US embassy cable - 05PORTAUPRINCE1564

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT AU PRINCE 001564 
 
SIPDIS 
 
WHA/CAR 
WHA/EX PLEASE PASS USOAS 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
DEPT FOR DS/IP/WHA 
DSERCC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, MOPS, ASEC, HA, MINUSTAH 
SUBJECT: HAITI: NEED HELP WITH UN AND JORDAN TO BOLSTER 
MINUSTAH 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James B. Foley for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
1. (C) Summary and Action Request: The performance of many 
MINUSTAH troops has been feeble.  We hope that the ongoing 
troop rotation will bring a more robust response to the 
worsening instability.  The Jordanian contingent has been one 
of the most ineffective forces here.  Embassy requests that 
the Department raise concerns about the meager performance of 
the Jordanian battalion with the government of Jordan.  The 
Peruvians, on the other hand, have won a reputation for 
strong performance.  We understand, however that a proposed 
reinforcement of the Peruvian troops in Haiti has been 
stalled by an outstanding payment from the UN on Peru's 
original MINUSTAH deployment.  Embassy requests that the 
Department check on the status of the payment with the UN's 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in New York. 
End Summary. 
 
Peruvians can Help 
------------------ 
 
2. (U) The Peruvian MINUSTAH unit, a reserve force currently 
stationed in the southern city of Jacmel but which has seen 
duty in Cite Soleil, is one of the best-trained and most 
effective military units in Haiti.  With reinforcement and 
redeployment to Port-au-Prince, the Peruvians could 
significantly improve security in the capital. 
 
3. (C) In a visit to Haiti last week, the Peruvian Defense 
Minister said that Peru is prepared to send an additional 200 
troops and move the resulting battalion of 400 to 
Port-au-Prince.  According to the MINUSTAH chief of staff, 
the Peruvians would likely be positioned in or near the 
critical Sonapi industrial zone to bolster the less effective 
Jordanian and Brazilian units already operating around Cite 
Soleil.  The Peruvian Defense Minister said that once the 
political process in Peru is started, it will take 60-90 days 
for the new contingent and their equipment to be on the 
ground and ready.  However, the UN has reportedly not yet 
paid Peru for the first contingent, and Peru does not have 
the money to send additional troops without receiving payment 
for the first group.  Therefore, while the Peruvian Chief of 
Operations in Haiti said that he has begun to prepare the 
troops in Jacmel to move to the capital, their redeployment 
could be delayed until the UN pays Peru for its first troop 
deployment. 
 
4. (U) Post requests that the Department raise this issue 
with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in New 
York and urge the UN to address this issue rapidly in order 
to open the way for additional Peruvian troops, and a 
redeployment to Port-au-Prince. 
 
Jordanian Performance is Poor 
----------------------------- 
 
5. (C) The Jordanian military contingent, which has been 
working in Cite Soleil for the duration of its deployment is 
widely considered to be one of the least effective in Haiti. 
According to a U.S.-MINUSTAH military liaison, the Jordanians 
are not trained to the same standard as the best groups in 
the MINUSTAH force.  They are not assertive and rarely leave 
their armored vehicles; we have received numerous accounts of 
crimes committed within sight of Jordanian checkpoints that 
fail to elicit a Jordanian response.  Small unit leaders in 
the Jordanian force cannot make decisions on the ground 
without referring back to the Jordanian Commander, which 
makes the Jordanians unable to react quickly in the volatile 
Port-au-Prince environment.  The former Jordanian force 
commander was ineffective and risk-averse.  In the last week, 
MINUSTAH reduced the Jordanians' area of responsibility, 
forcing other thinly stretched contingents to pick up their 
slack. 
 
6. (C) However, the replacement Jordanian force commander has 
recently arrived in Haiti, and could help solve at least some 
of the Jordanian force's shortcomings.  MINUSTAH Force 
Commander Heleno reportedly gave the Jordanians two weeks to 
improve its performance or he would ask for the contingent's 
withdrawal from Haiti.  Embassy Port-au-Prince requests that 
the Department raise this concern with the Government of 
Jordan and stress the need for a more active and assertive 
approach by the Jordanian military contingent. 
FOLEY