US embassy cable - 05BOGOTA5497

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 BOGOTA 005497 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, CO 
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT URIBE AND COLOMBIA FACE UNCHARTERED 
WATERS -- AND IT HAS BEEN SHOWING 
 
Classified By: Charge Milton K. Drucker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
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INTRODUCTION 
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1. (C) For the first time in Colombian history, the sitting 
President is a potential candidate for re-election.  The 
political landscape is new for the President, the Congress 
and the public.  The script is being written as they go and 
the disquiet has been evident everywhere.  Over the last few 
weeks, the government appeared to lose its surefootedness on 
several key issues, the President's poll numbers dropped, and 
executive-congressional relations grew more tense.  With 
Congressional elections in March 2006 and Presidential 
elections two months later, the campaign season has already 
begun.  But the sequencing leading up to elections has become 
inverted.  The Constitutional Court will most likely render 
its verdict on whether President Uribe can stand for 
reelection in late September, while the principal political 
parties will select presidential candidates at party 
conventions during the summer -- before knowing if Uribe can 
run.  The unfamiliar terrain has been contributing to power 
struggles in some of the main political parties and blocks 
over ideology, party leadership, and presidential and 
congressional candidates.  While seemingly a bleak picture, 
senior officials in the Administration are beginning to come 
to grips with the unprecedented political dynamic, 
acknowledge their unpreparedness for it, recognize their 
fatigue, and are taking steps to bring themselves out of 
disarray. 
 
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HAS URIBE BEEN STUMBLING? 
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2. (C) The political situation has put Uribe Administration 
off its game in recent weeks.  Senior officials have not been 
speaking with one voice.  Their poor handling of the 
demobilization law, failure to respond to AUC cease-fire 
violations, lack of progress in the peace process with 
guerrilla groups, weak response to Congressional criticism 
over immunities for U.S. military personnel, and inability to 
manage competing domestic constituencies for FTA 
negotiations, all pointed to a rudderlessness unusual for the 
disciplined and workaholic Uribe Administration. 
 
3. (C) A five-city poll conducted by Gallup Colombia in May 
suggests that the public has been reacting as well.  While 
Uribe's overall approval rating remains at a strong 69 
percent, it has dropped five points in the first four months 
of the year.  More importantly, on key issues like his 
handling of corruption, the guerrillas, and the paramilitary 
peace process, declines have been sharper since December 
2004.  On dealing with corruption, he has dropped 10 points 
to 61 percent, on the guerrillas, 11 points to 59 percent, 
and on the paramilitaries, 19 points to 54 percent.  For the 
first time since September 2004, more Colombians believe the 
situation is worsening (40 percent) than improving (36 
percent).  According to an adviser to former presidential 
candidate and close Uribe confidant Noemi Sanin, the 
President was stunned by the polls.  He told Sanin in a May 
23 telephone call that he was not getting his message out and 
his Ministers were performing poorly. 
 
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LAW FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE 
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4. (C)  The GOC has made itself an easy target for criticism 
on the demobilization law currently before the Congress. 
Recent changes softening the draft strengthened arguments 
from political opponents, some G-24 nations and NGOs that the 
GOC is playing into the AUC's hands, and that the law will 
not dismantle their narco/criminal networks.  Contradictory 
comments from Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo, 
Minister of Interior and Justice Sabas Pretelt, and Vice 
President Francisco Santos have further weakened the GOC 
position.  The GOC was reluctant to defend or even publicize 
its version of the law until well after Senator Rafael Pardo 
had sold his rival draft to human rights groups and other 
international organizations.  Surprisingly still, unlike with 
other issues, the GOC did not respond with an aggressive 
public campaign to defend its draft overseas, including in 
the United States, leaving a vacuum that Pardo, Human Rights 
Watch and other NGOS gladly filled. 
 
5. (C) At the same time, the AUC continued to violate the 
cease-fire, including recruiting efforts in southern Bogota 
and perpetrating spikes in violence in Buenaventura. 
Although the military has increased pressure on the 
paramilitaries and full compliance with the case-fire is 
difficult given the on-going conflict and concentration of 
AUC commanders in Ralito, the violations nonetheless 
reinforced the view that the GOC is soft on the 
paramilitaries. 
 
