US embassy cable - 05VIENNA1935

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EU FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING AND EU CUBA POLICY: AUSTRIAN RESPONSE

Identifier: 05VIENNA1935
Wikileaks: View 05VIENNA1935 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Vienna
Created: 2005-06-10 09:28:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PHUM PARM IR IZ LE YI CM CU AU EUN
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENNA 001935 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/ERA AND EUR/AGS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PARM, IR, IZ, LE, YI, CM, CU, AU, EUN 
SUBJECT: EU FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING AND EU CUBA POLICY: 
AUSTRIAN RESPONSE 
 
REF: A) STATE 105235 B) STATE 102505 C) VIENNA 1740 
 
     D) VIENNA 1826 
 
Classified By: ACTING DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION GREGORY E. PHILLIPS 
REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
1.  (SBU) Embassy delivered ref (a) points on the upcoming 
GAERC to Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on June 7. 
Embassy delivered ref (b) points on Cuba on June 3.  Pol Unit 
chief then discussed the issues on June 8 with Andreas 
Riecken, MFA Coordinator for EU Common Foreign and Security 
Policy. 
 
2.  (C) BALKANS/KOSOVO:  Riecken thanked us for the copies of 
Under Secretary Burns' testimony and speech.  He said that 
the focus during the GAERC would be on Kosovo.  The standards 
review would soon result in a need to consider the "the 
post-UNSC 1244 period."  Austria was prepared to tackle the 
organization of a Thessaloniki follow-up conference during 
its EU presidency, but only if there were realistic prospects 
for success.  The Commission was encouraging Austria to plan 
for such a conference, he added. 
 
3.   (SBU) IRAN: Riecken told us that Iran was not on the 
agenda for the June 13 GAERC but would figure in the 
Conclusions of the EU Summit on June 16-17.  He added that 
there was complete agreement between the EU and the U.S. on 
the need for Iran to abandon its uranium enrichment program. 
 
4.  (SBU) LEBANON: Riecken told us that Lebanon was not an 
agenda item for the GAERC, and that the current draft of the 
Conclusions for the EU Summit did not address Lebanon, "but 
that could change, depending on new developments." 
 
5.  (SBU) IRAQ: Riecken said Austria appreciated the 
importance of the U.S.-EU sponsored conference, and confirmed 
that Foreign Minister Plassnik was planning to attend (ref c). 
 
6.  (SBU) U.S.-EU SUMMIT:  Austria was following developments 
closely in preparation for its assumption of the Presidency 
in January 2006, Riecken said.  We commented that there may 
be some decisions taken at the June 20 Summit in Washington 
with a reporting date for follow-up at the 2006 Summit. 
 
7.  (C) CHINA ARMS EMBARGO: We emphasized that the Code of 
Conduct would not be a substitute for the Embargo, and that a 
lift would have serious repercussions.  Riecken commented 
that the Luxembourgers, "like star pupils," were trying to 
complete action on a goal they had set for their presidency. 
However, Riecken confided, he did not see any consensus on a 
lift emerging now, and also doubted strongly that the UK 
presidency would push the issue.  This made it more likely 
that the problem would land on Austria's desk in 2006, he 
added. 
 
8.  (C) EU CUBA POLICY (ref b): Riecken commented that the 
PSC, COREPER, and the GAERC would all consider this issue 
over the next few days, but that finding a consensus would be 
difficult.  The Spanish wanted to be most accommodating to 
the Cuban regime, while the Czechs were holding out for a 
harder line.  All member states regretted the actions the 
Cuban government had taken to prevent attendance at the 
opposition meeting on May 20 - but some felt that it was a 
positive sign that the regime had allowed the meeting to take 
place at all.  Riecken thought that neither the common 
measures nor their later suspension had produced the positive 
effects the EU had sought.  It might be preferable for EU 
member states to calibrate their own responses to Castro's 
oppressive measures (ref d) -- rather than lock them into a 
lowest-common-denominator position. 
Brown 

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