US embassy cable - 05ANKARA3199

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003199 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2025 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, PHUM, TU 
SUBJECT: CABINET SHUFFLES AND THE LONG SQUEEZE: PM ERDOGAN 
SETS HIS SIGHTS ON FONMIN GUL 
 
 
(U) Classified by Polcounselor John Kunstadter; reasons: E.O. 
12958 1.4 (b,d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: Long rumored to be considering a cabinet 
re-shuffle, PM Erdogan has made his first move suddenly and 
in limited fashion.  However, more ministers in a cabinet 
which is still dominated by people loyal to Erdogan's chief 
internal rival FonMin Gul may be in Erdogan's sights as he 
tries slowly but surely to whittle down Gul's influence.  End 
summary. 
 
2. (C) In a trademark sudden move, PM Erdogan announced the 
replacement of three ministers in a mini-Cabinet shuffle June 
4.  Cabinet changes have been an intense subject of debate 
and waiting-for-Godot expectation in ruling AKP since Erdogan 
inherited the Cabinet from his internal arch-rival Abdullah 
Gul, now FonMin, in March 2003.  Yet despite the heavy Gul 
influence (until this shuffle Erdogan could depend on only 
four of 22 ministers for internal political support) and 
despite his overriding popular support, Erdogan long appeared 
intimidated from making any changes.  When Minister of 
Culture and Tourism Erkan Mumcu resigned in Feb. 2005, 
Erdogan remained in thrall to Gul for the abortive choice of 
current State Minister Besir Atalay and eventual choice of 
Atilla Koc to replace Mumcu. 
 
3. (C) Now Erdogan appears to have overcome his indecision, 
spurred in part by what Minister of Energy Hilmi Guler told a 
close contact of ours June 6 is Erdogan's realization of how 
much damage to his policies Gul and his circle are wreaking. 
Finally dismissed are three prominent incompetents: Minister 
of Agriculture Sami Guclu, a barrier to progress on issues of 
concern to the U.S. and a Gul ally; Minister of Public Works 
Zeki Ergezen, infamous for his scornful remarks about 
"infidels" (gavurlar), surrounded by rumors of corruption, 
unable to finish Erdogan's 15,000 kilometer divided highway 
project on time, an ally of Minister of the Interior 
Abdulkadir Aksu, and reportedly close to Gul; and State 
Minister for Women's Affairs Guldal Aksit, daughter of Galip 
Demirel, a prominent follower of controversial Islamist sage 
Fethullah Gulen and a close associate of Aksu. 
 
4. (U) Erdogan appointed as Minister of Agriculture Mehmet 
Mehdi ((Eker)), a Diyarbakir MP from a prominent local family 
with high status in the Naksibendi brotherhood.  Born in 
Bismil (Diyarbakir province) 1956; graduate of Ankara U. 
veterinary faculty, MA in agricultural economics from 
Aberdeen U, PhD from Ankara U.'s health sciences institute. 
Veterinarian.  Worked in upper-mid-level positions in the 
Agriculture Ministry and as director of veterinary affairs in 
the Greater Istanbul Municipality when Erdogan was mayor. 
Married, three children.  Speaks English, but we haven't yet 
tested his level. 
 
5. (C) An AKP deputy chairman and two other long-term Embassy 
contacts with deep relations in AKP describe Eker as a decent 
but passive man, close to Erdogan.  These contacts and 
Minister of Energy have described in detail how Eker was 
deeply involved in a plan to remove former Minister Guclu by 
concealing from him a Russian government note threatening six 
months ago to suspend imports of Turkish fruits and 
vegetables for phytosanitary reasons; the ban recently went 
into effect with Guclu looking ineffectual and uninformed. 
Embassy Ag Counselor's contacts note that Eker is unlikely to 
be able to override the Ministry's entrenched, protectionist 
bureaucracy. 
 
6. (U) The new Minister of Public Works is Trabzon MP Faruk 
Nafiz ((Ozak)) (umlaut over the O).  Born Trabzon 1946. 
Civil engineering degree from Karadeniz technical University 
in Trabzon.  Senior civil engineer.  Former captain of 
premier league Trabzonspor football team.  Chairman of the 
board of YAPISUN construction company.  Chairman of the board 
of Trabzonspor.  A founder of the Trabzon development 
Foundation.  Married, two children.  Reportedly speaks 
English. 
 