6. (C) On May 25, Uribe ordered the arrest of AUC senior 
commander "Don Berna" for murdering a local government 
official.  The President's order landed in the press before 
it was executed, and it became clear that an alerted Don 
Berna was unlikely to be caught, at least right away. 
Between that and concern at the prospect of a breakdown of 
the peace process and a return to high levels of para 
violence, Uribe negotiated Don Berna's surrender.  On May 27, 
Don Berna turned himself in, in exchange in a ranch house for 
demobilizing his troops (roughly 4,000) and being held in 
government custody outside of the concentration zone.  While 
we believe he will be tried for the murder, the GOC has not 
guaranteed that it will prosecute Berna for his other 
numerous crimes or approve his extradition to the U.S. on 
drug trafficking charges.  International organizations and 
many Colombians will accuse the GOC of being soft on Don 
Berna if he is given a light sentence.  Many Colombians will 
recall charges that Uribe is sympathetic to the 
paramilitaries.   Human Rights Watch already issued a warning 
that GOC treatment of Don Berna would be a clear indication 
of its committment to holding major criminals accountable. 
 
7. (C) Cordoba Governor Libardo Lopez and leading Senator 
Juan Manuel Lopez, both Officialist Liberals, complained to 
poloff on May 20 about the rarified political atmosphere and 
the AUC peace process.  They agreed with Democratic Pole 
(PDI) representative Gustavo Petro's May 14 accusations on 
the House floor that the Uribe administration had links to 
the paramilitaries, that neighboring Sucre department was 
infested with paras at all levels, and that Sucre politicians 
had participated in the creation of paramilitary 
organizations.  Surprisingly, there was a deafening silence 
from the President for days.  Casa de Narino Communications 
Director Jaime Bermudez admitted to polcouns on May 26 that 
Uribe waited too long to respond to Petro's accusations. 
Presidential advisor and reelection coordinator Juan Manuel 
Santos told polcouns the same on May 14: the stigma of the 
paras along with the perception of a weak peace and justice 
law continues to cost the President and tarnish his 
Administration.  And, he said, we have not been fighting back 
as we should. 
 
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PEACE PROCESS WITH THE GUERRILLAS AT A STANDSTILL 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
8. (C)  The peace processes with the ELN and FARC have 
stalled, leaving the impression that the GOC has run out of 
ideas.  The process with the ELN fell apart on April 17 when 
the ELN rejected Mexican facilitation, reportedly because of 
Mexico's vote against Cuba at the UN Commission on Human 
Rights.  In fact, the process had already frozen over the 
ELN's refusal to cease kidnapping.  In a May 10 conversation, 
Peace Commissioner Restrepo continued to be pessimistic about 
re-starting a process with the ELN. 
 
9. (C) The up-tick in FARC attacks, military action and 
diplomacy abroad has persuaded many that the group is still a 
strong political presence in the country.  While recent FARC 
efforts have not been militarily significant, they have cast 
doubt on the success of President Uribe's democratic security 
policy.  Progress in the area of operations of Plan 
Patriota's Phase 2B (PP2B) has been slow in early 2005, in 
part because the FARC have adapted to COLMIL's strategy.  The 
FARC are also increasing their use of booby traps and 
subterfuge to counter COLMIL efforts.  COLMIL military 
commanders reallocated PP2B troops because the old zoning 
used last year did not allow for communications between local 
commanders.  Even with the reorganization, military troops 
have had trouble engaging the FARC in combat zones.  The GOC 
has been unable to locate and kill or capture any high value 
targets (HVTs) despite extensive USG tactical support. 
 
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WOBBLY ON IMMUNITIES FOR U.S. MILITARY 
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10. (C) On May 3, two U.S. soldiers were detained by 
Colombian National Police in Melgar, Tolima Department for 
their alleged involvement in an ammunition sale, possibly to 
illegal armed groups.  The soldiers are members of the U.S. 
Army's 7th Special Forces Group and were serving as staff 
members of a Special Forces company conducting training at 
the Colombian Army's National Training Center in Tolemaida, a 
few kilometers away.  They were released into U.S. custody on 
May 5 and departed Bogota on May 6.  A month earlier, on 
March 30, 35 pounds of cocaine were found on a U.S. military 
plane that left Colombia for Fort Bliss.  Three U.S. military 
personnel temporarily stationed in Colombia, who had 
immunity, and two in the U.S. were arrested by U.S. 
authorities for transporting drugs to the U.S. on military 
aircraft.  One has been released, while the investigation 
continues on the others. 
 
