US embassy cable - 05KUWAIT2508

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 002508 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARPI, INR-B 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PINR, PARM, KU, IR, KUWAIT-IRAN RELATIONS 
SUBJECT: (C) KUWAITI AMBASSADOR TO TEHRAN: IRAN FEARS 
SANCTIONS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4 (b and d) 
 
This cable contains biographical information.  Please see 
para. 9. 
 
1. (C) Summary:  During a June 4 meeting with Poloff and 
PolMiloff, Kuwaiti Ambassador to Iran Majdi Al-Thufiri shared 
his thoughts on the June 12 election, Supreme Leader 
Ayatollah Sayed Ali Khamenei's ability to control Iran's 
security forces, the U.S.-Iranian relationship and Iran's 
concerns over the poor state of its economy.  Al-Thufiri said 
Iran's leaders think it unlikely that the U.S. will take 
military action against the country, but fear the potential 
impact of economic sanctions.  Echoing the sentiments of 
other Kuwaitis, Al-Thufiri predicted that Ali Akbar Hashemi 
Rafsanjani would handily win the elections, as it is widely 
recognized that he alone is capable of enacting much needed 
economic reforms.  Finally, Al-Thufiri shared details of a 
January 2003 meeting during which Iranian FM Kamal Kharazi 
made comments indicating Iranian ability to assess U.S. 
military strength may have been very poor.  End Summary. 
 
Rafsanjani "Only Choice" in Elections 
------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Taking time out of a four-day visit to Kuwait to speak 
with Poloff and PolMiloff, Kuwaiti Ambassador to the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Majdi Al-Thufiri said June 4 that former 
President Rafsanjani was by far the most popular candidate of 
those running for President in Iran.  He said Rafsanjani was 
the "only choice" for those who had hopes of reforming the 
economy because he is the one candidate powerful enough to 
influence Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei.  Contradicting 
reports that Rafsanjani and Khamenei do not get along, 
Al-Thufiri said Rafsanjani was Khamenei's "favorite" and that 
Khamenei had thrown his support fully behind him.  Al-Thufiri 
said Khamenei is concerned that low voter turnout during the 
June 12 elections would harm the legitimacy of the elections 
in the eyes of world opinion, and was therefore going to 
great lengths to support candidates -- like Rafsanjani -- 
whom he believed would turn out large numbers of voters. 
 
3. (C) Al-Thufiri said that if elected, Rafsanjani could be 
expected to open Iran's economy to further foreign 
investment, but would have to work very hard to do so. 
Describing the Iranian political system as akin to the "North 
Korean model," he said control was very centralized in the 
upper echelons, but that each region had its own powerful 
leaders and interests. 
 
Supreme Leader May Not Control Security Forces 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
4. (C) Responding to a question from PolMiloff, Al-Thufiri 
said it was not clear that Supreme Leader Khamenei would be 
able to control Iran's security forces in the event of a 
serious political crisis.  He said the combination of unclear 
lines of command and the current religious debate inside Qom 
as to the viability of Velayat e Faquih would be complicating 
factors in the event of a crisis.  Asked if it was likely the 
regime might counter future unrest with a Basij-led 
crackdown, as it had in 1999, Al-Thufiri said no. 
 
Regime Will "Do Anything" to Keep Power, Fears Sanctions 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
5. (C) Al-Thufiri said that hardliners in the Iranian 
establishment "would do anything" to maintain their power, 
and are acutely aware that the poor state of Iran's economy 
was its main weakness.  He said that although Iran was 
uncomfortable with a U.S. military presence in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, it does not view a U.S. strike on Iranian 
territory as likely, and it dismisses the chances of success 
should any strike target Iran's dispersed nuclear facilities. 
 Rather, he said, Iran fears that further economic sanctions 
could produce a popular backlash large enough to topple the 
regime. 
 
6. (C) Noting Iran's involvement in Iraq, Al-Thufiri said 
that Iran's policies in Iraq had counterbalanced those of 
Syria, on which he said Iran had applied (unspecified) 
pressure to patrol its borders with Iraq more effectively. 
 
Iran's Pre-War Assessment of U.S. Troop Strength Off 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
7. (C) Regarding the Kuwaiti-Iranian bilateral relationship, 
Al-Thufiri said he had advised Kuwaiti Prime Minister Shaykh 
Sabah Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah to be frank in his dealings with Iran 
in order to win the country's respect.  Revealing details of 
a January 10, 2003 meeting between Iranian Foreign Minister 
Kamal Kharazzi and PM Shaykh Sabah, he said that the Iranian 
FM had told PM Sabah that Iran estimated that U.S. forces in 
Kuwait numbered 40,000 at that time and asked if this was 
correct.  PM Sabah had responded bluntly that the number was 
100,000 too low and added that there were plans for another 
40,000 British troops. 
 
Kuwaiti Concern Over Possible Iranian Nukes 
------------------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Al-Thufiri said that Kuwait is "very, very concerned" 
about the possibility that Iran might develop nuclear 
weapons, as it could potentially set off a nuclear arms race 
in the region, eventually culminating in a nuclear armed Iraq 
that could someday again threaten Kuwaiti sovereignty. 
 
Biographical Note 
------------------ 
 
9. (C) Al-Thufiri is a Sunni who has served as Kuwait's 
Ambassador to Iran since 2001.  Although he does not speak 
Farsi, he is known to be close to high-level leaders in Iran, 
and post has no reason to doubt his claims that he frequently 
sits with former President and presidential candidate Ali 
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.  Al-Thufiri appears to be in his 
mid-forties and speaks English fluently. 
 
********************************************* 
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********************************************* 
LEBARON