US embassy cable - 05COLOMBO1033

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001033 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
LONDON FOR BELL 
USPACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, CE, Political Parties, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA:  JVP DIGGING IN HEELS OVER JOINT 
MECHANISM 
 
REF: A. COLOMBO 1027 
 
     B. COLOMBO 1019 
 
Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD.  REASON:  1.4 (B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C) In a June 8 conversation with poloffs, Somawansa 
Amarasinghe, Leader of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), 
confirmed his party's determination to quit the United 
People's Front Alliance (UPFA) if President Chandrika 
Kumaratunga proceeds with plans to sign a so-called "joint 
mechanism" on tsunami relief with the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE).  Since elections would be "disastrous" 
for the country, Amarasinghe said, the JVP would join the 
opposition but would continue to support the government from 
the outside on "people-friendly" issues.  If early elections 
were called, however, he was confident that his party would 
fare better than in 2004 and could be back in government as a 
partner in another alliance.  Citing a lack of support for 
the mechanism within the President's own party, however, 
Amarasinghe predicted that Kumaratunga would not sign the 
agreement with the Tigers.  The JVP clearly sees the 
confrontation over the joint mechanism as a way to 
demonstrate its leadership--and divert attention from the 
President's own attempts to demonstrate leadership.  End 
summary. 
 
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NO JOINT MECHANISM BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS 
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2.  (C) On June 8 poloffs met with Somawansa Amarasinghe, 
Leader of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) partner in the 
United People's Front Alliance (UPFA), and Nandana 
Gunatilleke, JVP MP from Kalutara District (and UPFA 
Chairman) to discuss JVP threats to leave the government if 
President Chandrika Kumaratunga signs the so-called "joint 
mechanism" agreement on tsunami relief with the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).  Amarasinghe, noting bitterly 
that no one in his party--including Cabinet Ministers--has 
even seen the draft text, said that the President had briefed 
his party on the salient points of the agreement on May 27. 
The JVP opposes the mechanism, he said, because it puts a 
terrorist organization on the same plane as a democratically 
elected government.  The agreement would be perceived as 
rewarding the LTTE with undeserved legitimacy, he continued, 
when the Tigers had done nothing to change their terrorist 
tactics, renounce violence or cease child recruitment.  "We 
do not expect them to disarm tomorrow," but they violate the 
Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) blatantly and continuously, he 
charged.  Before engaging with the Tigers, "we have to see 
some evidence of improved behavior and willingness to enter 
the democratic process," he insisted. 
 
3.  (C)  The UPFA manifesto authorizes the President to 
undertake peace negotiations--not to sign an agreement on a 
joint mechanism, Amarasinghe continued.  "We've been elected 
to implement the manifesto; anything that creeps in afterward 
will not be tolerated."  Poloff noted that both sides seemed 
to have reached an impasse over preconditions for 
negotiations; could the joint mechanism not provide an avenue 
to re-engage with the Tigers without preconditions?  No, said 
Amarasinghe.  The Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) is prepared 
to re-enter negotiations without preconditions with the 
Tigers at any time, he added; the only thing preventing 
resumed negotiations is the Tigers' own inflexibility.  "The 
joint mechanism cannot be a stepping stone to dialogue," he 
asserted; "this cannot be the beginning."  Acknowledging U.S. 
concerns about Tiger ceasefire violations, poloff asked if 
humanitarian concern for the welfare of innocent tsunami 
victims in the north and east were not enough reason to 
consider the mechanism.  No, Amarasinghe responded, adding 
"We don't separate politics and humanitarian work."  He then 
expressed appreciation for the firm U.S. stance on terror, 
asserting that the JVP, like President Bush, says yes to 
democracy and no to terror.  He said his party was grateful 
that the USG, unlike the GSL, had maintained the LTTE's 
listing as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. 
4.  (C)  Even if his party were not absolutely opposed to the 
joint mechanism as a matter of principle, there are numerous 
other problems as well with the assumptions underpinning the 
mechanism, Amarasinghe said, and began to tick them off. 
First, the LTTE controls only 49 of the over 350 grama 
sevakas (the smallest unit of local administration--usually a 
cluster of villages) in the north and east; why is it given 
equal status with the GSL in deciding how tsunami aid in that 
area will be implemented?  Giving the Tigers such a prominent 
role in decisions affecting areas not under their control 
only reinforces the idea of a Tamil homeland of which the 
Tigers are the sole representative, he complained.  Second, 
the overwhelming number of tsunami victims in the north and 
east are Muslim; why are Tigers given a greater role--and 
more representatives--in the mechanism?  Third, the mechanism 
is not actually needed to distribute tsunami assistance. 
Tsunami aid is already reaching affected populations, 
 
SIPDIS 
including in LTTE-controlled areas, without the mechanism, he 
asserted.  If that were not the case, he concluded, there 
would have been food riots in the welfare camps. 
 
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LTTE UNPOPULAR IN EAST? 
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5.  (C) Although the Tigers continue to claim the north and 
east as a traditional Tamil homeland, the LTTE is not popular 
in the east, Amarasinghe said; Tamil people there support the 
dissident "Karuna" group.  If the ceasefire broke and 
full-scale hostilities were to resume, he predicted, eastern 
Tamils would come out in force in favor of Karuna.  He added 
that the JVP had been trying to organize better and create 
linkages with civil society in the east, but those efforts 
had been interrupted by the tsunami.  The party plans to 
resume those activities soon, he reported. 
 
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THE FIRST ALLIANCE, BUT NOT THE LAST 
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6.  (C) The President has not met the JVP on the joint 
mechanism since May 27, and no meetings on this controversial 
issue have been scheduled since, Gunatilleke said.  When 
asked what the JVP would do if the President were to sign the 
mechanism agreement, Amarasinghe rejoined that his party 
would leave the alliance and sit with the opposition in 
Parliament.  He confirmed that the JVP might still support 
the President on "people-friendly" issues that are consistent 
with the UPFA manifesto.  The party is not hoping for early 
elections, he said; elections now would be "disastrous" for 
the country.  If elections were held, however, the JVP would 
fare better than in the 2004 polls, he predicted, adding that 
the party now has three times the number of district 
delegates that it had in 2003.  "I can't say that means we 
would do three times as well" as last time, he conceded, but 
he expects the party's village-level organizational prowess 
would translate into an even stronger showing at the polls. 
When asked if the other two large parties were undertaking 
similar initiatives to improve their visibility and 
popularity at the local level, Amarasinghe responded, "We 
don't see them" in the villages.  If elections were called, 
"we can be in an alliance with anyone,"  Amarasinghe said, 
including, he indicated, the opposition United National 
Party.  The UPFA is "our first alliance, but not our last"; 
the JVP is learning and growing all the time. 
 
 
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SHOWDOWN OVER MECHANISM: 
TEST OF JVP LEADERSHIP 
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7.  (C) "Crises are good for us" as a party and as a country, 
Amarasinghe said, because crises produce leaders.  As a 
party, "we are demonstrating our leadership" through our 
principled stand on the joint mechanism, he stated.  That 
said, despite all the to-and-fro in the press and the 
President's much-repeated determination to sign the 
mechanism, "she will not do it," Amarasinghe predicted.  In 
the end, she will have to back down because most of her own 
Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) MPs do not support it, he 
said, asserting that she can count no more than 20 SLFP MPs 
in her camp.  (Note:  We had heard the previous day from an 
SLFP source that a number of SLFP MPs had refused to meet the 
President on the joint mechanism.  We have been unable to 
confirm that story, but it makes sense that at least some MPs 
would oppose it--not necessarily on principle but out of fear 
of the government falling and having to contest elections. 
Also in the rumor department, June 9 newspapers carried 
reports that the GSL had contacted the Election Commission 
about the prospect of holding early elections.  Assistant 
Commissioner of Elections Rasika Pieris denied that report to 
us.) 
 
8.  (SBU)  Other Sinhalese nationalist parties have also 
seized upon opposition to the joint mechanism as a way to 
demonstrate the strength of their convictions.  Ven. Omalpe 
Sobitha Thero, a Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) Buddhist monk MP, 
is now on the fourth day of his hunger strike, begun on June 
6 at the sacred Temple of the Tooth in Kandy, to protest the 
joint mechanism (Ref B).  The monk, who has only one kidney, 
is reportedly extremely frail and spurned an appeal from 
Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapakse, who visited him in Kandy on 
June 8, to talk to the President about the issue. 
 
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COMMENT 
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9.  (C) Amarasinghe, who underwent heart surgery in the UK in 
February, seemed much more tired, far more subdued and 
considerably less confident than we have ever seen him.  It 
is clear to us that the stress of his party's 
eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation with the President is 
beginning to show.  The question remains:  who will blink 
first?  The disagreement between the President and her 
alliance partner over this issue has received so much 
publicity and become so vitriolic--with the President 
accusing the JVP of killing her husband and hinting broadly 
that her own life may be at risk on one side and the JVP 
accusing her of selling out the country and the Sinhala 
people on the other--that there seems little hope of finding 
common ground for compromise.  Worse still, the JVP seems to 
have decided to make the joint mechanism the litmus test for 
Sinhalese nationalism and to showcase, through its 
unwavering, if ill-founded, opposition to dealing with the 
Tigers that it is better equipped to safeguard national 
interests than the President.  Although the JVP has 
threatened to leave the government countless times before, it 
appears that this time the former insurgents may mean it. 
LUNSTEAD