11. (C) Although GOC officials agree that the soldiers are 
entitled to immunity from Colombian criminal jurisdiction 
under existing bilateral agreements and the Vienna 
Convention, they have been less sure-footed in public. 
President Uribe has said he trusts the U.S. to fully 
prosecute those found guilty, but admitted privately to 
SOUTHCOM Commander General Craddock that he was unsure how to 
defend the immunity agreement to the public.  Meanwhile, some 
Congressmen and other influential politicians continue to 
question publicly immunity for U.S. military personnel in 
Colombia.  Colombian Inspector  General Edgardo Maya has 
called upon President Uribe to seek congressional approval of 
the current immunity agreements between Colombia and the 
United States.  He argues that the agreement currently in 
force, which was signed back in 1974, did not fulfill 
procedural requirements at the time and is therefore 
unconstitutional and inapplicable now.  Uribe has not 
responded. 
 
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FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (FTA) 
-------------------------- 
 
12. (C) The GOC is facing increasing opposition from the 
agricultural sector for the FTA as it becomes clearer that 
the agreement will negatively affect the interests of some 
groups.  While these groups' interests are being challenged, 
potential winners are reluctant to make their case.  Publicly 
the "antis" own the headlines and the air waves.  This 
combined with the political season in full swing, makes the 
GOC loathe to risk losing political support from any group, 
especially one as well represented in Congress as the 
agricultural sector.  Seeing an opening, other groups, such 
as the local pharmaceutical and auto parts industries, are 
also starting to question the GOC's intent on the FTA.  Those 
groups that will win with an FTA have yet to mount an 
effective campaign for the agreement, making the GOC's job 
much more difficult.  While the GOC remains committed to an 
FTA, those opposed to the agreement for either economic or 
ideological reasons are pulling out the stops to try to carve 
out protection for themselves, or failing that, scuttling the 
agreement altogether. 
 
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URIBISTA POLITICAL PARTY DEAD ON ARRIVAL 
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13. (C) Uribe's recent political initiatives have also fallen 
flat, been badly-managed or ill-timed.  Efforts to create a 
single "Uribista" party, launched May 8 to give the President 
a political base in one party, failed within days. 
Presidential adviser and former finance minister Juan Manuel 
Santos, attempting to put the best face possible on a 
political fiasco, told PolCouns on May 17 that the effort was 
not to create a single party, which everyone recognized was 
not possible, but to cluster smaller parties into three or 
four clearly defined groups.  He conceded, however, that even 
this was going slowly due to "nitty-gritty" political issues. 
 The small regional parties were competing.  For merging 
parties, state financial support would diminish or end 
altogether.  And party leaders would lose the opportunity to 
elaborate a list of candidates for the March elections. 
Uribe supporter and Cambio Radical Party head German Vargas 
Lleras also resisted, believing he could do better on his own 
(he could) and others followed his lead.  Vargas Lleras, 
along with other key Senators such as Luis Guillermo Velez 
and Luis Alfredo Ramos, also had no intention of taking 
orders from Santos, "who has never won a vote in an electoral 
contest in his entire life," as Velez complained to poloff. 
For his part, Santos responded privately that Vargas Lleras, 
and others like him pursuing their own agendas instead of the 
President's, preferred to be "the head of a rat instead of 
the tail of a lion." 
 
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CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS 
----------------------- 
 
14. (C) Executive-Congressional relations have suffered in 
other ways as well.  Some members of Congress say the Uribe 
Administration has been treating them with disdain of late. 
The censure motion against the MOD (albeit stalled and likely 
going nowhere) for failing to appear to testify when 
required, is viewed by many as Congressional retaliation for 
recent GOC mistreatment.  Opposition leaders complain that 
the President rarely meets with them, and even strong 
supporters of the President have been coming out of meetings 
angry, venting to the media.  The President's key advisers on 
legislative issues -- Interior and Justice Minister Sabas 
Pretelt and Casa de Narino's Bernardo Moreno -- have not 
inspired confidence among senior members of Congress, 
including from Uribistas.  Leaders of the Offialist Liberal 
and the Democratic Pole (PDI) parties, including respective 
party heads Juan Fernando Cristo and Samuel Moreno, say 
genuine dialogue with the President has grown difficult.  If 
anyone criticizes the GOC, they charge, the President has 
been taking it personally and accusing interlocutors of being 
FARC sympathizers. 
 
