US embassy cable - 05COLOMBO1019

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 001019 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
USPACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2015 
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PREL, IN, CE, LTTE - Peace Process, Political Parties 
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA:  JVP THREATENS SHOWDOWN, PRESIDENT 
SEEKS SUPPORT FOR JOINT MECHANISM 
 
REF: A. COLOMBO 1004 
 
     B. COLOMBO 998 
     C. COLOMBO 955 
 
Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD.  REASON:  1.4 (B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C) With coalition partner Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna 
(JVP) still threatening to withdraw from the government if 
President Chandrika Kumaratunga signs the "joint mechanism" 
on tsunami aid with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE), Kumaratunga is seeking support for the controversial 
agreement from Opposition Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe.  While 
the Indian government endorsed the joint mechanism during the 
President's June 2-4 visit to New Delhi, Wickremesinghe's 
United National Party (UNP) so far has declined to "rescue" 
the President by announcing public support.  In a June 7 
meeting with Peace Secretariat head Jayantha Dhanapala, the 
Ambassador expressed concern at the steady erosion of the 
Ceasefire Agreement, underscoring the need for both sides to 
respect all aspects of the Agreement.  Dhanapala said that if 
the President has not signed the joint mechanism agreement by 
the June 13 co-chairs meeting--and indicated that she is not 
expected to--a co-chairs statement endorsing the mechanism 
could be counter-productive.  We think a carefully crafted 
statement expressing support for the principles underpinning 
the joint mechanism is necessary.  End summary. 
 
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IF THE INDIANS SUPPORT IT, 
CAN THE JVP BE FAR BEHIND? 
--------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) President Chandrika Kumaratunga returned from her 
June 2-4 visit to New Delhi with official--if not 
effusive--support for the proposed "joint mechanism" on 
tsunami relief with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
 
SIPDIS 
(LTTE).  (The joint communique noted that the Indian Prime 
Minister "expressed understanding of and support for" efforts 
to establish the mechanism, which was identified as the Post 
Tsunami Operational Management Structure.)  Before her 
 
SIPDIS 
departure for New Delhi, the President had indicated to a 
number of western envoys the need to bring the Indians on 
board before proceeding further. 
 
3.  (C)  In a June 7 meeting with the Ambassador, Indian High 
Commissioner Nirupama Rao said that her government's support 
of the mechanism was "neither conditional nor tepid," as 
indicated in some local Sri Lankan press reports.  Rao 
described Indian government interlocutors as impressed with 
Kumaratunga's "rational," persuasive and dispassionate 
arguments in support of the mechanism and emphasized that 
Indian leaders, including the Prime Minister and Congress 
leader Sonia Gandhi, understand that the Government of Sri 
Lanka (GSL) has no option but to work with the LTTE.  In a 
separate meeting with the Ambassador the same day, Jayantha 
Dhanapala, head of the GSL Peace Secretariat, who had 
participated in many of the meetings in New Delhi, described 
the Indians' reception of the mechanism proposal as "very 
positive," emphasizing that even the Indian Defense Minister 
had expressed support.  Dhanapala added that the Indian trip 
was necessary to "clear the air" of "murky rumors of Indian 
opposition" to the mechanism "fabricated" by some political 
actors in an "effort to change the debate by introducing 
disquieting rumors." 
 
 
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JVP THREATENS WALK-OUT; 
JHU MONKS FASTING 
------------------------ 
 
4.  (U) If the President was hoping that Indian support would 
help bring the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) around, her 
ever-contentious coalition partner moved quickly to quash any 
such expectation. On June 3 the JVP Politburo decided the 
party would leave the government if Kumaratunga proceeds with 
plans to sign the agreement on tsunami relief with the LTTE. 
On June 5 the party followed up with a second broadside, 
threatening to withdraw support from the United People's 
Front Alliance (UPFA) in all seven Provincial Councils if the 
mechanism were signed.  The Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), a 
Sinhalese chauvinist party whose Buddhist monk MPs have also 
vigorously opposed the agreement, issued an even more 
sensationalist ultimatum to the government on June 6, when 
JHU Secretary and MP Ven. Sobitha Thero began a 
well-publicized "fast-unto-death" at the Temple of the Tooth 
in Kandy, the holiest Buddhist shrine in the nation, to 
protest the proposed agreement.  (Not signing the mechanism 
is just one of the hunger-striking monk's demands.  He is 
also pressing the government to issue a statement that it 
will sign no agreements of any kind with the Tigers; to issue 
a statement guaranteeing that Buddha statues in Trincomalee 
and Jaffna will not be removed (Ref C); and to ensure 
adequate security to GSL forces guarding the controversial 
statue in Trincomalee, as well as to all Army and police 
intelligence officers.) 
 
