US embassy cable - 05MADRID2209

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OPPOSITION HITS MORATINOS ON WESTERN SAHARA/MOROCCO

Identifier: 05MADRID2209
Wikileaks: View 05MADRID2209 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Madrid
Created: 2005-06-08 15:56:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL MO WS SP
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 002209 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/WE AND NEA/MAG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2015 
TAGS: PREL, MO, WS, SP 
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION HITS MORATINOS ON WESTERN SAHARA/MOROCCO 
 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Kathy Fitzpatrick; reason 1.4 (D). 
 
1. (C) Summary.  FM Moratinos faced vigorous opposition 
criticism this week for declining to condemn Morocco's 
refusal to admit two Spanish political delegations seeking to 
visit Laayoun as a demonstration of support for the Sahrawis. 
 The opposition Popular Party has been the most vocal critic, 
but support for the Sahrawis cuts across party lines and the 
Zapatero administration has faced criticism from both the 
right and left for its perceived tilt towards Morocco over 
the last year.  Moratinos is under pressure to demonstrate 
positive motion on the Western Sahara issue and he responded 
by pressing for the rapid selection of a UNSYG Personal 
Representative to replace Alvaro de Soto, dispatching Spain's 
Deputy Foreign Minister to the region, and gaining Moroccan 
approval for the visit of an official Parliamentary 
delegation to Morocco.  The Popular Party refused to 
participate in that delegation and is likely to maintain 
pressure on Zapatero to harden Spanish policy towards Morocco 
regarding Western Sahara.  In contrast to other foreign 
relations issues such as Venezuela and Cuba, Zapatero's 
leftist allies are unlikely to offer much support for his 
continued demonstration of flexibility on the Western Sahara 
issue.  Our normal Western Sahara contacts indicate that 
Moratinos is personally handling this issue and limiting 
information on developments to members of his inner circle. 
End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Opposition politicians sharply criticized Foreign 
Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos for declining to condemn the 
Moroccan government's June 5 decision to bar the entry of a 
group of municipal political figures from Madrid, 
journalists, and human rights monitors who attempted a visit 
to Laayoun.  Political opponents (and even some allies) have 
asserted that the Zapatero government has tilted to the 
Moroccan government over the last year at the expense of 
Spain's traditional support for the Sahrawis and this episode 
brought their frustrations into the open.  The Spanish 
delegation was organized by the "State Federation of 
Institutions in Solidarity with the Sahrawi People" and 
included Socialist (PSOE) and United Left (IU) municipal 
representatives, as well as journalists and the president of 
the "Spanish Pro Human Rights League."  Its announced purpose 
was to evaluate human rights conditions in Laayoun in the 
wake of the recent disturbances by Sahrawi youths.  The group 
traveled to Laayoun from the Canary Islands, but was not 
permitted to disembark from the airplane and was required to 
return to Spain.  The situation was exacerbated on June 7 by 
news that Morocco would also bar the entry of a multi-party 
Catalan delegation that included an IU Parliamentarian. 
According to Spanish daily "El Pais," Moroccan MFA official 
Taieb Fassi Fihri said that Morocco would not tolerate 
interlocutors "who are not impartial...and who are 100% 
anti-Moroccan."  The Catalan delegation announced June 8 that 
they still planned to proceed to Laayoun, though a PSOE 
member withdrew from the delegation at the request of the MFA. 
 
3. (SBU) Moratinos moved swiftly to contain the damage and 
demonstrate GOS activism on the issue.  He dispatched Deputy 
FM Bernardino Leon on a lightning visit to Algiers, Rabat, 
Tindouf, and Nouakchott to urge calm.  An MFA source told 
Spanish media that Moratinos would also ramp up efforts to 
have UN Secretary General Kofi Annan name a new Personal 
Representative to replace Alvaro de Soto.  Moratinos 
reportedly sent a letter to Annan on June 3 urging the 
selection soon of a high-level figure for that role and was 
considering convoking other relevant international actors 
(U.S., France, UK) to get their support for the immediate 
selection of a new UNSYG Personal Representative.  (NOTE: 
There was no mention in the press of Moratinos' preference 
that the Personal Representative be a high-level U.S. 
political figure.  END NOTE.) 
 
4. (U) FM Moratinos sought to calm domestic critics by 
arranging with Moroccan FM Mohamed Benaisa Rabat's acceptance 
of the visit of an official Spanish Parliamentary delegation 
to Laayoun sometime in the next two weeks.  Opposition 
Popular Party (PP) Parliamentary spokesman Eduardo Zaplana 
said that the PP would not participate in the visit, arguing 
that Moratinos should have forcefully protested the expulsion 
of the delegation from Madrid.  Zaplana said it was 
"intolerable" for the GOS to negotiate with Moroccan 
officials regarding which Spanish political figures could 
enter Morocco and which could not.  Unnamed PP sources later 
said they might amend their earlier refusal to accompany the 
delegation if the GOS also invited journalists and members of 
the NGOs that had been barred from entry by Morocco. 
5. (C) Percival Manglano, foreign relations coordinator for 
the PP Parliamentary group, told us that the PP was taking 
the hardest line on this issue, but that a considerable 
number of Socialist and United Left legislators also believed 
Moratinos had undermined the rights of Sahrawis by not taking 
a tougher stand against the expulsion of the Madrid 
delegation.  Manglano said that Morocco's decision to bar the 
visit of the Catalan delegation made it unlikely that Spanish 
legislators from the right or left would be willing to 
participate in the visit arranged by Moratinos. 
 
6. (C) Moratinos undermined his own efforts to reach out to 
the opposition when he allegedly told members of the 
Parliamentary Spain-Morocco Friendship Group, including PP 
Senator Cristina Tejedor, that Spanish leftists supported the 
Sahrawis "out of solidarity, while the right is nostalgic for 
colonialism and wants the (Spanish Foreign) Legion to return 
to Sahara."  Socialist participants in the meeting disputed 
whether Moratinos had used this precise expression, but PP 
legislators reacted angrily nonetheless and demanded 
Moratinos' resignation. 
 
//COMMENT// 
 
7. (C) This episode has proven particularly challenging for 
Moratinos and Zapatero because of the depth of feeling on the 
Western Sahara issue within their own leftist political base. 
 Many PSOE and IU members are as skeptical as their 
center-right PP rivals of Zapatero's decision to demonstrate 
greater flexibility on the resolution of the dispute.  There 
is understanding of the broad strategic imperitives 
underlying Zapatero's efforts to repair a bilateral 
relationship with Morocco strained during the Aznar 
administration, but there is equally strong emotional support 
for the Sahrawis, particularly among long-standing leftist 
backers of the Polisario.  Zapatero can easily afford to 
antagonize the PP, but he must be far more careful with his 
far left IU coalition partners.  He and Moratinos will be 
under increasing pressure to adopt a harder line with Rabat 
regarding both events at Laayoun and on the Western Sahara 
issue in general. 
 
MANZANARES 

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