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| Identifier: | 05NEWDELHI4234 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05NEWDELHI4234 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy New Delhi |
| Created: | 2005-06-07 03:10:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL EWWT SENV BG PK IN INDO |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 004234 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2015 TAGS: PREL, EWWT, SENV, BG, PK, IN, INDO-PAK SUBJECT: GOI WATER ISSUES FLOWING SLOWLY WITH PAKISTAN AND BANGLADESH Classified By: Charge Bob Blake, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 1. (C) Summary: In recent meetings with SA Bureau's S&T Officer for Pakistan and Bangladesh Marcella Szymanski, the MEA emphasized GOI commitment to working with Bangladesh to create water sharing agreements to benefit both countries and to resolving its water issues with Pakistan consistent with the Indus Water Treaty (IWT). MEA Bangladesh Desk Officer Puneet Kundal noted that Bangladeshi opposition has slowed progress on the controversial river linking projects. India and Bangladesh share 54 rivers, but have only one water sharing agreement for the Ganges signed in 1996 and are working to link more of its rivers to drought-prone areas. 2. (C) MEA Director for Pakistan Monica Mohta noted that while preferring to negotiate water issues with Pakistan bilaterally, the GOI would follow the IWT provisions to solve the Baglihar and Kishenganga dam issues. As India and Pakistan prepare for the first Baglihar Dam meeting with World Bank-appointed water expert Raymond Lafitte in Paris on June 9-10, ongoing talks at the level of Permanent Indus Commissioner in New Delhi were put on hold. Mohta underlined New Delhi's resolve not to use water as a weapon as the two countries work through the disputes during a time of improved relations. End Summary. River Linking In Feasibility Stage ---------------------------------- 3. (C) Since the last meeting of the Water Minister-level Joint Rivers Commission (JRC) in September 2003, the only discernible progress between India and Bangladesh on water sharing issues is the start of a joint feasibility study on the project, according to MEA's Puneet Kundal. At that time, India agreed to involve Bangladesh in future discussions on its river linking projects, which it began considering in 1986. He explained that the JRC created the Joint Committee of Experts (JCE), which was entrusted to find water sharing formulas for seven of the shared rivers. The JCE met last on September 2004 and decided to prioritize the Tista River, a tributary of the Brahmaputra River. To explore the Tista project, the JCE began a feasibility study which is scheduled to be completed at the end of 2006. According to Kundal, the idea of the river linking project is to utilize excess surface water wasted in flood areas by connecting it to drought areas. Areas of abundant water will be diverted to scarcer areas through hundreds of canals, reservoirs and dams. Bangladesh Opposes Environmental Impacts ---------------------------------------- 4. (C) Although the JCE is still studying the feasibility of this project, Indian media continues to report stiff opposition in Bangladesh to the river linking project, noting that the GOB MFA is "very much concerned" about the project, while environmentalists warn that diverting water to India could damage the country's fish and farming sectors by turning parts of the country into a desert. In response to charges that India is "drying out" Bangladesh, MEA's Kundal remarked that "40 to 50 percent of Bangladesh is under water at any one time" and that "desertification wouldn't happen even if we tried our best." He stressed that no investment decisions will be made until the feasibility study is complete in 2006. When the governments reach the negotiation stage, the GOI is committed to ensuring that the agreement gives Bangladesh certain "minimum command areas" that are dependent on a certain volume of water. He posited that these command areas would ensure that Bangladesh does not face desertification. No Meeting Date Set ------------------- 5. (C) On May 9, the Indian media reported that Bangladesh Water Resources Minister Hafiz Uddin Ahmed called for the next meeting of the JRC, protesting that the council is supposed to meet at least two times each year but has only met once in the last four years. The GOI agreement to include Bangladesh in the negotiations at the September 2004 JCE meeting reportedly led Ahmed to comment that "We believe the Congress government in India has softened on the issue." MEA's Kundal told Poloff that there was still no date set for the next JRC or JCE meetings. However, he stressed that under the bilateral Science and Technology Agreement signed with Dhaka, the GOI had trained Bangladeshi science teachers, shared flood forecasting data, and gifted supplies such as arsenic contamination detection kits and water measurement tools. GOI Prepares for Neutral Expert on Baglihar ------------------------------------------- 6. (C) On Pakistan, MEA Director Monica Mohta praised the Indus Water Treaty as a "model," adding that with the exception of Baglihar, there have never been any problems under the treaty since it was signed in 1960 "in spite of the ups and downs" in the overall Indo-Pak relationship. This was a sign that the GOI would never use water as a weapon against the Pakistani people, she noted. Calling the Baglihar problem "political and not technical," Mohta said that Pakistan opposes all projects in J&K. Whenever the GOI proposes a project there, Pakistan "either says that it will flood us or deprive us, because Musharraf wants the people to be alienated from the GOI at the expense of the benefits of the project." She claimed that when Delhi asks Islamabad to quantify the objections, they usually come back empty-handed. 