7. (C) A fellow Trabzon contractor and Trabzonspor board 
member describes Ozak as coming from the Sufi (mystical) line 
of the Milli Gorus Islamist movement; he is a quiet, 
reserved, obedient Erdogan man.  As part of Erdogan's 
strategy to use sports to maintain AKP's grassroots support, 
and in the wake of AKP's defeat in the Trabzon mayoral race 
in March 2004, the Istanbul-Black Sea axis which forms 
Erdogan's Istanbul power base reportedly subsequently 
succeeded in having Ozak appointed Trabzonspor chairman of 
the board.  At the same time Erdogan reportedly agreed to 
transfer several million dollars from one of the Prime 
Ministry's hidden reserves to permit Trabzonspor under Ozak 
to purchase better players.  Our contacts expect Ozak to be 
relatively more upright than Ergezen was (not a high bar). 
 
8. (U) Istanbul Second District MP Nimet ((Cubukcu)) is the 
new State Minister for Women's Affairs.  Born Ayranci 
(Ankara) 1965.  Grew up in relatively well-to-do 
circumstances with a family summer home on Heybeliada, one of 
the Princes' Islands off Istanbul.  Law degree from Istanbul 
U. law faculty.  Worked as an independent attorney, most 
recently representing the Islamist businessmen's association 
MUSIAD.  A founding member of AKP.  Married, one child. 
 
9. (C) Cubukcu is focused, highly ambitious, and months ago 
made clear to us she sought the state minister position.  She 
has ensured that she stays close to Erdogan's wife Emine, 
which appears to have been a major factor in her selection, 
according to what party deputy chairman Saban Disli told us 
June 7.  Her businesslike approach and relative openness in 
private about problems in AKP brought her to our attention 
early in AKP's tenure; she participated in Embassy's NATO 
tour for MPs in Feb. 2004 and in the NDI-sponsored democracy 
commission trip to Washington in Spring 2005.  Responding to 
the bitter complaints of many women from AKP's grassroots in 
the northeast Black Sea region who have seen their husbands 
take Russian and other Black Sea-littoral women as second 
wives, Cubukcu vigorously argued for criminalization of 
adultery during a controversy over adultery in autumn 2004. 
On the other hand, although she talks about her son, she 
rarely mentions her husband and there are persistent 
questions among some observers of AKP about her attitude 
toward her own marriage. 
 
10. (C) With the dismissal of Guclu and these appointments 
Erdogan has shown more clearly that he intends to whittle 
down Gul's influence.  By dismissing Aksit and Ergezen and 
appointing Eker, whose family status in Diyarbakir makes him 
a powerful rival to Interior Minister Aksu, Erdogan has also 
drawn the noose around Aksu.  Aksu has most recently served 
Erdogan's purposes by dismissing Hanefi Avci, an leading 
Gulenist who as National Police (TNP) department head for 
organized crime was starting to push corruption 
investigations that were leading to the heart of AKP. 
However, Erdogan has long been troubled by Aksu, whom he 
suspects of being ready to bolt from AKP with a number of 
disgruntled MPs.  Aksu's Kurdish favoritism, reported ties to 
the heroin trade, well-known predilection for teenage girls, 
and his son's open Mafia links make him a weak link in the 
Cabinet, one Erdogan knows the core institutions of the 
Turkish State could exploit at any time. 
 
11. (C) Contacts such as Prime Ministry advisor Aydin Kanat, 
who has provided a wealth of accurate insights into AKP, 
foresee a high possibility that Erdogan will continue to 
shuffle his cabinet in stages.  In addition to Aksu, those 
who appear to be most in his sights are Minister of Labor 
Murat Basesgioglu, a former ANAPer who has a poor record of 
responding to AKP MPs' queries and requests; Minister of 
Trade and Industry Ali Coskun, who appears to be deeply 
implicated in a major corruption scandal at the Turkish 
Standards Institute (TSE) -- involving payoffs of $500 
million for certifications, according to the TSE director's 
statement in the June 7 press; and State Minister for Foreign 
Trade Kursad Tuzmen, a former (ultra-nationalist) MHPer who 
was implicated in the Iraq oil for food payoffs and is 
described by multiple contacts as open to every type of 
kickback. 
 
12. (C) Erdogan may also be aiming over time to remove Gul's 
close associate State Minister Atalay and Minister of Justice 
and government spokesman Cemil Cicek, who has not bothered to 
hide his prime ministerial and presidential ambitions and his 
disrespect for Erdogan. 
MOORE