5.  (C)  Japanese DCM Hiroshi Karube told DCM on June 7 that 
JVP leaders had not wavered from their hard-line position 
throughout the duration of a May 20-June 2 "study visit" to 
Japan, despite official Japanese support for the joint 
mechanism.  In fact, he added, JVP leader Somawansa 
Amarasinghe told the Japanese Ambassador on June 7 that it 
was "too late"  for Kumaratunga to try to win JVP support on 
the issue, especially since the President had still not even 
shown the text of the controversial document to her coalition 
partner. 
 
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PRESIDENT PLOTS STRATEGY; 
HOPES FOR OPPOSITION SUPPORT 
------------------------------ 
 
6.  (C) According to Health Minister and Kumaratunga 
confidant Nimal Siripala de Silva, the President held a 
three-hour meeting on June 6 with Prime Minister Mahinda 
Rajapakse and de Silva to decide next steps if the JVP 
continued its opposition. Recounting the discussion to the 
Ambassador, de Silva summarized the conundrum confronting the 
President:  What is the good of signing the joint mechanism 
if the JVP pulls out of the government, the government falls 
and the joint mechanism can never be implemented?  To resolve 
this dilemma, de Silva reported, the President has decided to 
ask Opposition Leader and former Prime Minister Ranil 
Wickremesinghe to issue a statement of public support for the 
mechanism before she signs it.  To this end, Kumaratunga will 
invite Wickremesinghe for a discussion on the topic, de Silva 
said.  In the meantime, the President plans to meet with 
government MPs, including those from the JVP, the evening of 
June 7. 
 
7.  (C)  Dhanapala also briefed the Ambassador on the plan to 
enlist opposition support for the mechanism, criticizing 
Wickremesinghe for letting the President "stew in her own 
juices" while the JVP threatened to quit.  Wickremesinghe 
might have done things differently, Dhanapala conceded, but 
it is "irresponsible to stand on the sidelines and cheer" at 
the President's difficulties on an issue of such grave 
national importance.  Unfortunately, Dhanapala said, the 
joint mechanism has become a lightning rod for all kinds of 
extremist views.  If the mechanism were not signed, he 
predicted, there was a "great danger of regression"  and "a 
huge loss of credibility for the peace process," especially 
among the Tamil community.  He asked if the Ambassador could 
help persuade Wickremesinghe to support the proposal.  Much 
of the problem with similar overtures from the President to 
Wickremesinghe in the past, the Ambassador  responded, has 
been in the way such requests were conveyed--usually in the 
form of letters that were released to the press at the same 
time as to Wickremesinghe.  Declining to serve as a 
go-between in such matters, the Ambassador said that the best 
way to frame the appeal to Wickremesinghe would be to depict 
the joint mechanism as helping to further the peace process 
that he started. 
 
8.  (C)  With respect to the June 13 co-chairs meeting in 
Washington, Dhanapala said that it would be "awkward" to 
address the issue of the joint mechanism in a public 
statement if the agreement had not been signed by the time of 
the meeting (which, he indicated, was a likely scenario). 
The co-chairs would face the dilemma of how to modulate a 
message of support for the mechanism without inciting the 
"sometimes xenophobic reaction to well-meaning efforts" from 
western donors that arises from some quarters.  He asked that 
co-chairs consider other ways to increase pressure on the 
LTTE, including by examining funding funneled through the 
Tamil diaspora and by pressing for a UN Security Council 
Resolution condemning LTTE recruitment of child soldiers.  He 
added that disagreement within the P-5 on this issue--with 
the UK reportedly "dragging its feet" while the French are 
"quite keen" to pass the resolution--was apparently to blame 
for the delay. 
 
