US embassy cable - 05TAIPEI2509

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 002509 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS AIT/W 
STATE FOR EAP/RSP/TC, EAP/EP, EB/IFD/OIA AND NP/ECC/MCCELLAN 
STATE FOR INR/EC/NKWG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2020 
TAGS: ETTC, PARM, PINR, PREL, PTER, TW 
SUBJECT: SCHEDULING EXPORT CONTROL VISITS WITH TAIWAN 
 
REF: A. TAIPEI 2496 
 
     B. STATE 104043 
     C. TAIPEI 2475 
     D. TAIPEI 1780 
     E. TAIPEI 1501 
     F. TAIPEI 543 
 
Classified By: AIT DIRECTOR DOUGLAS H. PAAL, REASON 1.5 (b), (d), (h) 
 
1.  (U)  Action request in para. 11. 
 
2.  (S)  Summary.  AIT/T Deputy Director met June 8 with Wang 
Hsi-tien, Deputy Director General of Taiwan's National 
Security Council (NSC), to discuss ongoing cooperation on 
export controls.  Taiwan is feeling pressure to send a 
high-level nonproliferation delegation to Washington and, at 
the same time, has been long expecting a U.S. experts 
delegation to come to Taipei to help design and implement a 
more effective export control regime.  While Wang looks 
forward to the opportunity to visit Washington and discuss 
Taiwan-U.S. cooperation, he believes that it would be most 
useful to have the experts group visit Taipei prior to his 
visiting Washington.  Recent messages from TECRO/W stating 
that Wang would be visiting Washington in July are premature 
and TECRO/W should be correcting the record in the near 
future.  AIT/T recommends that Washington Agencies consider 
scheduling the U.S. experts visit to Taipei prior to Wang 
visiting Washington.  End Summary. 
 
3.  (S)   AIT/T Deputy Director met June 8 with Wang 
Hsi-tien, Deputy Director General of Taiwan's National 
Security Council (NSC).  AIT discussed ongoing cooperation 
between the U.S. and Taiwan to enhance Taiwan's export 
control regime and delivered the demarche contained in ref B 
regarding continued dealings by a Taiwan machine tool company 
with Iran, which had been presented to the Board of Foreign 
Trade June 7 (ref A). 
 
4.  (C) Wang said that he and his government understand that 
the U.S. would like to have a high-level delegation from 
Taiwan visit the U.S. to discuss export control issues.  Wang 
said that he would be pleased to lead such a delegation to 
the U.S. at any time.  However, he also expressed a degree of 
frustration over the delay in sending a team of experts from 
the U.S. to assist the Board of Foreign Trade (BOFT) to 
design and implement an effective export control regime to 
handle exports of machine tools to North Korea (DPRK).  From 
Taiwan's perspective, Wang said it would be most useful to 
complete work on the issues discussed during the February 1-2 
visit to Taipei by the U.S. delegation and then to have a 
follow up senior-level meeting to discuss progress made and 
next steps. 
 
5. (C) Wang said that, during the February meetings, Taiwan 
had agreed to establish three working groups:  one on 
exchanging intelligence information, a second on 
investigating the Supernote case of counterfeit U.S. currency 
and a third one on enhancing Taiwan's export control regime 
(ref F).  Most of the discussion centered on the export 
control working group. 
 
6.  (C) Wang noted that cooperation on the Supernote Working 
Group is proceeding very well, with a USSS agent already in 
Taiwan and working closely with the Taiwan prosecutor in 
charge of the investigation.  However, he said the export 
control working group has been delayed as Taiwan has been 
expecting expert input from the U.S. on ways to enhance 
sharing of intelligence information and to improve Taiwan's 
export control processes.  As reported in ref C, BOFT has 
developed a proposal to require Taiwan firms to obtain an 
export permit before shipping machine tools to the DPRK.  On 
June 3, BOFT provided its draft proposal to AIT and requested 
U.S. comments on the draft. 
 
7.  (S) Both Wang and BOFT (refs A and C) expressed a great 
deal of interest in sharing intelligence information with the 
U.S.  They emphasized that Taiwan has little information 
about how goods shipped from Taiwan may be rerouted or 
forwarded on to destinations of concern.  AIT delivered the 
talking points contained in ref B to Wang and told him we had 
delivered the same points to BOFT the day before.  Wang said 
the information that Ecoma may be continuing to conduct 
business with Iran is a prime example of how the U.S. and 
Taiwan can usefully share intelligence information.  He also 
said that he has directed Taiwan's National Security Bureau 
and the Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau to monitor 
DPRK businessmen who come to Taiwan.  In particular, he said 
Taiwan is monitoring conversations and dealings that DPRK 
visitors have with Taiwan firms.  (Comment:  The clear 
implication from Wang and BOFT was that the U.S. would be 
supplying the bulk of the intelligence information.  End 
Comment.)  The Deputy Director noted that the initiatives 
Wang had just described could prove very useful.  He said 
that he was sure that Taiwan would have abundant useful 
intelligence information to share with the U.S. 
Confused Schedules 
------------------ 
8. (C) Currently, Wang and various agencies in the Taiwan 
Government are actively planning a delegation to visit the 
U.S.  AIT understands that TECRO/W has already informed 
Washington Agencies that Wang would lead a delegation to 
Washington in July. According to Wang, that message was 
delivered prematurely.  While we were in his office, Wang 
instructed his staff to check with the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs to check on why the message had already been 
delivered to AIT/W and Washington Agencies.  Wang said that 
he will consult further with MOFA and have TECRO/W deliver a 
revised message to Washington Agencies.  The revised message 
would reflect his view that it makes more sense to have the 
experts group from the U.S. visit Taiwan prior to his visit 
to Washington. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
9.  (C)  There are three distinct visits currently being 
contemplated regarding export control policy:  1) Wang's 
visit to Washington, 2) a small experts group from Washington 
to Taiwan, and 3) the second round of EXBS training.  In our 
view, these three visits have become somewhat tangled. 
Wang's visit has become particularly enmeshed with the U.S. 
experts visit to Taiwan. BOFT has been waiting since early 
February for the experts visit and, feeling the pressure to 
produce an export control plan, has done so without benefit 
of U.S. input.  Wang, feeling the pressure to demonstrate 
Taiwan's commitment to nonproliferation, has set in motion a 
visit to Washington.  Alongside these events, the first round 
of EXBS training went so well that the Taiwan agencies have 
been pressing for quickly scheduling the rest of the 
training.  The contractor for EXBS training has already 
advised AIT/T that it wishes to hold the second round of EXBS 
training July 12-15. 
 
10.  (S) While we do not know scheduling concerns of 
Washington Agencies, Wang's analysis seems reasonable that 
the most efficient use of resources, both in Taiwan and the 
U.S., would be to first schedule the visit by U.S. experts to 
assist BOFT to design and implement its export control 
regime.  Following such a visit, Wang could lead a delegation 
to Washington to reciprocate the February visit to Taipei and 
talk about future steps.  Wang is clearly prepared to come to 
Washington in July and deliver assurances of Taiwan's 
commitment to nonproliferation and cooperation with the U.S. 
His first priority at this point, which we believe the U.S. 
should support, is to follow up on the issues discussed at 
the February meeting and find ways to enhance quickly 
Taiwan's export control regime.    End Comment. 
 
11.  (C) Action Request:  We request direction on how to 
respond to Wang's proposal that Washington agencies consider 
scheduling an experts group to visit Taiwan to consult with 
NSC, NSB and BOFT.  End Action request. 
PAAL