FM 
Parolin 
will be reported by Embassy Vatican. 
 
Italy:  "No" Votes Are an Opportunity 
------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C)  At every meeting, Fried explained that this visit, 
his first bilateral trip as A/S, was to assess the way 
ahead in the U.S.-European relationship in the wake of the 
"no" 
votes by France and the Netherlands on the EU Constitution. 
The U.S. had no specific position on the Constitution itself-- 
that was Europe's business--and we recognized that EU 
countries 
now had some serious thinking to do about how to better 
explain 
the EU to its citizens.  But we did not want the EU to react 
to 
the "no" votes by withdrawing into introspection that would 
endanger a vital and active partnership with Europe on a 
common worldwide agenda.  President Bush in his visit to 
Brussels made it a point to visit the EU as well as NATO-- 
this was no accident.  It was a deliberate message, 
reinforced 
by Secretary Rice and U/S Burns, that we want an active 
partnership with Europe. 
 
4.  (C)  Fried noted that we also wanted to deter some EU 
members from using the "no" votes to revive anti-Americanism 
and the bankrupt argument that the EU was a counterweight to 
the U.S.  We needed and wanted a strong trans-Atlantic 
partnership to move forward on an outward-looking action 
 
agenda to promote democracy, stability and prosperity 
throughout the Broader Middle East (especially Iraq and 
Lebanon), the Balkans, the South Caucuses, and Sudan. 
Fried said this partnership was already a reality with 
Italy, which we considered a major player in Europe, and he 
expressed U.S. appreciation for Rome's support in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Kosovo, Forum for the Future and the BMENA 
initiative. 
 
5. (C) At the MFA, Secretary General Vattani stressed that 
Italy continues to support EU enlargement in a way that 
supports the trans-Atlantic partnership.  He cited the 
December 2003 joint statement by Secretary Powell and EU 
Foreign ministers (drafted by Vattani) that defined common 
values and threats and supported strengthening the EU-NATO 
relationship.  He recommended the UK during its upcoming 
EU Presidency use this paper as a basis to build U.S.-EU 
cooperation.  Italy was already engaged, working not only 
in Iraq and Afghanistan but also with the G-8 on Yemen, 
the Balkans, Turkey, Georgia, Armenia, and Ajerbaijan. 
Italy considered the Black Sea states similar to  the 
Mediterranean in importance. Fried agreed that NATO was 
the core institution of the trans-Atlantic alliance, not 
just an extension of the U.S., and said we wanted a strong 
NATO capable of projecting effective multi-nationalism 
(not just coalitions of the willing) beyond Europe's 
traditional borders. He welcomed Italy's interest in the 
Black Sea, the edge of classical Europe, where the EU 
should be trying to enhance stability.  The prospect of 
EU membership for not just Turkey, but also Georgia and 
Ukraine, was a magnet to promote democracy and prosperity. 
Vattani reaffirmed Italy's support for Turkish membership 
and noted the danger that some states would use the "no" 
to slow enlargement.  This would affect not just Turkey 
but also Bulgaria and Romania. 
 
6.  (C)  Castellaneta said the "no" votes did not create a 
a crisis but could not be ignored either.  There were ways 
forward without the Constitution, perhaps to create a 
Foreign Minister, extend the tenure of the Presidency, and 
consider more input from individual states.  This could 
also be an opportunity for Italy (read PM Berlusconi) to 
lead European states to support a more liberal economic 
agenda, as well as a political program that strengthened 
the trans-Atlantic relationship (at France's expense, he 
implied).  The point was to show the public that the EU 
was not just an abstract entity that made life more 
difficult for Europeans.  He did not rule out development 
of an anti-American agenda by some members, if only as a 
means to change the subject.  In his view, the French vote 
was a rejection of expansion, a popular French reaction 
against "Polish plumbers" (i.e., cheap "foreign"workers). 
Castellaneta, who had just visited Tunis, also commented 
that the "no" votes were worrying states in North Africa 
that depended on a strong Europe to promote trade and 
stability. 
 
