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| Identifier: | 05BRUSSELS2146 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05BRUSSELS2146 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Brussels |
| Created: | 2005-06-06 13:54:00 |
| Classification: | SECRET |
| Tags: | PREL PHUM PINR CU EUN |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T BRUSSELS 002146 SIPDIS DEPT FOR WHA/CCA, EUR/ERA E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2015 TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PINR, CU, EUN SUBJECT: CZECH FONMIN PUSHING IDEAS TO TOUGHEN EU CUBA POLICY REF: USEU TODAY 06/02/05 Classified By: USEU POLOFF TODD HUIZINGA, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 1. (S) On the margins of a European Parliament conference on Cuba on June 2, Czech FonMin Cyril Svoboda told us he had "four or five" specific proposals for toughening the EU's stance on Cuba. In the run-up to the June 13 EU FonMins meeting, at which Cuba policy will be reviewed, Svoboda is trying to drum up support among his EU counterparts. Since he is still promoting these ideas internally, Svoboda said he could not disclose them to us. He stressed, though, that he was doing all he could to come to an EU common position that would ratchet up the pressure on Cuba and keep the pressure on until the regime made real changes. He told us he believed he already had the support of Poland, Slovakia and Germany, and added that his Danish counterpart, Per Stig Moeller, told him he would support Svoboda's proposals after they had been officially tabled. 2. (S) Svoboda said he was almost certain the EU would not reinstate the June 2003 restrictive measures, but that everyone admitted the measures' suspension had failed to bring any change at all to Cuba. Remarking on a recent meeting he had had with Spanish FonMin Miguel Moratinos, Svoboda said, "Even he realizes the EU has to make some changes (in its Cuba policy)." In a further comment, Svoboda said the Dutch desire to play the role of mediator had not always been constructive: they often seemed interested in reaching a consensus as an end in itself as opposed to promoting an effective EU Cuba policy. 3. (C) COMMENT: The fact that Svoboda himself counts only 3 to 5 allies among the member states reveals he has his work cut out for him. Also, he appears to have given up the possibility of reinstating the restrictive measures, despite the fact that the Czech Republic was the member state most strongly opposed to suspending them in January. This leads us to believe that Svoboda's hoped-for tougher policy may prove to be little more than an EU declaration wrapping continued suspension of the restrictive measures in tougher language. Nonetheless, with the internal EU debate on Cuba policy still very heated, Svoboda may have a fighting chance to get the EU to increase the pressure on Castro. Much will depend on how strongly Germany supports him, and how determined Spain proves to be in its advocacy of continued EU rapprochement with Cuba. END COMMENT. MCKINLEY .
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