US embassy cable - 05BRUSSELS2146

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CZECH FONMIN PUSHING IDEAS TO TOUGHEN EU CUBA POLICY

Identifier: 05BRUSSELS2146
Wikileaks: View 05BRUSSELS2146 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Brussels
Created: 2005-06-06 13:54:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PREL PHUM PINR CU EUN
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.


 
S E C R E T BRUSSELS 002146 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CCA, EUR/ERA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PINR, CU, EUN 
SUBJECT: CZECH FONMIN PUSHING IDEAS TO TOUGHEN EU CUBA 
POLICY 
 
REF: USEU TODAY 06/02/05 
 
Classified By: USEU POLOFF TODD HUIZINGA, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
 1. (S) On the margins of a European Parliament conference on 
Cuba on June 2, Czech FonMin Cyril Svoboda told us he had 
"four or five" specific proposals for toughening the EU's 
stance on Cuba.  In the run-up to the June 13 EU FonMins 
meeting, at which Cuba policy will be reviewed, Svoboda is 
trying to drum up support among his EU counterparts.  Since 
he is still promoting these ideas internally, Svoboda said he 
could not disclose them to us.  He stressed, though, that he 
was doing all he could to come to an EU common position that 
would ratchet up the pressure on Cuba and keep the pressure 
on until the regime made real changes.  He told us he 
believed he already had the support of Poland, Slovakia and 
Germany, and added that his Danish counterpart, Per Stig 
Moeller, told him he would support Svoboda's proposals after 
they had been officially tabled. 
 
2. (S) Svoboda said he was almost certain the EU would not 
reinstate the June 2003 restrictive measures, but that 
everyone admitted the measures' suspension had failed to 
bring any change at all to Cuba.  Remarking on a recent 
meeting he had had with Spanish FonMin Miguel Moratinos, 
Svoboda said, "Even he realizes the EU has to make some 
changes (in its Cuba policy)."  In a further comment, Svoboda 
said the Dutch desire to play the role of mediator had not 
always been constructive: they often seemed interested in 
reaching a consensus as an end in itself as opposed to 
promoting an effective EU Cuba policy. 
 
3. (C) COMMENT: The fact that Svoboda himself counts only 3 
to 5 allies among the member states reveals he has his work 
cut out for him.  Also, he appears to have given up the 
possibility of reinstating the restrictive measures, despite 
the fact that the Czech Republic was the member state most 
strongly opposed to suspending them in January.  This leads 
us to believe that Svoboda's hoped-for tougher policy may 
prove to be little more than an EU declaration wrapping 
continued suspension of the restrictive measures in tougher 
language.  Nonetheless, with the internal EU debate on Cuba 
policy still very heated, Svoboda may have a fighting chance 
to get the EU to increase the pressure on Castro.  Much will 
depend on how strongly Germany supports him, and how 
determined Spain proves to be in its advocacy of continued EU 
rapprochement with Cuba.  END COMMENT. 
 
MCKINLEY 
. 

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