US embassy cable - 05ANKARA3144

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IRAQI TURKMEN GROUPS SQUARE OFF IN TURKEY

Identifier: 05ANKARA3144
Wikileaks: View 05ANKARA3144 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2005-06-06 10:07:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV EAID ECON IZ TU
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

061007Z Jun 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 003144 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO USAID 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, EAID, ECON, IZ, TU 
SUBJECT: IRAQI TURKMEN GROUPS SQUARE OFF IN TURKEY 
 
REF: A. STATE 99829 
 
     B. ANKARA 1211 
     C. KIRKUK 75 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (U) This is an action request--please see para. 15. 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
2. (C) There are a number of Iraqi Turkmen groups in Ankara. 
Three that we have met recently appear to be united only in 
their anger at what they believe is CF support for Kurdish 
domination of northern Iraq, especially Kirkuk.  One group 
claimed (several weeks ago) there is no insurgency in the 
northwest Ninewah city of Talafar, and that the Kurds are 
duping us so they can gain control of the city.  The somewhat 
more reasonable Iraqi Turkmen Assembly seeks USG assistance 
for two projects in Kirkuk as well as security support for a 
pan-Turkmen "summit" later this year; we would welcome the 
input of our colleagues in Iraq on these requests (see para 
15).  Despite the Iraqi Turkmen Front's poor showing in the 
Jan. 30 election, Turkey will not likely cut its support for 
the party soon.  Turkey will use the Turkmen issue as a wedge 
on Kirkuk.  End summary. 
 
3. (C) According to Turkmen sources, the Iraqi Turkmen (or 
Turkomans) came from Central Asia and are descended from 
Turkic-speaking tribes who began settling in Iraq 1500 years 
ago.  More recently, the Turkmen were favored by the Ottoman 
Empire when it controlled what became Iraq after World War I. 
 Turkish and the Turkmen language are mutually intelligible. 
Partly for these historical reasons, and likely also because 
the Turks seek to balance perceived Kurdish dominance in 
northern Iraq, the GOT seeks to position itself as a defender 
of Turkmen interests.  (NOTE: However, Turkey said or did 
little to protest Saddam's mistreatment of the Turkmen during 
his rule.  END NOTE.)  A number of Iraqi Turkmen groups have 
representatives in Turkey and--to varying degrees not 
entirely transparent to us--enjoy access to high levels in 
Ankara. 
 
Turkmen Groups: Angry 
--------------------- 
 
4. (C) Meetings with three different Iraqi Turkmen 
organizations in Ankara over the past few months reveal the 
following, at least about the groups represented here: 
 
--Iraq's Turkmen are not united politically. 
--The Turkmen are, to varying degrees, angry at Kurdish moves 
to expand their control in northern Iraq, especially in 
Kirkuk province. 
--This anger to a certain degree spills over to us, as the 
Turkmen believe we have sided with the Kurds (a view shared 
by many Turks).  This is especially manifested in their view 
of the Jan. 30 elections, wherein they believe Iraq's Turkmen 
were disenfranchised. 
 
5. (C) The Turkmen with whom we met are all determined to 
"educate" us about the history of the Iraqi Turkmen and to 
ensure that we consider them among the main ethnic 
groups--along with Arabs and Kurds--represented in Iraq. 
While they profess to be friends of the United States and of 
the coalition--and to have welcomed the liberation of 
Iraq--they believe we have been co-opted by Iraq's Kurds, 
whom they accuse of carrying out both historical and current 
persecution. 
 
6. (C) PolMilOff has met several times in the past 10 months 
with the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF) and the Iraqi Turkmen 
Cultural and Assistance Association (ITCAA).  ITF's ties to 
the GOT and TGS are well known; we cannot evaluate those of 
ITCAA.  In addition, the Ambassador met Feb. 4 with the Iraqi 
Turkmen Assembly; PolMilOff has subsequently met with this 
group. 
 
