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| Identifier: | 05ZAGREB973 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05ZAGREB973 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Zagreb |
| Created: | 2005-06-08 15:27:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | EFIN ECON EAID HR Econ |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. 081527Z Jun 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L ZAGREB 000973 SIPDIS TREASURY FOR VIMAL ATUKORALA USAID FOR ANNE CONVERY E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2015 TAGS: EFIN, ECON, EAID, HR, Econ/Privatization SUBJECT: IMF GIVES WAY IN CROATIA - AGAIN Classified By: DCM Greg Delawie for Reasons 1.5 (b and d) Summary and Comment -------------------- 1. (SBU) The IMF mission that departed Croatia June 6 hopes to assemble a package that will pass IMF Board muster in August, despite Croatia's serial failure to come close to its budget targets. The team is clinging to GOC commitments to structural reforms (not yet implemented) to justify the agreement. In the absence of any real leverage on the GOC--including a galvanizing economic crisis -- the IMF believes that keeping the Standby Arrangement in place is the best way to encourage good behavior. Despite our disappointment in the GOC's dismal economic management, we think the IMF is correct. End Summary. Oops, We Did It Again --------------------- 2. (SBU) The GOC could have been expected to be on its best behavior for this visit. After all, it was already on "probation," with the first review, scheduled for March, delayed because the GOC had missed its 2004 deficit target (5.0% vice 4.5%) and had not fulfilled its promise to reverse the introduction of higher pension indexation. Nevertheless, when the IMF team arrived May 24, the GOC did not have data ready, spending was out of control (the IMF estimates that the GOC "used up" 80 percent of its target deficit in the first quarter), and the GOC failed to deliver what it had promised in March -- a plan to put the agreement back on track. Sanader Saves the Day with Promises -- Again -------------------------------------------- 3. (SBU) IMF Mission Chief Dimitri Demekas told the DCM in a meeting June 6 that the IMF's visit had seemed doomed to failure until PM Sanader returned from a trip in the last days of the visit. Sanader pledged that Finance Minister Suker would bring a package of budget cuts to Washington by June 20. Demekas acknowledged that the quality of such cuts would probably be dismal -- there was no time to carefully craft cuts that would aid the institutional reform of the government. While the 2005 budget deficit target of 3.7% was unattainable, Demekas had refused to name an "acceptable figure." (Nonetheless, a government leak to the press, citing 4.2% as acceptable, is apparently accurate.) Demekas believes an IMF retreat is justified because of promises made on the structural front. The Half-Full Glass -- Structural Reforms ----------------------------------------- 4. (SBU) Once again, the government is promising to return to the old pension indexation scheme. The IMF (understandably) is skeptical. It is more encouraged by the Ministry of Health plans (the details of which are not yet public) to introduce co-payments for medical services and the "privatization" of the heretofore ruinous "supplemental insurance." The GOC has also allegedly agreed to a restructuring plan for the shipyards. This plan would be different from previous restructuring plans because it would be done with the experience of experts from the World Bank and/or EU, with a view to ending the hemorrhaging of subsidies. None of these measures can be done quickly, and certainly not before the parliament recesses mid-July. The concrete prior actions for the August Board meeting are to be a revised budget, a new civil service law (also a World Bank requirement), a revision of the employment subsidy program, preparations for the next tranche of privatization of the state oil company, and reforms to the law on state aid. 5. (C) Demekas expressed unease over a couple of developments -- the GOC is apparently dragging its feet over including all government spending in a single treasury account. The government may be trying to maintain the ability to spend money off-budget. The government is also backing away from commitments to privatize the large state-owned insurance company -- fueling suspicion that it still hopes to use the company for emergency funds or simply a place to park party faithful. No Crisis Here -------------- 6. (SBU) While the IMF (and the rest of the international community) is frustrated by the GOC's fiscal fecklessness, the relative health of the economy and the continued willingness of the markets to lend the government money leave the IMF little leverage. While growth is slowing down (the IMF may revise its 2005 estimate from 3.8% to 3.5%), it hardly qualifies as a crisis. Inflation is up slightly, but the Central Bank attributes this to one-time oil and food price increases. Unemployment is up slightly according to local measures, but there are some small positive trends in employment as well. Most significantly for the IMF agreement, foreign debt -- the key element of the agreement -- has stabilized and begun to edge down, if still at a dismal 77% of GDP. Last Chance to Make the Agreement Real -------------------------------------- 7. (SBU) Especially in the absence of a clear start date for EU accession negotiations, an IMF agreement is the best curb on government fiscal recklessness, thus we grudgingly support the IMF's attempt to keep the agreement alive. However, the IMF Board should demand real performance BEFORE the August Board vote -- the agreement is due to end by the end of the year, and the credibility of the IMF and the international community can only suffer if the GOC is able to skate through yet another agreement without making real reforms. FRANK NNNN
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