US embassy cable - 05BRUSSELS2165

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 002165 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CCA, EUR/ERA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, CU, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: CUBA: FURTHER CHANGES IN EU POLICY UNLIKELY 
 
REF: A. A) STATE 102505 
     B. B) BRUSSELS 2059 
     C. C) THE HAGUE 1536 
     D. D) PARIS 3722 
 
Classified By: USEU POLOFF TODD HUIZINGA, FOR REASONS 1/4 (B) AND (D) 
 
 1. (C) SUMMARY:  According to a key EU Council official 
(protect), the EU will almost certainly continue the 
suspension of the June 2003 restrictive measures against Cuba 
and seek "constructive" dialogue with the Cuban authorities. 
This is the principal message of the draft EU policy 
declaration on Cuba that the official showed us.  The June 6 
meeting of the EU Working Group on Latin America (COLAT) was 
dominated by the Spaniards, who effectively fended off Polish 
and Czech attempts to take a harder line.  We expect the June 
7 EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) to approve the 
draft policy declaration (perhaps with cosmetic changes), and 
EU FonMins are likely to give it final approval on June 13. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
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DRAFT DECLARATION REAFFIRMS DIALOGUE 
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2. (C) On June 6, Poloff delivered REF A demarche to Nicolas 
Pascual de la Parte (protect), EU HighRep Javier Solana's 
Adviser on Latin America.  Pascual showed Poloff the 
Luxembourg EU Presidency's draft EU policy declaration on 
Cuba.  The document reaffirmed the EU Common Position on 
Cuba, in force since 1996, and its basic approach of 
"constructive engagement" with Cuba.  It contained language 
condemning detention and harassment of dissidents, and 
expressing EU plans to continue increased contacts with the 
peaceful opposition.  Its basic message, though, was that the 
EU would extend its suspension of the June 2003 restrictive 
measures against Cuba in the interest of promoting dialogue 
with the Cuban authorities.  The draft calls for another 
review of the suspension by June 2006, but Pascual said that 
Germany might push for a review by December 2005. 
 
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SPAIN DOMINATES ON CUBA 
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3. (C) Pascual said COLAT discussion of Cuba policy was 
dominated by Spain.  He said returning to the status quo ante 
was impossible -- it was clear the Spaniards would not agree 
to re-impose the June 2003 measures.  Pascual reported that 
the Spanish COLAT representative argued successfully that the 
measures had proven contradictory to the EU Common Position 
on Cuba, with its emphasis on "constructive engagement" with 
the Cuban authorities.  A Polish-led push to re-institute the 
most controversial of the June 2003 measures, the policy of 
inviting dissidents to national day celebrations at EU 
Missions in Havana, found little support.  Spain asserted 
that if dissidents were invited, Cuban government officials 
would refuse to attend, thus creating an obstacle to the 
dialogue foreseen by the Common Position.  When the Czech 
COLAT representative proposed that the EU fund the peaceful 
opposition, Spain responded that there was no reason to set 
such a precedent when the EU does not fund the opposition in 
other problematic countries with which it seeks constructive 
dialogue, such as China or Iran. 
 
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EU CONSTITUTION VOTES AFFECT DELIBERATIONS 
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4. (C) Pascual predicted that the EU Political and Security 
Committee (PSC) would on June 7 approve the substance of the 
draft policy declaration.  In the wake of the French and 
Dutch referenda on the EU constitutional treaty, he said, the 
EU's foremost concern was to show unity -- to demonstrate 
that the EU can reach consensus and make decisions.  He said 
Germany might push to move the next review of the restrictive 
measures' suspension from June 2006, as foreseen in the draft 
declaration, to December 2005.  He added that the Czechs and 
Poles might succeed in getting some tougher language on the 
Castro regime in the declaration.  All in all, though, the 
message coming out of the June 13 EU Foreign Minister's 
meeting was likely to be a reaffirmation of constructive 
engagement in the interest of maintaining dialogue with the 
Cuban regime. 
 
5. (C) COMMENT: The Czechs and Poles do not appear to have 
been able to drum up enough support within the EU for a 
harder line, while the Spaniards remain determined and 
capable in their defense of dialogue with the regime as the 
top priority.  Germany appears to favor a somewhat tougher 
policy, but did not provide the active support that is key to 
the Czechs' and Poles' prospects for influencing other member 
states.  If, as expected, the EU reiterates its pledge to 
increase contacts with the peaceful opposition, it would 
offer an opportunity for continued U.S.-EU consultation on 
how to put those words into action.  END COMMENT. 
MCKINLEY 
.