Cultural Association: Bile... 
----------------------------- 
 
7. (C) While ITF and ITCAA claim not to be affiliated with 
each other, they appear to share similar views and an 
apparent distrust of CF and the Kurds.  Both are anxious 
about CF presence in Talafar, a city with a sizable Turkmen 
population in northwest Ninewah province which has been 
infiltrated over time by insurgents, thus drawing a strong CF 
and ISF presence there.  ITCAA members are especially 
confrontational; they flatly told PolMilOff that there is no 
insurgency in Talafar, and that the Kurds have duped us into 
moving forces there so that the Kurds can come in behind us 
and take over the town.  They accused CF of using napalm 
during September 2004 operations there, and accused former 
Peshmerga IA units of expelling Turkmen from their homes and 
taking them over.  They insist that CF should withdraw from 
Talafar to the airport and meet with local leaders there. 
When PolMilOff recalled that insurgents essentially took 
control of the city in September 2004 until CF arrived in 
larger numbers, our interlocutors insisted that there is no 
insurgency in Talafar. 
 
8. (C) ITCAA representatives recited familiar Turkmen 
concerns about Kirkuk, many of which reflect the views of the 
GOT.  They claimed that 300,000 Kurds moved into Kirkuk 
Governorate after April 2003, and that the Kurds also carried 
out mass fraud to dominate the Jan. 30 provincial elections. 
PolMilOff explained that Article 58 of the TAL dictates that 
the future of Kirkuk will be decided through a national 
political and constitutional process, not merely by the 
wishes of the Kirkuk Governorate Council.  After a difficult 
two and a half hour back-and-forth with ITCAA, its leader, 
Mahmut Kasapoglu, closed by stating that the U.S. and much of 
the world viewed Saddam Hussein positively until the Halabja 
chemical weapons attack in 1988; he then asked when the U.S. 
will come to the same realization about Iraq's Kurds and Shia. 
 
...Iraqi Turkmen Front: Guile... 
-------------------------------- 
 
9. (C) The ITF's Ankara representative, Ahmet Muratli, is 
generally more diplomatic than Kasapoglu, but no less 
determined to persuade us that we have been duped by the 
Kurds into oppressing the Turkmen.  Muratli frequently 
contacts us to ask about the status of ITF members allegedly 
detained by CF, the ISF, or Peshmerga and he also passes on 
(usually incorrect or exaggerated) press accounts of actions 
again Turkmen.  At the same time, Muratli insists that the 
ITF supported OIF and was disappointed when the Turkish 
parliament rejected the use of Turkey to enter Iraq in March 
2003, neither of which is the case as far as we know. 
 
10. (C) Muratli acknowledges that the ITF failed to unite 
Iraq's Turkmen under one banner in the Jan. 30 elections, 
though he also argues that fraud and intimidation served to 
largely disenfranchise many Turkmen.  GOT leaders roundly 
criticized the ITF for its poor performance in the January 
elections (see ref a), and the Turkish press reported on the 
ITF's apparently failed recent Congress in Kirkuk, in which 
they failed to agree on a platform or new leaders (Muratli 
told us May 9 that the Congress would resume soon).  Safeen 
Dizayee, head of the KDP's international bureau and former 
KDP representative in Ankara, told PolMilCouns and PolMilOff 
May 18 that the ITF's failed Congress hurt its credibility, 
and that it is facing many defections. 
 
...Iraqi Turkmen Assembly: A Smile... 
------------------------------------- 
 
11. (C) The Iraqi Turkmen Assembly (ITA) told the Ambassador 
Feb. 4 that the organization seeks U.S. "recognition and 
protection."  The Ambassador demurred, noting that as the 
Ambassador to Turkey he was in no position to do so, though 
the coalition is committed to protecting all Iraqis as 
individuals.  In PolMilOff's May 10 meeting with ITA 
officials, they sought U.S. support for three initiatives in 
Kirkuk: 
 
--A new international university with an English-language 
curriculum, also to include a teaching hospital and medical 
school; 
--An industrial park "for middle class businesspeople and 
craftsmen;" and 
--Provision of CF security for a pan-Turkmen "summit" this 
July or later "to reunite Turkmen at all levels." 
 
