US embassy cable - 05VILNIUS596

C O N F I D E N T I A L VILNIUS 000596 
 
SIPDIS 
 
CONFIDENTIAL 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/NB, DS/IP/EUR, AND DS/ITA/EUR 
 
TALLINN FOR FBI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2015 
TAGS: MCAP, KSTC, PARM, PTER, PINR, EFIN, KNNP, ASEC, IR, LH, HT33 
SUBJECT: GERMAN AND LITHUANIAN AUTHORITIES SCRUTINIZE MONEY 
TRAIL FOR IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM EQUIPMENT 
 
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY RSO BRENT A. BARKER. REASON 1.5 (D). 
 
2. (C) Summary. The Lithuanian Financial Crime 
Investigative Service recently disclosed to us that in 2004 
it received an informal request from a German government 
agency regarding a financial transaction used to "purchase 
equipment in Germany for a nuclear station in Iran."  The 
German request stated that the purchase was legal, but 
questioned why the payment was effected through Lithuania. 
End Summary. 
 
3. (C) The International Relations Division of the 
Financial Crimes Investigative Service (FCIS) provided RSO 
with information regarding an informal request from its 
German counterpart, the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). 
In June 2004, the FCIS received an informal request from 
the FIU asking for confirmation that a banking transaction 
had taken place in Lithuania.  The money transfer was 
allegedly linked to equipment purchased for the Iranian 
Nuclear Program. 
 
4. (C) German authorities asked the Lithuanian FCIS to 
confirm that on May 14, 2004 the British company Priory 
Trading LTD had transferred 200,000 Euros from their 
account in the Snoras Bank of Lithuania (Account # 
840370477) to the Commercial Bank of Berlin account of the 
German company, Solo Handels Gmbh (Account # 238828800). 
The FCIS confirmed to Germany that the transaction had 
taken place. 
 
5. (C) According to the FCIS, the German FIU informal 
request stated that the transaction was to "purchase 
equipment in Germany for a nuclear station in Iran."  The 
German FIU stated that the purchase was legal, but sought 
insights about why the payment originated in Lithuania. 
Lithuania confirmed that the transaction did occur, and 
stated that it did not violate any Lithuanian laws.  By the 
time of the German request, the account was closed.  The 
Lithuanian FCIS told the German FIU to submit a formal 
request through official channels if it required any 
further information.  Germany submitted no official request 
related to this transaction. 
 
6. (C) Comment.  The FCIS official stated that he could 
provide the information reported above because it was part 
of an informal request and not a formal request.  RSO asked 
for additional information, such who transferred the 
200,000 Euros into the Snoras Bank.  The official replied 
that information was protected by Lithuanian banking laws 
and could not be disclosed informally.  But he did say that 
the Untied States could obtain additional information by 
making a formal request through the MLAT process or through 
a FINCEN request. 
 
MULL