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ALSO PROBLEMS WITH REELECTION LEGISLATION 
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15. (C)  The state of play of reelection implementing 
legislation in the Congress and the impasse over associated 
draft rules (known locally as "garantias") for creating a 
level playing field for candidates also remains troubled. 
While the GOC appeared to reach an agreement on some 
guarantees with several members of the PDI, a separate group, 
including the PDI head, rejected the agreement.  On May 23, 
the Officialist Liberals decided to formally boycott the 
guarantees debate.  The Liberals are largely posturing, as 
differences in the Liberal- and GOC-backed draft legislation 
are not that significant in real terms.  Nevertheless, there 
is a strong feeling among the left and center left that, 
despite his 69 percent approval rating, Uribe is not ready to 
give up his incumbent advantages.  Multi-hour television 
coverage of the President's weekly community council meetings 
only serves to fuel opposition claims that the GOC has an 
unfair advantage going in to 2006 elections.  As Liberal 
leader Horacio Serpa told poloff in early May, Uribe has 
appeared on the cover of the weekly newsmagazine Semana some 
20 times in the last four years.  The next closest 
competitor, Bogota Mayor Lucho Garzon, has appeared twice. 
 
16. (C) And finally, in the middle of all this, the GOC 
launched a drive to reform the Constitution to eliminate the 
concept of political crimes.  While the move was justified on 
democratic grounds, it reinforced growing suspicions that the 
GOC was losing focus and taking on more than it could handle, 
including a constitutional reform that requires eight rounds 
of debate/passage in two consecutive sessions -- with 
Congressional elections ten months away. 
 
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PRESIDENTIAL ADVISERS CONCEDE THE ROUGH PATCH 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
17. (C)  Presidential Chief of Staff Juan Lozano admitted to 
polcouns on May 24 that the past few weeks had not been the 
Administration's best.  The demobilization law and 
implementing legislation for presidential reelection were 
moving slowly.  The Administration had not handled them well. 
 The fact that the sitting President was a potential 
candidate for the first time was exacerbating relations with 
the Congress and affecting the legislative agenda.  It has 
taken the President off his pedestal and made him human -- 
and he is now everyone's target.  According to Lozano, the 
issue has not only bothered the President's predecessors but 
upset potential successors whose political futures were being 
affected.  More unexpected and surprising has been the 
personal rancor.  Senator Pardo and former Bogota mayor 
Enrique Penalosa had been strong political and personal 
friends of Uribe's, and are now bitter political opponents. 
 
 
18. (C) Lozano said the President and his inner-circle had 
been caught off guard by the new political environment and 
were unprepared.  The President's initial response was to 
lash out.  While trying to focus on his presidential duties, 
Uribe has been unable to resist responding to the attacks of 
new and old political opponents in the media.  The government 
was under the microscope every second.  No one had 
anticipated this kind of scrutiny moving into the fourth year 
of the Administration, he said.  We are exhausted and have to 
manage as if it were the first day of the first year. 
 
19. (C) Communications Director Jaime Bermudez told polcouns 
on May 26 that the national media was being equally tough on 
the President, and Uribe continued to lose his temper in 
interviews, overshadowing content.  As we move into the 
campaign season, we have to do a better job deciding what 
fights needed to be fought, he said. 
 
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COMMENT 
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20. (C) Lozano and Bermudez disagree on the extent of the 
recent disarray but both acknowledge they have spent 
considerable time analyzing what has gone awry and how to get 
things back on track.  We are beginning to see signs that the 
President and his team are coming out of their funk and 
adjusting to the new political reality.  Uribe made a tough 
call to pursue AUC narco-trafficker Don Berna and then again 
to negotiate his surrender.  While the final denouement 
remains to be seen, he has jump-started additional 
demobilizations and may have saved the peace process.  After 
months of GOC silence on the demobilization law, Foreign 
Minister Barco publicly responded for the first time to 
critics in the May 31 International Herald Tribune, and there 
are plans to send Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo to 
Canada, Europe, and the U.S. to explain the law after 
Congress passes it. 
 
21. (C) Bermudez now reports that the President is sticking 
to his decision to make no comments on re-election until the 
Constitutional Court rules in September.  Bermudez also said 
the GOC has launched a regional and local media campaign to 
counter-act Bogota outlets -- and politics.  The new polls, 
taken in 20 cities around the country, show the President's 
support is holding firm above 70 percent. They also show 
higher numbers for the President's handling of the drug 
issue, the economy and corruption than those of the past four 
administrations after three years in office, even with the 
re-election dynamic looming.  The challenge, said Bermudez, 
is to keep the President off the campaign stump until after 
the Constitutional Court ruling, and to act like he has the 
numbers most politicians would kill for. 
DRUCKER