US embassy cable - 05AMMAN4477

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 004477 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2015 
TAGS: MOPS, PHUM, PINS, XF, IZ, ICRC 
SUBJECT: ICRC BAGHDAD TO PUSH A "CONFIDENCE-BUILDING" 
AGENDA AT ITS MID-TERM REVIEW 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 2068 
 
Classified By: Acting DCM Christopher Henzel for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D 
). 
 
1. (C) On the margins of the UNRWA Major Donors and Host 
Nations conference (septel), PRM PDAS Greene met with ICRC 
Head of Delegation (HOD) Chistoph Beney to express USG 
concerns that ICRC actions in Baghdad were causing a 
deterioration in the overall USG-ICRC relationship.  Greene 
asked that Beney implement a series of discrete steps to 
start restoring USG confidence in ICRC's detention monitoring 
activities in Baghdad.   In the process of departing Amman to 
participate in ICRC's ongoing mid-term review of its 
worldwide operations, Beney told Greene that he intends to 
propose that ICRC's Mid-East Zone reviewers adopt the 
confidence-building measures outlined below.  Beney admitted 
that ICRC's institutional tendency to "view tensions in 
detention work to be normal," combined with his mission's 
on-the-ground absence from Iraq, had "de-sensitized" him to 
the rift growing between his mission and Coalition Forces 
(ref A).  Beney assured Greene that the aftermath of the Camp 
Bucca visit had "enlightened" him to the extent relations in 
the field are strained, and expressed a desire to lay 
groundwork ahead of his scheduled July departure to "turn the 
situation around." 
 
ASHRAF PLAN: ICRC REQUESTS MEK DEFECTOR LIST 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Raising the Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK) as a possible 
vehicle to improve cooperation, Beney said he would use the 
ongoing ICRC mid-term review to press ICRC to clarify its 
objectives for the Ashraf Camp population "over the next six 
months," starting with a developing a concrete plan to 
facilitate the return of the 400-plus MEK "defectors" who are 
interested in returning to Iran as soon as possible.  Beney 
noted that ICRC Baghdad is ready to start cross-checking the 
Ashfraf residents who want to repatriate against its 1992 POW 
list, but requires formal notification to start the process. 
Beney added that ICRC Baghdad had approached MNF-I for the 
Ashraf returnee list earlier this month.   (NOTE:  Beney 
assured Greene that ICRC does not believe POWs have any fears 
that would prevent their return to Iran.  END NOTE.)   Beney 
predicted that ICRC would propose facilitating repatriation 
through a border operation, similiar to the symbolic 
repatriation carried out earlier this year.  However, if the 
numbers prepared to return turned out to be small, Beney 
thought ICRC would consider using its aircraft to facilitate 
returns directly from airports inside Iraq. 
 
3. (C)  Beney expressed hope that progress on the MEK 
defectors would create sufficient momentum to enable ICRC to 
make a commitment to conduct private interviews for the 
remaining 3,000 Ashraf residents over the next six months. 
He also proposed that ICRC help raise interest in 
repatriation to Iran by improving telephone access for those 
who have already returned.  However, he stressed that ICRC 
Geneva is struggling to see the value of interviewing the 
remaining 3,000 Camp Ashraf population who "remain under MEK 
control," and is concerned that the USG expects ICRC to "work 
miracles" by identifying a new population who want to return 
to Iran or finding a third-country destination for 
resettlement. 
 
ACKNOWLEDGE IMPROVEMENTS IN DETENTION CONDITIONS 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
4. (C) Turning to ICRC inspections of MNF-I detention 
facilities, Beney acknowledged that inmate conditions have 
improved over the past year and that "ICRC should have been 
more appreciative of the improvements, and should have 
recognized the efforts that have been made."  But he 
expressed concern about persistent reports that suggest ICRC 
Baghdad is "fixated on the provision of toothbrushes," when 
ICRC has communicated its serious outstanding concerns 
regarding undisclosed transfers to visiting USG delegations. 
Beney thought that ICRC could improve the lines of 
communication by working to meet MNF-I in Baghdad on a 
monthly basis, adding that he would visit Baghdad with his 
yet-to-be-named successor in July to kick-start the process. 
On ICRC Baghdad's efforts to engage MNF-I on its IHL 
concerns, Beney acknowledged that their efforts were 
"mis-timed," and stressed that ICRC has no interest in 
extending legal recognition to the insurgents.  He also 
assured Greene that ICRC Baghdad has "nothing to gain in 
talking to the press," and would work to ensure that any 
statements were coordinated with Washington through its 
Headquarters in Geneva in the future. 
5. (C)  PRM PDAS GREENE COMMENT:  Beney clearly feels the 
heat of intense USG dissatisfaction with aspects of ICRC's 
performance in Iraq.  Clearly, Beney also feels significant 
pressure from ICRC headquarters to improve the relationship 
with the USG.  While responsive to USG criticism, Beney is 
transiting to another assignment and will not be a factor in 
moving the relationship forward.  To get the relationship 
back on track, we will continue to strongly encourage a 
senior-level visit from ICRC Geneva to press ICRC to make 
tangible commitments regarding the Ashraf population, and 
urge it to focus on making tangible improvements to their 
press and communications strategy in Iraq. END COMMENT. 
 
6. (U)  This message was cleared by PRM PDAS Richard Greene. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HALE