 
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AMBASSADOR EXPRESSES CONCERN AT VIOLENCE, 
FRAGILITY OF CEASEFIRE 
------------------------------------------ 
 
9.  (C) Referring to the co-chairs meeting, the Ambassador 
noted to Dhanapala that if international interest in the 
peace process is to be sustained, there must be an actual 
peace process that can be identified.  If the joint mechanism 
cannot be concluded, he continued, how can the more 
comprehensive agreements needed to achieve a lasting 
settlement be concluded?  The Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) has 
become badly frayed, the Ambassador stressed, and the ensuing 
violence is "detrimental to all sides."   Both parties to the 
CFA seem to have decided on a de facto abrogation of key 
parts of the Agreement, he emphasized, undermining the 
security situation and inflaming public opinion.  While the 
LTTE is undeniably the main culprit in violating the 
ceasefire, the accelerated tit-for-tat violence is creating 
an explosive situation.  (Note:  Two alleged LTTE 
intelligence agents were killed in Colombo on June 5, for 
example.  End note.)  When Dhanapala objected to suggestions 
that the GSL shared some of the blame for the violence, the 
Ambassador replied that it strained credulity to suppose that 
anti-LTTE Karuna forces--some of which operate from camps 
next to GSL security installations--do not at least receive 
Government acquiescence.  Dhanapala did not respond. 
 
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UNP:  NOT TO THE "RESCUE" 
------------------------- 
 
10.  (C) In a June 7 meeting with the Ambassador, Opposition 
Leader Wickremesinghe said he would not release a public 
statement supporting the mechanism before the President 
actually signed the agreement.  To do otherwise would only 
serve to "rescue" the President from her own political 
problems, which, he said bluntly, he was disinclined to do. 
In the meantime, he said, the President should prepare a 
contingency plan in case the JVP quits the government.  One 
of her options, he continued, is to begin to talk seriously 
with his United National Party (UNP); alternatively, she 
could continue to "play games" by trying to lure UNP MPs 
across the aisle.  Pressed by the Ambassador, he conceded 
that he might agree to meet with the President if she were to 
invite him.  He also conceded that the UNP would have to 
support the joint mechanism if it were signed. 
 
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LTTE:  STILL READY TO SIGN 
--------------------------- 
 
11.  (C) Swiss Ambassador Bernardino Regazzoni told the 
Ambassador on June 6 that he had visited LTTE headquarters in 
Kilinochchi on June 2 and met with LTTE political wing leader 
Thamilchelvan.  According to Regazzoni, Thamilchelvan 
asserted that the LTTE remains ready to sign the joint 
mechanism.  Regazzoni added that Thamilchelvan himself raised 
the fragility of the Ceasefire Agreement, describing the CFA 
as key to further progress on the peace process.  Regazzoni 
responded that the ongoing LTTE campaign of violence, 
including the killing of Sri Lanka Army Major Muthaliff (Ref 
B), was seriously undermining the ceasefire;  such violations 
were "devastating" for the image of the LTTE in the south and 
with donors, Regazzoni stressed.  Thamilchelvan neither 
confirmed nor denied LTTE involvement in Muthaliff's slaying. 
 
 
 
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COMMENT 
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12.  (C) Some observers had speculated that support from the 
Indian government, which has studiously cultivated the 
renegade JVP over the past year, could be sufficient to mute 
the party's strident opposition to the mechanism.  So far, 
that has not proven to be the case. It is hard to tell if the 
JVP, which has threatened to leave this government so many 
times before, is just practicing brinkmanship or whether it 
has already packed its bags.  Conventional wisdom holds that 
while the JVP might do even better in a fresh parliamentary 
poll than it did last April, it would still not do well 
enough to win anything more than a repeat performance as a 
junior coalition partner in another government. 
Wickremesinghe's apparent decision to sit back and watch the 
President squirm may not be statesmanlike, but it is hardly 
surprising, given the personal enmity between the two party 
leaders.  Unfortunately, their mutual antipathy is preventing 
cooperation on an issue of grave national importance--while 
simultaneously letting the JVP capitalize, at the expense of 
both of these mainstream parties, on the stalemate.  Despite 
Dhanapala's concern that a co-chairs' statement on the 
mechanism could be counter-productive, we believe that a 
carefully crafted statement expressing support for a 
structure to coordinate tsunami assistance--even if that 
structure is not directly identified as a joint mechanism--is 
needed. 
LUNSTEAD