7.  (C)  Terzi, fresh from a G-8 meeting in London, 
described the UK decision to postpone its referendum as 
understandable, if not particularly helpful for efforts to 
stabilize the mood in Europe.  There was no need to 
dramatize events, but Europe must face the lack of public 
support and understanding for EU institutions--the recent 
debate among some in Italy for returning to the lira was 
one example of this reaction. 
 
8.  (C)  Tactically, Terzi reported the European Council 
would in the next few days try to assess next steps.  They 
had to absorb the shock and proceed carefully but had to 
keep in mind the two-year timetable for approval of the 
Constitution.  He echoed Castellaneta's suggestions--to 
strengthen foreign policy capability, even without the 
Constitution, and to support stability in the Balkans and 
Quartet action in the Middle East.  It was important to 
consider the effect of the "no" votes on enlargement; 
Sofia, he said, is already concerned.  Then there is the 
question of Turkey; Italy supports membership but France 
could use the votes to slow or block negotiations with 
 
Ankara. Terzi noted that the original concept of the EU had 
not been to allow a few big states to call the shots on 
major issues like Iraq or ESDI.  The whole point of 
creating supra-national institutions was to rise above 
nationalism.  Italy could now position itself as a 
proponent of a Europe comprised of equal partners and 
strong trans-Atlanticism.  There were opportunities to 
review cooperation with the U.S. every day on Kosovo, 
Bosnia, Iraq, Afghanistan, MEPP. 
 
UNSC Reform: Final Blow for Integration 
--------------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C)  Vattani commented that the "no" votes exposed deep 
rifts ("subterranean rivers") within Europe.  The G-4 
proposal 
to reform the UNSC would only deepen these rifts, and we 
could 
face not only the lack of a common agenda but the 
possibility the U.S. and EU will not be talking at all.  He 
warned it could create bitter exchanges and mechanical 
reactions based on nationalist interests that would 
reverberate beyond New York.  Vattani noted that it was not 
in Italy's interest to prevent others from joining the 
Security Council, but Rome remained concerned that reform 
would create further divisions in Europe.  He was not sure 
that Washington fully understood this. 
 
10.  (C)  Fried responded that we do appreciate the depth of 
Italian feeling on this issue.  This is a tough issue for 
us.  We support UN reform that improves the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the institution but UNSC reform must be 
based on a broad consensus that does not yet exist.  This 
is true even in Asia, where we have already committed to 
giving Japan a seat.  But we are not interested in 
exacerbating tensions or increasing divisions.  This is not 
just an Italian problem.  The U.S. has not yet taken a 
position on the details of UNSC reform; we want first to see 
broad 
consensus.  Vattani suggested the U.S. needs to publicize 
that position and joked, "do we want five more years of 
Schroeder?" 
 
11.  (C)  Terzi characterized the G-4 offer on reform as 
the final blow to European integration, at least for 
foreign policy.  With Castellaneta and Terzi, Fried 
reiterated that the U.S. wanted to step back to look 
carefully at the question of UNSC reform.  We did not want 
to exacerbate tensions in the name of improving 
international relations. 
 
Darfur: Decision on C-130 Deployment June 7 
------------------------------------------- 
 
12.  (C)  Fried told Vattani, Castellaneta and Terzi that 
there was plenty of work for all in Sudan, but it was 
important for each country and institution to focus on its 
competitive advantages.  The U.S. and France offered to 
airlift battalions of the African Union.  SHAPE is best 
positioned to organize an airlift; EU countries have 
airlift assets to lend.  We were asking Italy to provide 
one-two of its C-130's to this important humanitarian 
effort.  In principle, all the Italians agreed on their 
desire to help.  Vattani noted that an MFA officer had been 
in Darfur for months and they were planning on providing 
200 soldiers.  Vattani and Terzi noted that there was an 
MFA-Ministry of Defense meeting scheduled for June 7 at 
which it would be decided if and to whom (EU or NATO) the 
Italians would support deployment of C-130s for Darfur. 
(Note:  As of June 10, the Italians had not yet made a final 
determination on how to support the airlift.)  Francesco 
Talo indicated that Italy also would be able to 
extend training in Vincenza for African peacekeepers if the 
G-8 could come up with additional funding.  Current plans, 
funded by the U.S. and Italy, called for training 1,000 
trainers from seven countries per year beginning in 
September/October. 
 
