US embassy cable - 05GENEVA1401

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JCIC-XXVII: (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON VANDENBERG VISIT OFFER AND GROUND TRANSPORTATION NOTIFICATION FORMATS

Identifier: 05GENEVA1401
Wikileaks: View 05GENEVA1401 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: US Mission Geneva
Created: 2005-06-07 11:56:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 GENEVA 001401 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR T, AC, NP, VC, EUR AND S/NIS 
DOE FOR AN-1 
JCS FOR J5/DDIN AND J5/NAC 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/SACC 
NAVY FOR CNO-N514 AND DIRSSP 
DTRA FOR SA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR MILLER 
DTRA FOR OSA 
DIA FOR RAR-3 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2015 
TAGS: PARM, KACT, US, RS, UP, BO, KZ, START, JCIC, INF 
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII:  (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON 
VANDENBERG VISIT OFFER AND GROUND TRANSPORTATION 
NOTIFICATION FORMATS 
 
REF: A. STATE 53670 (JCIC-DIP-05-003) 
     B. GENEVA 1339 (JCIC-XXVII-009) 
     C. 04 GENEVA 856 (JCIC-XXVI-005) 
 
Classified By:  Dr. George W. Look, U.S. Representative 
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). 
Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-017. 
 
2.  (U) Meeting Date:  June 2, 2005 
                Time:  3:00 - 5:05 P.M. 
               Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
 
SUMMARY 
 
3.  (S) A Working Group Meeting was held at the Russian 
Mission on June 2, 2005, at which Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, 
and the United States were represented; Kazakhstan was not 
represented.  The Parties discussed the U.S. offer of a 
one-time visit to the silo launchers that the United States 
had attributed to the Vandenberg Space Launch Facility (REF 
A) and Ground Transportation notifications issues. 
 
4.  (S) The U.S. Delegation outlined the parameters for the 
visit and assured the other Parties that the United States 
would not view acceptance of the offer as an indication that 
the other Parties no longer had concerns about the 
reattribution of silos to the Vandenberg Space Launch 
Facility.  The U.S. Delegation also reminded the other 
Parties that the visit must be conducted prior to June 1, 
2006. 
 
5.  (S) The U.S. Delegation said it would not discuss the 
Russian-proposed ground transportation formats (REF B) 
because the draft formats specified changes to the content of 
the Format 144 notifications.  The U.S. Delegation sought 
only to distinguish ground transportation notifications from 
other Format 144 messages by the use of suffixes.  After 
lengthy discussion, the Russian Delegation withdrew its 
proposed formats, and the Parties reached substantive 
agreement whereby the Parties would add five letter suffixes 
-- A, B, C, D and E - to the proposed letters under 
discussion, which would authorize their use on subsequent 
NRRC Format 144 notifications when used for ground 
transportation.  It would be up to the respective NRRCs to 
agree on which suffix would be applied to the individuals 
notification requirements spelled out in the ground 
transportation agreement. 
 
VANDENBERG:  QUESTIONS REGARDING THE VISIT 
 
6.  (S) At a Working Group Meeting at the Russian Mission on 
June 2, 2005, Mullins began by stating that the United States 
did not view acceptance of the U.S.-proposed offer to visit 
the silo launchers that had been reattributed to the 
Vandenberg Space Launch Facility as an indication that the 
other Parties no longer had concerns about the reattributed 
launchers at the Vandenberg Space Launch Facility.  He added 
that the visit must be conducted before June 1, 2006, for 
operational reasons.  He provided the other Parties with 
written parameters for the visit. 
 
Begin text of notional paper that was provided (undated): 
 
General Parameters for the Visit 
 
-- The visit will be conducted on a date mutually agreed upon 
by the Parties.  However, it must be conducted before June 1, 
2006. 
 
-- The visit will not be conducted in conjunction with a 
START inspection or sequentially following a START inspection. 
-- Although the visit will not be a START inspection, the 
United States will provide the observers with transportation, 
lodging, meals, and, as necessary, medical services while 
they are in the United States. 
 
-- The United States will treat the observers with due 
respect and take appropriate measures to ensure their safety 
while they are in the United States. 
 
-- The observers will be allowed to visit all five 
reattributed silos at the Vandenberg Space Launch Facility. 
 
-- The visit is expected to require no more than one day, not 
including travel time. 
 
Visit Details 
 
-- A total of ten observers, including interpreters, will be 
allowed to participate in the visit.  Visiting Parties must 
coordinate among themselves and provide the United States 
with a listing of who will attend. 
 
-- The observers will be escorted by U.S. personnel to the 
Vandenberg Space Launch Facility from the West Coast Point of 
Entry. 
 
-- The United States will conduct a pre-visit briefing at 
Vandenberg. 
 
-- The observers will be allowed to visit each reattributed 
silo in the observers' order of preference. 
 
-- The observers will be allowed the opportunity to go below 
grade at the four silos modified to contain Ground-Based 
Interceptors (GBIs) and view those silos from the Launch 
Equipment Room. 
 
-- The observers will be allowed to measure the diameter of 
any emplaced GBIs to confirm they are not START-accountable 
items of inspection in accordance with START measurement 
procedures. 
 
-- The clamshell doors of the four modified silos will remain 
closed during the visit. 
 
-- The observers will be allowed the opportunity to view the 
unmodified silo from ground level through the open silo door. 
 
-- The observers will be escorted back to the West Coast POE 
for departure home. 
 
End text. 
 
7.  (S) Fedorchenko asked whether the visit would be a joint 
visit or inspection.  He noted that the written parameters 
outlined several START inspection procedures.  He asked 
whether the JCIC agreement on joint inspections (sic) applied 
with regard to the proportional representation by the 
Parties, in which case no less than seven members of the 
visiting delegation should be from Russia. 
 
8.  (S) Mullins repeated that the United States is offering a 
visit, not a START inspection.  The offer is for a single 
visit, and it is up to the other Parties to determine among 
themselves who will participate in the visit.  The United 
States will pay all associated costs of the visit while the 
other Parties are in the United States, but the other Parties 
must pay their own round-trip transportation costs to and 
from their own respective country to the West Coast POE. 
 
9.  (S) Shevtsov asked what were the U.S. objectives or 
purpose for the visit.  Mullins stated that the visit would 
provide an opportunity for the other Parties to view all five 
silos reattributed to the Vandenberg Space Launch Facility, 
and to confirm that the emplaced GBIs are not strategic 
offensive arms.  The other Parties will also be able to see 
that the empty silos do not contain items of inspection 
(IOI).  The offer is not being made within the context of 
START, but as a positive measure without preconditions. 
 
10.  (S) In response to specific questions, Mullins provided 
the following information.  The silos have been modified to 
launch GBIs, not converted under the treaty.  Two modified 
silos have emplaced GBIs, and the other two modified silos 
are empty.  The other Parties will not be allowed to measure 
the silos, but they will be allowed to measure the diameter 
of the GBIs pursuant to START procedures to confirm they are 
not IOI.  No additional documentation will be provided to the 
other Parties following the visit, nor will a final report be 
expected.  Mullins also declined to discuss whether 
interceptors would be emplaced at other facilities, 
indicating he did not know the Missile Defense Agency's 
plans.  When asked why the United States insisted on a June 
1, 2006 cutoff date for the inspection, Mullins explained 
that it was a practical matter and not due to scheduled 
launch activity.  Shevtsov stated that Ukraine intends to 
participate in the visit if it occurs.  Fedorchenko said 
Russia would take the U.S. offer for a visit under advisement. 
 
PARTIES AGREE TO ADD SUFFIXES TO GROUND 
TRANSPORTATION NOTIFICATION FORMATS 
 
11.  (S) Mullins deferred discussion on the Russian-proposed 
ground transportation formats (REF B), stating that the 
objective of exchanging the letters during this session was 
to simply allow for the use of suffixes to the already 
existing free-flowing Format 144; not to negotiate or agree 
to new 144 Formats.  The specific content of each sending 
Party's ground transportation-related 144s is determined by 
the ground transportation agreement, which the U.S. had no 
interest in reopening.  Suffixes would not alter the 
structure and content of the information conveyed in START 
Format 144 ground transportation notifications that are 
exchanged by the Parties, as required by the March 20, 2002 
Ground Transportation Agreement.  Lengthy discussion ensued 
between the Parties regarding both the number of suffixes to 
be added to the Format 144 message number and the information 
to be provided in formats. 
 
12.  (S) Disagreement arose regarding Russia's insistence 
that border-crossing information be required in U.S. Format 
144 ground transportation notifications.  Mullins declared 
this as unacceptable.  He explained that the Russian trucking 
company, the U.S. monitors, and Russian Department 162 at 
Votkinsk had a good working relationship with regard to 
ground transportation missions.  The best solution is to 
continue the current practice, where the Russian trucking 
company determines which route it will take rather than the 
United States being held responsible for border-crossing 
information in the NRRC message.  Mullins added that the 
Russian position contravened the Ground Transportation 
Agreement that had been completed in 2002.  Ryzhkov stated 
that Russia would consider border-crossing information to be 
tentative and would remain flexible if timelines were not 
met.  Russia wanted the information to provide to its border 
control and customs agencies to facilitate transfer of 
equipment across the Belarus border.  Mullins responded that 
the U.S. cargo was commercial cargo, not diplomatic cargo. 
Furthermore, the draft Format 144s submitted by Russia at the 
first meeting had Russia providing locations and timelines 
for border-crossings.  Now, Russia was proposing for the 
United States to provide border-crossing information.  After 
consultation on the Russian side, Fedorchenko asserted that 
none of the Parties sought to change the content of the 
Format 144s, but all agreed to add suffixes to the formats to 
distinguish ground transportation notifications from other 
Format 144 notifications.  He withdrew the Russian-proposed 
formats from the table. 
 
13.  (S) Acknowledging that the Parties were close to 
agreement on the issue, and to ensure mutual understanding, 
Mullins repeated the U.S. position that border-crossing 
information should not be provided in the Format 144 
notifications used for ground transportation.  He suggested 
that, for ground transportation notifications, the Parties 
agree to add five suffixes, A-B-C-D-E, to the Format 144 
notifications without comment, and defer to the respective 
NRRCs to agree on which suffixes applied to which 
requirements in the Ground Transportation Agreement.  The 
proposed exchange of letters that would be completed during 
this session of the JCIC will include the suffixes A, B, C, D 
and E. 
 
14.  (S) Fedorchenko agreed to the exchange of letters 
provided by the United States on May 31, 2005 (REF C).  He 
then proposed to amend the Russian draft documents to reflect 
agreement.  Mullins said he was confident that the Parties 
had reached substantive agreement on the issue. 
 
15.  (U) Documents exchanged:  None. 
 
16.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
Mr. Mullins 
Mr. Dunn 
Col(sel) Emig 
Mr. Herrick 
Mr. Jones 
Mr. Miller 
Maj Mitchner 
Mr. Sessions 
Mr. Smith 
Mr. Singer 
Mr. Tiersky 
LCDR Woods 
Dr. Hopkins (Int) 
 
Belarus 
 
Mr. Grinevich 
 
Russia 
 
Col Fedorchenko 
Mr. Bolotov 
Ms. Kotkova 
Mr. Maksimenko 
Col Razumov 
Col Ryzhkov 
Mr. Shabalin 
Mr. Smirnov 
Ms. Sorokina 
Mr. Yegorov 
Mr. Anisimov (Int) 
 
Ukraine 
 
Dr. Shevtsov 
Col Taran 
 
17.  (U) Look sends. 
Moley 

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