US embassy cable - 05SINGAPORE1788

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DEPUTY SECRETARY ZOELLICK'S MAY 10 MEETING WITH SENIOR MINISTER GOH CHOK TONG

Identifier: 05SINGAPORE1788
Wikileaks: View 05SINGAPORE1788 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Singapore
Created: 2005-06-07 08:35:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: OVIP PREL PGOV ECON SN
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SINGAPORE 001788 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY ZOELLICK 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2015 
TAGS: OVIP, PREL, PGOV, ECON, SN 
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY ZOELLICK'S MAY 10 MEETING WITH 
SENIOR MINISTER GOH CHOK TONG 
 
REF: SINGAPORE 910 
 
1. (U) Classified by: Ambassador Franklin L. Lavin.  Reason 
1.4(d) 
 
2. (U) Date Time and Place: May 10, 2005, 12:30PM, Istana, 
Singapore 
 
3. (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
---- 
 
The Deputy Secretary 
Ambassador Franklin Lavin 
DAS Marie Huhtala, EAP 
D Executive Assistant Ross Wilson 
Chris Kavanagh (Embassy Notetaker) 
 
Singapore 
--------- 
 
Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong 
Minister of Defense Teo Chee Hean 
Second Minister for Trade and Industry Vivian Balakrishnan 
MFA Second Permanent Secretary Bilahari Kausikan 
MFA Notetaker Lee Chong Hock 
 
4. (C) Summary: During their May 10 meeting, Senior 
Minister Goh Chok Tong and the Deputy Secretary discussed 
developments in the Middle East, the Asia-Middle East 
Dialogue, and Goh's interest in encouraging moderate 
Muslims to fight terrorism at the ideological level.  SM 
Goh noted that Islam had gained a greater role in the 
political arena in Malaysia, which was a concern for the 
long-term.  Turning to Indonesia, SM Goh thought it had its 
best leadership team since Suharto, but its revival would 
depend on President Yudhoyono's being decisive and acting 
quickly.  The Deputy Secretary noted Malaysia and 
Indonesia's interest in enhancing maritime security. 
Commenting on China, SM Goh said its leadership was focused 
on promoting internal economic development.  The danger 
point in cross-Strait relations had passed and President 
Chen Shui-bian had been boxed in by recent developments. 
End Summary. 
 
------------------------- 
Asia-Middle East Dialogue 
------------------------- 
 
5. (C) During their May 10 meeting, Senior Minister Goh 
Chok Tong briefed the Deputy Secretary on the Asia-Middle 
East Dialogue (AMED), which Singapore was sponsoring in 
June (Reftel).  More than 30 countries had agreed to 
participate in the event and it would bring together both 
government and non-governmental organization leaders.  SM 
Goh said his main goal was to encourage moderate Muslims in 
the Middle East to fight terrorism at the ideological 
level.  Only Muslims could debunk the corruption of the 
Koran undertaken by extremists.  The United States and 
other countries could help, but it was ultimately a fight 
Muslims must win themselves. 
 
6. (C) SM Goh said he was encouraged by the success of some 
Gulf States, such as Dubai and Qatar, in showing that 
observant Muslims could also have a modern economy.  More 
travel and people-to-people exchanges, especially from 
Saudi Arabia, were needed to change conservative mind 
sets.  Economically, the Middle East had to diversify 
away from just oil.  Politically, these countries had 
to implement reform at their own pace, with a nudge 
from the United States.  The Deputy Secretary commented 
that the AMED was an excellent idea and he had encouraged 
the Gulf States to look at Asia as well as the United 
States as a model for economic development. 
 
-------------------- 
Israel and Palestine 
-------------------- 
 
7. (C) From May 19-20, SM Goh will be visiting Israel and 
Palestine.  The Deputy Secretary commented that Singapore 
was in a unique position to share perspectives with Israel 
since they both understood the problem of lacking strategic 
depth.  Asked about Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud 
Abbas, the Deputy Secretary said that he faces a number of 
challenges in building political support on top of the 
electoral legitimacy he won in the Presidential election. 
Both Abbas and PM Sharon will need help and support. 
The main questions were whether he could be firm enough 
and control the security services. 
----------------- 
Islam in Malaysia 
----------------- 
 
8. (C) Noting that Malaysia was another part of his brief, 
SM Goh said that Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi 
was a good man to work with and wanted to make Malaysia a 
modern and moderate Islamic country.  He was concerned, 
however, that introducing Islam into the political arena 
was a mistake and could become a problem in the future. 
Defense Minister Teo observed that it was self-defeating 
for UMNO to engage in a "holier than thou" contest with the 
Islamic party (PAS). 
 
------------------ 
Hope for Indonesia 
------------------ 
 
9. (C) Indonesia had its best chance to move forward and 
its best leadership team since Suharto, observed SM Goh. 
President Yudhoyono had the vision and character to restore 
Indonesia.  It was unclear, however, if he had the strength 
to do so and would move fast enough.  Vice President Jusuf 
Kalla was more decisive, but lacked Yudhoyono's 
international perspective.  If they complemented each 
other, they could make a good team.  At this moment, they 
appeared to be working together, although their respective 
supporters were jockeying for position, noted Defense 
Minister Teo. 
 
10. (C) Teo added that it was important to institutionalize 
"outward thinking" in Indonesia, especially in the armed 
forces (TNI).  In the late 1990's, the TNI did not consider 
the United States to be a possible threat.  Because it had 
been cut off from contact with the United States for so 
many years, however, it had grown increasingly suspicious 
of the United States.  In some Indonesian military planning 
scenarios, the United States was rated a higher potential 
threat than China. 
 
----------------- 
Maritime Security 
----------------- 
 
11. (C) The Deputy Secretary said he had discussed maritime 
security with both Indonesia and Malaysia.  Indonesia 
appeared interested in assistance to improve its maritime 
security capabilities.  Malaysia was too, and it also saw 
the benefits of real-time information sharing.  Teo noted 
that the foreign ministers of the three littoral states 
were planning to meet soon to discuss maritime security. 
There had been a historic tension between the three about 
how to deal with the Malacca Strait.  Singapore wanted 
the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to play 
a greater role in enhancing maritime security, while 
Malaysia and Indonesia wanted to limit the issue to the 
three littorals. 
 
-------------------------------- 
China and Cross-Strait Relations 
-------------------------------- 
 
12. (C) China's senior leadership was focused on the 
country's internal economic development, commented SM Goh. 
They did not want any external problems to distract them, 
especially any problems with the United States.  While the 
economy was in good shape, there were increasing internal 
stresses due to the divergence between the economically 
advanced coastal regions and the interior.  The Deputy 
Secretary noted that China was under pressure to make major 
 
SIPDIS 
economic policy changes, such as to the renminbi exchange 
rate.  It was a new member of the international economic 
system, but it had to face the burdens of being a major 
economy. 
 
13. (C) Nine months ago, Singapore was very worried about 
the possibility of cross-Strait conflict, but the danger 
point had now passed, said SM Goh.  President Chen 
Shui-bian had been boxed in by domestic unhappiness with 
his pro-independence moves, President Bush's statement on 
the limits to USG support, Beijing's Anti-Secession Law, 
and the visits to the PRC by opposition leaders Lien Chan 
and James Soong.  The February U.S.-Japan statement had 
also helped stabilize the cross-Strait situation. 
LAVIN 

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