US embassy cable - 05PRAGUE869

C O N F I D E N T I A L PRAGUE 000869 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, CU, EZ, EUN 
SUBJECT: CZECHS DISAPPOINTED WITH EU CUBA NEGOTIATIONS; 
WILL PUSH FOR LIMITS ON HIGH LEVEL VISITS 
 
REF: A. BRUSSELS 2165 
 
     B. BRUSSELS 2146 
     C. PRAGUE 833 
     D. PRAGUE 832 
     E. PRAGUE 814 
 
Classified By: Pol-Econ Counselor Mike Dodman for reasons 1.4 b+d 
 
1. (C) The Czechs are very disappointed with their inability 
to win support for tougher EU measures towards Cuba.  MFA 
Cuba Desk officer Petr Mikyska confirmed assessments provided 
to USEU by Solana's office (ref A) from this week's COLAT and 
PSC meetings.  Mikyska said that, despite their optimism last 
week (refs B and C) following bilateral discussions with the 
Spanish and the expulsion from Cuba of European MPs and 
reporters, the Czechs were isolated at the June 6 COLAT 
meeting. 
 
2. (C) The Czechs were seeking approval for action in three 
areas:  reinstating the 2003 measure of inviting dissidents 
to national days, limits on high level visits to Cuba, and 
approval for EU funding to support Cuban dissidents.  On 
national days, Mikyska said the Czechs were prepared to 
accept a statement that EU Members States were free to invite 
dissidents to their receptions.  The COLAT passed the issue 
to the PSC, which on June 7 sent the question back to the 
COLAT for further discussion, meaning that the issue will not 
be addressed in the conclusions of the June 13 GAERC (Mikyska 
added that the Czechs will invite dissidents to their October 
national day reception, regardless of the state of EU 
deliberations on the question). 
 
3. (C) The Czechs are still fighting for their proposal to 
limit the level of official Member State visits to Cuba.  The 
Czechs propose that the EU authorize Foreign Ministers to 
travel, but that no other ministers be allowed to make 
official visits (i.e., only sub-cabinet officials from other 
ministries).  This would facilitate the engagement called for 
in the 1996 Common Position, and permit FMs to lend support 
to the opposition movement, but limit the level of 
recognition afforded Castro.  Mikyska said no other country, 
including Poland, supports the Czech proposal.  The PSC will 
consider it at a meeting June 9, but Mikyska does not expect 
approval.  He believes this is the one issue FM Svoboda will 
take a stand on at next week's GAERC. 
 
4. (C) Mikyska said EU Mission chiefs in Havana proposed EU 
funding for a variety of projects, including academic, 
athletic, cultural and "support for dissidents."  The latter 
was challenged by many at the COLAT, with the Czechs actively 
supporting.  Mikyska said the COLAT has asked Commission 
lawyers for a ruling on whether this is possible.  He added 
that the Czechs have no specific ideas on how such funding 
would be used, but rather would defer to staff in Havana. 
 
5. (C) Mikyska reviewed orally the text of the Presidency's 
draft Council declaration on Cuba, which tracks with ref B 
(it repeats the call for the Cuba to release political 
prisoners and improve civil liberties, and also condemns the 
expulsion of European observers to last month's opposition 
meeting).  The only open questions, according to the Czechs, 
are whether the statement that the June 2003 measures remain 
suspended will be modified by their proposed limitation on 
high level visits, and the date of the next review.  The 
Czechs want a review after six months, rather than in June 
2006.  Mikyska said there was no discussion at the COLAT of 
what stands behind the pledge to deepen the structured 
dialogue with the peaceful opposition; these details will be 
worked out by Havana heads of missions. 
 
6. (C) Mikyska said the Czechs see the likely outcome of this 
review as a victory for Castro.  Going forward they will 
continue efforts to make the EU structured dialogue with the 
opposition effective, they will seek approval for EU funding, 
and will engage in the next review of the EU policy.  But the 
Czechs have low expectations for any positive change as a 
result of EU engagement in Cuba; they are not optimistic that 
the UK Presidency will make it a priority to reinstate any of 
the 2003 measures.  The Czech focus will increasingly be on 
the sort of bilateral efforts -- official and private -- 
already underway (refs C and D). 
CABANISS