Lebanon/Syria 
------------- 
 
13. (C)  In the MFA meeting with Vattani, Fried described 
Lebanon as being vulnerable and in need of continued 
U.S.-EU support.  Without suggesting we have proof, Fried 
said one would wonder if the assassination of journalist 
Samir Kassir was Syria's way of continuing to pressure 
Lebanon.  This would perhaps be a good time to show support 
for the interim Lebanese government, perhaps with a 
high-level visit. 
 
14. (C)  Vattani responded that the assassination of PM 
Hariri, and now Kassir, were real blows.  Italy has a long 
relationship, including active cultural ties, with Lebanon 
and is Lebanon,s leading trade partner.  The question is 
Syria.  The Syrians, he said, have always responded in 
devious and obscure ways to all the pressure exerted 
against them.  They withdrew troops but what or who did 
they leave behind?  Vattani wondered if there was a way 
we can persuade Syria to a "more positive and less 
obnoxious" stance.  Threats do not seem effective, and 
there could be a time--perhaps not yet--when the EU could 
offer economic incentives in exchange for better behavior, 
especially on border and security issues. 
 
15. (C)  Fried responded that there was a real risk if the 
timing of such an initiative was wrong.  Asad could easily 
misinterpret such an offer as a reward for bad behavior. 
The U.S. understands the possibility of positive outreach, 
and Fried cited recent policy on Libya and Iran.  However, 
Fried noted that combined U.S.-French pressure had yielded 
results on withdrawal, and it was important that Asad 
continue to feel that pressure.  A positive outreach to Syria 
now would be misinterpreted.  The U.S. and the EU were 
working together on Gaza disengagement, a two-state 
solution and a credible Palestinian state, and democracy 
in Lebanon.  Syria was working against all of these 
initiatives and was providing real support for fighters 
killing U.S. and Italian forces in Iraq.  It was time Syria 
understood it had few friends and needed to change its 
behavior.  We do not rule out in principle positive 
engagement with Syria, Fried noted, but now is not the time. 
Vattani held out the possibility that the EU could take 
some soundings of Damascus to see how they might react 
to an initiative, but conceded the time is not yet right. 
 
Iraq: Leave the Fish but Reduce the Water 
----------------------------------------- 
 
16.  (C)  Fried told Castellaneta and Terzi that things 
were steadily improving in Iraq.  We deeply appreciated the 
continued Italian commitment and were pleased Rome would 
attend the June 22 Conference on Iraq.  He told 
Castellaneta it was important for Italy to fully fund its 
existing commitments and hopefully unfreeze remaining Iraqi 
assets here.  Castellaneta agreed things were slowing 
improving vis a vis the insurgency, noting that sometimes 
it was better to leave the fish but reduce the water in 
which it swims. 
 
Agrement/Berlusconi Address to Congress 
--------------------------------------- 
 
17.  (C)  Over dinner at the Ambassador's residence, Fried 
delivered the good news to Castellaneta that Washington had 
granted his agrement to become Italy's next Ambassador. 
Castellaneta reported that PM Berlusconi was hoping to 
schedule his address to a joint session of Congress next 
spring, perhaps in February-March, depending on the 
Congressional agenda.  (Note: The invitation for the 
address came from House Speaker Hastert). 
 
18.  (U)  This message was cleared by A/S Fried. 
 
 
SEMBLER 
 
 
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 2005ROME01979 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL