US embassy cable - 05AMMAN4598

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 004598 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2015 
TAGS: PREL, KDEM, IZ, JO 
SUBJECT: OUTREACH TO SUNNIS OUTSIDE IRAQ 
 
REF: A. BAGHDAD 02319 
 
     B. STATE 99829 
     C. BAGHDAD 02188 
     D. AMMAN 3963 
 
Classified By: CDA David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
 1.  (C)  Post will continue its ongoing interagency efforts 
(ref D) to maintain and expand contacts with appropriate 
Sunni Arab Iraqis living in and transiting Jordan, keeping in 
mind the need to isolate supporters of the insurgency.  We 
will also carry on our efforts to urge these contacts to 
participate peacefully in the political process and to 
encourage others in the Iraqi Sunni community to do the same. 
 
2.  (C)  There needs to be continued close coordination 
between all USG elements working on engaging the Iraqi 
community in Jordan.  Post (and Embassy Baghdad) should be 
kept informed of any element of the USG traveling to Jordan 
for talks with Iraqis in order to facilitate our outreach 
efforts and to ensure appropriate coordination with the 
Jordanian government. 
 
GOJ Outreach 
 
3.  (C)  The GOJ also views itself as having an important 
interest in encouraging the integration of Sunni Arabs into 
Iraqi political life.  The GOJ has also engaged with Iraqi 
Sunni leaders here to urge them to join the political and 
electoral process.  Jordan, for example, made several efforts 
before the January elections to generate momentum toward a 
conference of Sunni figures to help bring about their 
rapprochement with the Iraqi government.  We can expect the 
GOJ to continue to promote Sunni integration, though its 
influence in Iraq seems to have shrunken considerably since 
the advent of the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG).  This 
process is an ongoing one. 
 
ITG holds the key 
 
4.  (C)  Post's dialogue with Iraqi contacts, or that of the 
GOJ, cannot be a substitute for serious negotiations on Sunni 
Arab inclusion in the ongoing formation of the Iraqi state, 
carried on with an ITG partner who can deliver real 
inducements.  Such negotiations should be conducted directly 
with the ITG, rather than through U.S. officials.  (NOTE:  In 
contrast to efforts undertaken by former IIG PM Allawi, there 
appears to be no/no organized effort by the ITG in Jordan to 
engage a broad range of Sunni notables, although figures 
purporting to represent certain factions within the ITG 
(especially Dawa), and/or Ayatollah Sistani, are frequent 
visitors here and have reportedly been in touch with some 
Sunnis.  END NOTE.) 
 
5.  (C)  With this point in mind, we agree with Embassy 
Baghdad (ref A) that it would not be advisable to regularly 
bring ITG representatives into meetings with our Iraqi 
contacts.  These individuals are capable of talking to the 
ITG through their own contacts, but some choose not to do so. 
 Others claim they have already signaled willingness to 
engage in discussions, but have been rebuffed. 
 
6.  (C)  In our view, a more effective approach would be to 
facilitate political conversations among Iraqis by continuing 
to cajole our contacts to talk to ITG elements, and by 
providing names and telephone numbers of key Sunnis here to 
validate ITG representatives who express interest in meeting 
them. In addition, if cases arise in which we sense a contact 
would welcome our facilitating a meeting with ITG officials, 
we will of course do so, in coordination with Embassy Baghdad. 
 
Please visit Embassy Amman's classified web site at 
http://www.state.sgov/p/nea/amman/ or access the site through 
the Department of State's SIPRNET home page. 
HALE