US embassy cable - 05BANGKOK3799

C O N F I D E N T I A L BANGKOK 003799 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/BCLTV, L/EAP, EAP/RSP, L/PM, PM/ISO, INR 
AND DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2015 
TAGS: MASS, MARR, MOPS, PREL, PHUM, TH, HUMAN RIGHTS VETTING 
SUBJECT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION:  HUMAN RIGHTS VETTING 
FOR EXERCISE BALANCE TORCH 05-3 
 
REF: A. BANGKOK 3439 
     B. SHAW-LAMBERT EMAILS 
     C. 04 BANGKOK 8237 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Robert J. Clarke.  Reason 1.4 (a and 
 d) 
 
1.  (C)  Ref A) requests Department action for human rights 
vetting for the 5th Infantry Regiment, 5th Infantry Division 
of the 4th Army of the Royal Thai Army.  As noted in ref A), 
the unit is scheduled to participate in Exercise Balance 
Torch 05-3.  The Department has requested further information 
from post about the 5th Infantry Division's participation in 
the October 25, 2004 incident at Tak Bai, Narathiwat 
Province. 
 
2.  (U)  During that incident, Thai Army and Police Units 
moved to quell a demonstration by more than a thousand Thai 
Muslims protesting the arrest and detention of several Thai 
Muslims suspected of providing small arms to separatists.  At 
least seven persons died before the protests were brought 
under control.  Once the authorities brought the 
demonstrators under control, the security forces rounded up 
about 1,370 of the protesters, loaded them into trucks, and 
moved them to Ingkayuth military camp in Pattani Province. 
As dusk approached, the last of the protesters shipped to 
Ingkayuth were stacked into overcrowded trucks by poorly 
supervised security personnel, resulting in the deaths by 
crushing and suffocation of 78 detainees.  Prime Minister 
Thaksin Shinawatra appointed an independent commission to 
investigate the incident.  In April 2005, that commission 
determined that the former Commanding Officer of the 4th 
Army's 5th Infantry Division, Major General Chalermchai 
Wiroonphet, among others was guilty of negligence in the Tak 
Bai incident for having left the scene of the round-up 
without an acceptable excuse.  Major General Sinchai 
Nutsatit, the then deputy-Commander of the Fourth Army 
Region, was also found negligent for not taking appropriate 
action against officers tasked with transporting the 
detainees.  The commission did not/not find any of the units 
involved in the incident guilty of human rights abuses. 
 
3.  (C)  Post has utilized all available local resources to 
clarify the role in Tak Bai of Thai units recommended for 
training.  In order to better respond to Washington's 
inquiry, PolMilOff and JUSMAGTHAI Chief have both again 
reviewed video footage taken of the demonstration and the 
roundup of suspects (description of that footage reported ref 
C).  That footage shows Thai soldiers from at least four 
military units and two police units responding to the 
demonstration and rounding up suspects.  Video shows security 
forces using water cannon and tear gas as well as a great 
deal of firing into the air to stop the demonstrators. 
Footage shows mixed units of military and police responding 
to the demonstration, sometimes under the command of a 
military officer, sometimes under the command of a police 
officer. 
 
4.  (C)  Although video shows some suspects with hands tied 
behind their backs made to crawl to waiting trucks and other 
footage shows suspects being hit by baton wielding soldiers, 
the footage does not/not show clear evidence of gross human 
rights violations carried out by units in an organized 
fashion.  Post has also confirmed that elements of the 5th 
Infantry Regiment were among those troops involved at Tak 
Bai.  Post has no/no indication of the unit affiliation of 
the troops who loaded into trucks the detainees who died. 
Indications are that the actual loading of trucks was done on 
an ad hoc basis with no one unit having overall 
responsibility. 
 
5.  (C)  Although seven protesters died during this initial 
phase of the operation, our viewing of the video footage 
supports claims by Thai officials that the most serious 
rights violations associated with the Tak Bai incident took 
place during the transportation of suspects, not during the 
actions to bring the demonstration itself under control.  The 
Embassy assessment is that the fatalities incurred during the 
transport of the suspects were caused by negligence, lack of 
oversight, poor training and gross stupidity by Thai officers 
on the scene, not by any plan within parts of the Thai 
military to kill suspects.  In November 2004, initial 
analysis by Embassy officials led Post and JUSMAGTHAI to 
request Washington for funds, experts and permission to 
improve human rights training for senior Thai officials, 
mid-level officers and enlisted personnel -- including 4th 
Army's 5th Infantry Division -- who will be rotating to 
Southern Thailand. 
BOYCE