US embassy cable - 05TAIPEI2479

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TAIWAN STONEWALLS PRC TOURISTS, PANDAS AND FRUIT

Identifier: 05TAIPEI2479
Wikileaks: View 05TAIPEI2479 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Created: 2005-06-07 03:35:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL TW Cross Strait Politics Cross Strait Economics
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

070335Z Jun 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 002479 
 
SIPDIS 
 
WASHINGTON PASS AIT/W 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, TW, Cross Strait Politics, Cross Strait Economics 
SUBJECT: TAIWAN STONEWALLS PRC TOURISTS, PANDAS AND FRUIT 
 
REF: A. TAIPEI 2076 
 
     B. TAIPEI 2243 
 
Classified By:  AIT Deputy Director David J. Keegan, Reason 1.4 b 
 
1.  (C) Summary.  Taipei continues to hold at arm's length 
Beijing's offers of accommodation conveyed during the Lien 
and Soong visits.  Taipei officials insist that offers of 
tourism, pandas, and fruit be handled via government-to- 
government, or even virtual state-to-state (i.e., WTO), 
negotiations.  President Chen Shui-bian's primary objective, 
however, is not these highly unlikely official negotiations, 
but rather to neutralize the enthusiasm over the Lien and 
Soong trips, cool the accompanying "China fever" in Taiwan, 
and restore his own shaken political leadership.  Chen's 
criticism of Lien and Soong and stonewalling of Beijing 
appear to have squelched any cross-Strait momentum the two 
visits might have created.  These two maneuvers, together 
with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) May 14 National 
Assembly election victory, have largely restored Chen's 
unchallenged leadership of the DPP and control of 
cross-Strait relations.  Chen has pledged that after the KMT 
Chairman change in July, there will again be forward movement 
on inter-party conciliation and cross-Strait relations.  The 
appointment over the weekend of former DPP Secretary General 
Chang Chun-hsiung as Chairman of Taiwan's Straits Exchange 
Foundation (SEF), however, probably seals the fate of SEF as 
a venue for negotiations; though a senior party official, 
Chang has little experience with or apparent interest in 
cross-Strait relations.  Rather, Chen is reportedly still 
interested in establishing a cross-Strait peace and 
development commission with opposition party representation, 
but not leadership.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C) In late May, President Chen Shui-bian seized on PRC 
opposition to Taiwan's bid for observer status at the World 
Health Assembly in Geneva as proof the Lien and Soong visits 
achieved nothing and Mainland China continued hostile toward 
Taiwan.  A few days later, Chen declared Taiwan's opposition 
visit-induced "China fever" finished.  DPP Deputy SecGen Yan 
Wan-chin told AIT that Chen's primary objective was to 
counter the opposition trips and to neutralize the 
intra-party criticism he confronted in a May 6 DPP meeting 
(see Ref A).  Only then could Chen recover the positive 
trajectory in cross-Strait relations derailed by the PRC 
Anti-Secession Law in mid-March. 
 
3.  (C) Chen's effort to block cross-Strait exchanges 
stemming from the Lien and Soong visits has been reinforced 
by the hard line Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) and the more 
conciliatory Premier Frank Hsieh.  MAC has repeatedly 
intervened to insist on government-to-government talks before 
any of PRC proposals can be realized.  Hsieh has followed a 
more accommodating line, initially welcoming Beijing's 
announcements but subsequently hardening his stance to stay 
in line with Chen's campaign to negate the opposition party 
visits. 
 
4.  (C) Taipei has played the recalcitrant suitor to 
Beijing's public offers over the past two weeks: 
 
-- Tourists:  Premier Hsieh welcomed Beijing's May 20 
announcement that it would allow PRC citizens to visit 
Taiwan.  MAC Chair Joseph Wu (Chao-hsieh), however, quickly 
weighed in declaring that government-to-government talks were 
necessary before PRC nationals could visit Taiwan.  The 2005 
Chinese New Year charter flights, he claimed, could not serve 
as a model because tourism involves the work of many 
government agencies (a claim that DPP Deputy SecGen Yan 
disputed; see para 5 below). 
 
-- Pandas:  Premier Hsieh similarly welcomed Beijing's June 1 
announcement that preparations are underway to send pandas to 
Taiwan but added the caveat that Taiwan will handle the panda 
issue in accordance with international conservation and 
endangered species regulations.  Pro-independence hardliner 
Gary Tseng (Tien-tzu), Director-General of the Presidential 
Office Special Affairs Department, however, told AIT there is 
no support in the Presidential Office for allowing pandas, 
the national symbol of China, into Taiwan; they would not be 
refused outright, he noted, just postponed indefinitely by 
regulatory injunctions.  Dep SecGen Yan, on the other hand, 
told AIT that it is just "deep Green" DPP hardliners who 
oppose the pandas. 
-- Fruit:  MAC Chair Wu rejected Beijing's June 1 
announcement of duty-free import of 15 kinds of Taiwan fruit 
into Mainland China, insisting there must first be 
negotiations either between Taiwan and PRC officials or under 
the WTO framework. 
 
5.  (C) Over the weekend, President Chen appointed former DPP 
SecGen Chang Chun-hsiung as Chairman of Taiwan's Straits 
Exchange Foundation (SEF), replacing the inimitable Koo 
Chen-fu who led cross-Strait negotiations for Taiwan in the 
1990's.  Noting that Chang has little experience with or 
interest in cross-Strait relations, Deputy SecGen Yan, 
himself a former SEF Deputy Director, told AIT that SEF's 
"time has passed" and future cross-Strait negotiations must 
follow some variation of the 2005 Chinese New Year charter 
flight model (direct negotiations between relevant private 
organizations with low-level government involvement).  Yan 
surmised to AIT that, with the opposition cross-Strait 
initiative largely sidelined, Chen might resurrect his 
earlier idea of an inter-party "cross-Strait peace and 
development commission" as a mechanism for developing 
inter-party Taiwan consensus on cross-Strait issues. 
 
6.  (C) Comment:  The Chen administration is currently 
obstructing the efforts of both Pan-Blue opposition parties 
and Beijing to facilitate cross-Strait exchanges.  While Chen 
would be more than happy to leverage Beijing's conciliatory 
mood into official or government-to-government negotiations, 
he has a larger and more immediate goal:  to discredit the 
Lien and Soong China trips, neutralize the "China fever" in 
Taiwan, and restore his own leadership of both DPP and the 
cross-Strait process.  Chen has made considerable headway on 
all three fronts, effectively removing the "China fever" 
pressure for cross-Strait progress and giving himself room 
for maneuver.  He told a small gathering of DPP legislators 
on May 25, and Senator Rockefeller on May 31 (reported 
septel), that the July change in KMT leadership should 
improve the prospects for inter-party cooperation on domestic 
and cross-Strait issues.  If so, Chen's preferred venue for 
negotiation will likely be, not the moribund SEF, but his 
idea of an inter-party cross-Strait peace and development 
commission. 
PAAL 

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