US embassy cable - 05COLOMBO1039

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001039 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2015 
TAGS: PREL, EAID, PTER, CE, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT TELLS AMBASSADOR SHE IS UNDER PRESSURE, 
INTENDS TO GO AHEAD WITH JOINT MECHANISM -- BUT NOT SURE 
WHEN 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD FOR REASON 1.4 (D). 
 
 1. (C) SUMMARY: President Kumaratunga told 
Ambassador she intends to sign the Joint 
Mechanism, she hopes by end of the month.  She 
believes the JVP will not leave the Government if 
she signs.  She asked for strong Co-Chair support 
for the Joint Mechanism.  She will discuss the 
Joint Mechanism with Opposition Leader 
Wickremesinghe shortly.  She appeared to admit 
Government forces may be involved in the recent 
Cease Fire violations.  END SUMMARY 
 
2. (C) Ambassador called on President Chandrika 
Kumaratunga evening of June 9 in preparation for 
his departure for Washington to attend Co-Chairs 
meeting.  Kumaratunga bustled in and dismissed MFA 
notetaker--"I want to speak to the Ambassador one- 
on-one."  Apologizing for being late, she said 
that she was under a lot of strain.  "I have to 
make hard decisions which impinge on the future of 
the government and the country."  She then asked 
Ambassador about the upcoming Co-Chairs meeting. 
 
3. (C) Ambassador said that the meeting was 
important for several reasons: 
 
--It would be the first Co-Chairs meeting since 
the second Bush Administration began its term, and 
therefore would introduce some new players. 
 
--The debate about the Joint Mechanism for tsunami 
reconstruction in the North and East was reaching 
a crucial point. 
 
--The ceasefire seemed to be under increasing 
pressure, with killings taking place by both 
sides. 
 
Ambassador noted this meeting would take place 
almost exactly two years after the original Tokyo 
meeting where Co-Chair mechanism had originated. 
Co-Chairs had begun on the premise that it was a 
vehicle by which the international community could 
support the Sri Lankan peace process.  If the 
peace process could not progress due to internal 
factors in Sri Lanka, then Co-Chairs would have to 
consider and re-assess just what their role should 
be.  If there were no progress, then international 
attention would naturally move to other areas and 
problems.  Specifically, if the GSL and the LTTE 
could not agree on the Joint Mechanism--an 
administrative measure to deal with reconstruction 
needs--then the international community would have 
to wonder how they could make progress on much 
more complicated and politically difficult issues 
in the peace process.  Ambassador concluded that 
the purpose of the Co-Chairs was to assist in the 
peace process, working as a partner.  What did the 
President think would be a useful contribution 
from the Co-Chairs? 
 
4. (C) Kumaratunga responded by saying that she 
was committed to the Joint Mechanism and would 
have it signed--"certainly by the end of the 
month."  The JVP, she said, was not only agitating 
against the mechanism, but was also canvassing 
members of her own SLFP party.  The JVP was saying 
that at the recent Development Forum the donors 
had promised their money anyway whether or not 
there was a Joint Mechanism, so why was it needed? 
Only the President wanted it.  Ambassador said 
that donors had made clear that their tsunami 
relief was not conditional, but that they believed 
the Joint Mechanism would both make tsunami 
reconstruction more effective and provide a boost 
to the peace process.  In addition, smaller donor 
countries wanted to channel their assistance 
through the World Bank Trust Fund that would be 
set up in conjunction with the Joint Mechanism. 
Kumaratunga said it would be immensely helpful to 
her if the Co-Chairs made it clear that the Joint 
Mechanism was important both for reconstruction 
implementation and as a confidence building 
measure for the peace process. 
 
5. (C) Ambassador asked if she thought the JVP 
would leave the government is she signed the Joint 
Mechanism. Kumaratunga said she was 90 percent 
sure they would not leave.  The JVP values its 
Ministerial portfolios too much, she said.  She 
then said that Opposition Leader and UNP head 
Ranil Wickremesinghe had asked to come over and 
talk to her about the Joint Mechanism and she 
would see him the next day.  Ambassador said that 
he had spoken to Wickremesinghe two days before 
and had impressed upon him also that if the Joint 
Mechanism failed, the attention of the 
international community might move elsewhere. 
Kumaratunga went on that if the Government could 
not sign and implement the Joint Mechanism, then 
"it can't do anything."  The Tamils, she continued, 
would be completely disillusioned and would be 
justified in returning to war. 
 
6. (C) Ambassador shifted discussion to the Cease 
Fire Agreement, which he said appeared to be 
coming under increasing stress as both sides 
seemed to be committing violent acts, although the 
murky situation made it hard to tell who was doing 
what. Kumaratunga responded: "It's hard for me to 
know also."  It was possible, she said that "some 
low-level people" in the police or the military 
were supporting the Karuna faction.  She also said 
that police had just arrested two members of the 
anti-LTTE Tamil group PLOTE for the murder of the 
journalist Sivaram, implying that this showed the 
Government was not involved.  Ambassador stressed 
that there were other killings happening, that 
there was a need to find a way to bring the level 
of violence down, and said Co-Chairs would need to 
mention this. 
 
7. (C) Kumaratunga said that the Tigers have given 
a lot in agreeing to the Joint Mechanism, in 
effect admitting the sovereignty of the GSL and, 
for the first time, conceding that Muslims as a 
group had a right to representation.  She had just 
finished discussing the Joint Mechanism with 9 
Muslim MP's.  They wanted two changes in the Joint 
Mechanism.  She had asked them which change was 
most important and had promised to raise the issue 
with Norwegian Ambassador Brattskar to see if he 
could take it up with the LTTE. Kumaratunga ended 
by reaffirming that she still intended to sign the 
Joint Mechanism, "certainly within a few weeks." 
 
8. (C) Comment: Kumaratunga's resolve on the Joint 
Mechanism is apparently as strong as ever, but she 
faces an uphill battle (See septel on other Joint 
Mechanism developments.)  She believes the JVP 
will not leave the Government if she signs; all 
facts point the other way.  Her comment that she 
hopes to sign "by the end of the month" or "in a 
few weeks" is discouraging, as this date seems to 
keep fading into the distance.  It seems to us-- 
and to many other observers here--that the longer 
she waits the more difficult the task will become. 
Any attempt to reopen the text for negotiation, as 
she seems to have suggested to the Muslims, will 
also cause problems. 
LUNSTEAD