US embassy cable - 05ROME1966

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A/S FRIED'S CONSULTATIONS WITH ITALIAN U/S TERZI

Identifier: 05ROME1966
Wikileaks: View 05ROME1966 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Rome
Created: 2005-06-09 17:03:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV IT
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 001966 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, IT 
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED'S CONSULTATIONS WITH ITALIAN U/S TERZI 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Tom Countryman, for reasons 
 1.5 (B)(D). 
 
1.  (C) Summary.  A/S Fried met with Italian MFA U/S Giulio 
Terzi June 7 to discuss Italian reaction to the French and 
Dutch "no" votes on the EU Constitution (see septel).  With 
Russian FM Lavrov and Serbian PM Kostunica due in Rome, Terzi 
also reviewed with Fried our policies towards Kosovo, Bosnia, 
Ukraine and Russia.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C)  Terzi noted that Russian FM Lavrov (June 7) and 
Serbian PM Kostunica (June 7-8) would be visiting Rome and 
asked for an update on the U.S. position on Kosovo.  While we 
were thinking this through, Fried said our view was the 
status quo could not continue.  The best result would likely 
be a phased, supervised independence over time.  This should 
be coupled with the prospect of EU membership for both, along 
the lines proposed by the International Commission on the 
Balkans (chaired by former Italian PM Amato).  We understand 
this creates the risk of some instability, but it is better 
to accept instability on our terms rather than be forced to 
react to it on theirs, as was the case in March 2004.  Fried 
said he had told the Serbs that every time they play 
nationalist politics, they lose more territory, so it was 
time to accept that Belgrade cannot keep Kosovo.  We cannot 
allow either the Serbs halt the process.  The U.S. will stay 
involved, but the EU must do its part, especially by opening 
its door to the Balkans. 
 
3.  (C)  Terzi said it was especially good to know the U.S. 
was committed to continued involvement while the EU considers 
further action.  Rome was making bilateral efforts to improve 
the situation, and ICTY compliance was improving.  Regarding 
a dialogue with Pristina, it was important to apply pressure 
on the Kosovo side.  President Tadic was in Rome a few weeks 
ago, and Italy emphasized to him their concerns about the 
Kosovan Serbs, including the right of return and freedom of 
movement.  The ideal concepts of conditional independence 
should be finalized.  The prospect of integration is 
important but less credible for Kosovars--especially if the 
"no" votes on the EU Constitution slowed accession prospects 
for Bulgaria and Romania. 
 
4.  (C)  At the recent G-8 meeting in London, Terzi said, the 
Russians did not push for further postponement of the 
mid-term review.  He referred to a French technical paper 
that the EU could use on Kosovo and Bosnia/Herzegovina that 
included pragmatic details on commission representation and 
how KFOR could transfer power.  Questions remain, but this 
shows the French are making an honest effort and are not 
automatically siding with Belgrade.  They have moved and 
understand the need for an end game based on constructive 
solutions. 
 
5.  (C)  Terzi noted that Kostunica would be making an 
address at the Italian Senate this week (note: see speech 
summary in Embassy Rome Daily Sipirnet for June 8).  Fried 
asked that Italy try to persuade him to accept a definition 
of "less than independence" as being "less than unsupervised 
independence." He should be convinced to make this change in 
order to give himself a formula for success.  To keep the 
hard line on Kosovo's status will not be successful and will 
only delay Serbia's eventual integration in to European 
institutions.   He also asked Italy to work on getting 
Kostunica to encourage participation of Kosovo Serbs in the 
Kosovo political process, and to locate Mladic and hand him 
over to the ICTY.  (Note: On June 8, Berlusconi's office gave 
us a detailed readout of his meeting with Kostunica. 
Berlusconi did push on these issues but got little 
satisfaction from his guest on moderating his line on Kosovo). 
 
6.  (C)  Terzi asked where the Contact Group was going, 
noting Italian interest in the region.  OHR Paddy Ashdown was 
OK, but some questions remain on the police mandate.   Will 
the Bonn powers be less visible and less needed in the 
future?  The person who replaces Ashdown will have to follow 
up.  Rome would like to nominate a senior Italian diplomat, 
Laura Mirachian (formerly AMB to Syria and DAS-equivalent for 
Balkans), to take Ashdown's place, if a technocrat proves 
appropriate.   Terzi said the British and the French support 
 
the nomination and she is well-known to the U.S., but the 
Germans may not support her.  Fried promised to check into 
the issue. 
 
7.  (C)  On Georgia, Fried reiterated that the Russians had 
come to an agreement on base closings that we hope will hold. 
 We need, with Ukrainian help, to promote a fair settlement 
in Transnistria, which could include a withdrawal of Russian 
equipment and an end to Moscow's support for the Smirnov 
regime.  We are also concerned about domestic issues in 
Russia--the Yukos trial was quite disturbing.  European 
governments and the U.S. need to send consistent messages to 
Russia about the importance of democracies and the rule of 
law. 
 
8.  (U)  A/S Fried approved this message. 
 
SEMBLER 
 
 
NNNN 
	2005ROME01966 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL 


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