7. (C) On the Baglihar hydropower scheme, Mohta confidently observed that the GOI was "convinced that its designs are within the provisions of the Indus Water Treaty." After receiving Pakistan's six objections, the GOI said they had solved "two and a half and are waiting for concessions from Pakistan." Pakistan responded by invoking Article Nine, which allows them to consult an expert. Mohta believed this was premature, but said the "GOI had no objection to an expert" and that this process could be positive because it "sets a precedent for future projects." However, when asked what the GOI would do if the expert found India in breach of the treaty, she predicted that "this will not happen." 8. (U) On June 3, "The Hindu's" Gargi Parsai (who has written extensively on water issues) reported that Pakistan and India will meet World Bank-appointed water expert Raymond Lafitte in Paris on June 9-10 to address the Baglihar dispute. The five-member Indian delegation will include J. Hari Narayan, GOI Water Resources Secretary, Fali S. Nariman, the lawyer who will present India's case, and Shankar Das, a prominent specialist on international law. After the announcement, Parsai reported that Pakistan Commissioner Jamait Ali Shah was recalled to Islamabad, breaking off the ongoing Permanent Indus Commissioner-level talks in Delhi focused on the Kishenganga River Dam. "Hindustan Times" Foreign Correspondent Vinod Sharma told us the talks were put on hold in order to give the Commissioner and his colleagues time to brief the Pakistani delegation before they travel to Paris. Kishenganga River Dam Still in Negotiation Stage --------------------------------------------- --- 9. (C) On May 9, after talks broke down between India and Pakistan over a 103 meter high dam on the Kishenganga River in the Gurez Valley, India's Commissioner for Permanent Indus Waters Commission offered Pakistan a July 15 deadline to resolve differences. The MEA's Mohta hoped that the two governments would be able to solve this bilaterally, but explained that if the parties did not reach a solution in the next two months, Pakistan could invoke Article Nine and ask for an expert to resolve the dispute, as in the case of Baglihar. According to "The Hindu," before Permanent Indus Waters talks were stopped on June 2, the two sides reached convergence on four of the six issues, namely the flood value in the design of the damn, the location of sedimentation sluices, the water intake level and the release of water downstream. Although there was no resolution on inter-tributary transfer and protection of existing agriculture and hydro-electric uses before talks were ended, both sides reportedly agreed to meet again before the July 15. Despite the disagreement, the GOI has not suspended work on the project. Mohta termed stopping work "denying people development" and recalled the GOI experience when they gave in to Pakistan's demand to stop work on the Tulbul Navigation Project in 1987 and have never been allowed to resume. Comment ------- 10. (C) The idea for the river linking project in India's Northeast has been around for some 19 years and refuses to go away. The UPA government slightly improved the situation in September 2004 by agreeing to include Bangladesh in the Tista negotiations, but has not responded to GOB calls to cooperate further on water issues during a time of strained ties with Dhaka. As the wealthier upper riparian state with the most to gain from river linking, the ball is in India's court to make concessions, which it has been reluctant to offer, perhaps as a sign of unhappiness over other issues (e.g. Bangladeshi migrants in India and Indian insurgent groups reportedly in Bangladesh). 11. (C) We understand that instructions to proceed with the neutral expert on Baglihar came straight from the PM, and expect the GOI to follow his findings. Permanent Indus Commissioner-level talks on the Kishenganga issue were cut short to focus on the Baglihar meetings in Paris, which decreases the chances of resolving the matter bilaterally before the July 15 "deadline." The Baglihar process will signal whether the IWT is truly a "model" for bilateral dispute resolution, will reveal how each country reacts to outside mediation, and may foreshadow whether this outcome will influence Pakistan's decision to invoke Article Nine on the Kishenganga dispute. BLAKE
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