US embassy cable - 05DUBLIN715

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IRISH RESPONSE TO PRE-GAERC DEMARCHE

Identifier: 05DUBLIN715
Wikileaks: View 05DUBLIN715 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Dublin
Created: 2005-06-10 08:52:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PARM EUN
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

100852Z Jun 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 000715 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PARM, EUN 
SUBJECT: IRISH RESPONSE TO PRE-GAERC DEMARCHE 
 
REF: A. STATE 105235 
 
     B. DUBLIN 683 
     C. DUBLIN 598 
     D. STATE 106113 
     E. JOYCE-YOUNG E-MAIL OF JUNE 8. 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Jonathan S. Benton, Reasons 1.4 (B) an 
d (D). 
 
1.  (C) Summary: On June 8, Post delivered ref A talking 
points to Gerard Keown, Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) 
EU correspondent.  Keown said that the GOI might contribute 
police personnel to the EU's planned Rule of Law training 
program for the Iraqi Transitional Government, but would not 
likely decide before the June 21-22 U.S.-EU conference on 
Iraq.  He also conveyed Ireland's hopes that EU-3 diplomacy 
would yield a final deal with Iran, that the Balkan countries 
would undertake reforms necessary for integration into the 
European Union, and that the June 20 U.S.-EU Summit would 
yield concrete results, including a positive economic 
declaration.  Regarding the EU Constitution, Keown commented 
that the French and Dutch referenda had disappointed the GOI, 
but did not pose a crisis for Europe.  End summary. 
 
Iraq 
---- 
 
2.  (C) Ireland might make available police personnel to the 
EU's planned Rule of Law training program for the Iraqi 
Transitional Government (ITG), said Keown.  The GOI, however, 
would not likely decide on this possibility before the June 
21-22 U.S.-EU conference on Iraq, as the GOI was not planning 
to announce new forms of support for the ITG at the 
conference (per ref B).  Keown cited international 
recognition for Ireland's policing tradition, as reflected in 
UNSYG Annan's appointment of Ireland's Deputy Police 
Commissioner, Peter Fitzgerald, to head the UN investigation 
into the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister 
Rafik Hariri.  The fact that Irish police conducted most of 
their domestic duties unarmed posed a challenge, however, for 
Ireland's participation in the EU Rule of Law program.  Keown 
explained that Irish police trainers might not be the best 
fit for an Iraqi police force that will have to carry weapons. 
 
Iran 
---- 
 
3.  (C) EU-3 diplomacy with Iran remained on track and would 
hopefully yield a final deal satisfactory to all sides, said 
Keown.  He noted that Iran's statement in May about its 
intention to resume uranium conversion work was a concern, 
but should be viewed primarily in the context of Iran's June 
17 presidential poll (with candidates reluctant to show 
weakness in the face of international pressure).  Keown 
ventured that the Iranian Government approached the nuclear 
issue as a matter of national pride and as a legal 
entitlement under the NPT, which allowed for the civilian use 
of nuclear energy.  Iran also saw the issue as a strategic 
opportunity to assert itself in a region undergoing 
significant change, particularly with the ascendancy of the 
Shia community in Iraq.  Keown cited views expressed by 
Ireland's representatives at the NPT Review Conference that 
efforts by nuclear powers to reduce their weapons arsenals 
would help to discourage non-nuclear states from developing 
such weapons. 
 
The Balkans 
----------- 
 
4.  (C) Ireland agreed fully with ref A points on the Balkans 
and welcomed Under Secretary Burns' June 7-9 visit to the 
region, said Keown.  He noted the GOI's view that the EU had 
important contributions to make to the UN-led process of 
resolving Kosovo's status.  The 2003 Thessaloniki Agenda for 
the Western Balkans had set forth political and economic 
prescriptions for integration of the region's countries into 
the European Union, and Ireland hoped that more progress 
could be achieved on those fronts.  The GOI also saw 
Belgrade's attitude as central to the Kosovo status issue, 
but was concerned that Montenegro's possible referendum in 
2006 on independence from Serbia would influence Belgrade's 
capacity and willingness to play a more constructive role 
with Kosovo. 
 
China 
----- 
 
5.  (C) There had been no changes in Ireland's position on 
the EU arms embargo against China (which supports the 
embargo's removal, per ref C), according to Keown.  He 
asserted that technical-level discussions on the Code of 
Conduct were at an advanced stage, but had not yet been 
finalized.  Ireland did not expect EU movement, however, on 
lifting the arms embargo "in the immediate future."   Keown 
observed that the GOI was pleased with the start of the 
U.S.-EU strategic dialogue on East Asia and hoped that such 
exchanges could be regularized and perhaps expanded at some 
point to cover the overlap of security and economic issues. 
 
U.S.-EU Summit 
-------------- 
 
6.  (C) Ireland anticipated a positive, concrete outcome to 
the June 20 U.S.-EU Summit that would advance trans-Atlantic 
cooperation and build on the joint declarations reached at 
the 2004 Summit hosted by Ireland, said Keown.  He confirmed 
receiving from Emboff on June 7 a copy of ref D talking 
points regarding the Summit's draft economic declaration, 
which he had discussed with DFA's EU External Relations 
Division (the office responsible within DFA for 
trans-Atlantic economic issues).  The Division had seen, and 
supported, the response to the points provided by Department 
of Enterprise, Trade, and Employment (DETE) Senior Trade 
Negotiator, Tony Joyce, by e-mail to Emboff on June 8.  (Per 
ref E, Joyce said that Ireland hoped to see a strong, 
positive economic statement at the Summit, and he expressed 
confidence that the Commission shared that view.) 
 
The EU Constitution 
------------------- 
 
7.  (C) Emboff took the occasion to seek GOI views regarding 
the French and Dutch referenda on the EU Constitution, 
particularly in the context of the GOI's June 6 statement 
that Ireland would continue preparations for its own 
referendum.  Keown stated that the GOI would evaluate the 
referendum question on the basis of discussions at the June 
16-17 European Council meeting (a view expressed on June 2 by 
Foreign Minister Ahern).  Ireland, having shepherded the 
Constitution through negotiations during its 2004 EU 
presidency, continued to believe that the Constitution 
protected its national interests, while providing a 
simplified framework for the EU's future internal and 
external relations.  The French and Dutch rejection of the 
Constitution, mostly for domestic political reasons, was thus 
a disappointment for the GOI.  Keown emphasized, however, 
that the French and Dutch results did not pose a crisis for 
the EU and should be considered politically tantamount to the 
2003 California recall election.  He added that, contrary to 
European and U.S. reporting about the "end of the European 
enterprise," the enlargement process would continue, and the 
EU would continue to function "just fine" under the Nice 
Treaty. 
BENTON 

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