12. (C) Our ITA interlocutors insisted that they oppose the 
ITF, and blamed ITF's poor election results on the party's 
close identification with Turkey.  "We are Iraqis, not 
Turks," ITA Chairman Umit Akkoyunlu pointedly stated. 
Akkoyunlu was surprised when PolMilOff recalled that it was 
an ITF official who proposed the university idea to CODEL 
Hayes in Kirkuk (ref b).  He replied that the head of the 
steering committee for the university concept in Kirkuk 
happens to be an ITF member but that it is not an ITF concept 
per se.  PolMilOff encouraged ITA to discuss these issues 
with REO Kirkuk and/or Embassy Baghdad.  Akkoyunlu later told 
PolMilOff on June 1 that Hacitepe University in Ankara had 
agreed to enter into a partnership with this nascent 
university in Kirkuk. 
 
13. (C) Akkoyunlu added that ITA wants to send a delegation 
to Washington to discuss these projects and present the ITA 
agenda to the USG.  Subsequently, on June 1 Akkoyunlu told 
PolMilOff that he will be going to Iraq in about a month to 
launch the ITA in Iraq.  He claimed the ITF in Iraq was 
"dissolving" and that ITA had already made links with Turkmen 
groups in Iraq. 
 
14. (C) At least in Ankara, ITA presents a generally more 
agreeable image than ITF and certainly ITCAA.  At the same 
time, Akkoyunlu characterized the Jan. 30 elections as "not 
democratic," and said the ITA would not run as a party in the 
next elections unless its concerns were met.  He professed a 
desire to work with the Kurds and all other groups in Iraq, 
but accused the Kurdish leadership of overreaching and 
seeking to dominate Kirkuk. 
 
Action Request 
-------------- 
 
15. (C) We cannot evaluate the bona fides of the ITA, but we 
believe they are at least seeking to come to the table with 
ideas and--within limits--to be constructive.  We have no 
insight into their popularity in Iraq.  We were non-committal 
toward their request for assistance on certain projects in 
Kirkuk and trip to Washington, but we would be grateful to 
hear views from our colleagues in Iraq.  End action request. 
 
Turkey on the Turkmen 
--------------------- 
 
16. (C) Comment: Turkish government and press advocacy for 
Iraq's Turkmen waxes and wanes.  During the current period of 
a positive shift in the GOT's Iraq policy, we hear fewer 
Turkish complaints about alleged Kurdish mistreatment of the 
Turkmen, though the future of Kirkuk remains a sensitive 
issue in Ankara.  MFA Under Secretary Tuygan told the 
Ambassador after the election results were announced that a 
census in Iraq is vital in order to determine how many Iraqi 
Turkmen there really are (ref a).  Turkish officials 
routinely tell us that they believe there are at least five 
million Iraqi Turkmen, but the poor election results for the 
ITF (only 93,000 votes) may have served as a wake-up call to 
Ankara. 
 
17. (C) Comment cont.: Even with GOT criticism of the ITF's 
poor election showing, we see some indications that Ankara is 
distancing itself from the party.  But distance does not 
equal disinterest.  Turkey still sees the ITF as a means to 
exert political influence in Iraq, and ITF members provide 
intelligence (much of it false or exaggerated, we believe) on 
Kurdish activities to the Turks.  We expect Turkey neither to 
choose another Turkman organization nor to completely abandon 
the ITF.  Especially if unrest breaks out in Kirkuk, we can 
expect Turkey to pressure us to protect the Turkmen.  In the 
meantime, Turkmen groups in Ankara will continue to spin out 
their narratives to the GOT, to us, and anyone else who will 
listen even as the real action takes place next door.  End 
comment. 
 
18. (U) Iraq posts minimize considered. 
MOORE 

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