US embassy cable - 02AMMAN4145

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 004145 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2012 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, JO 
SUBJECT: IRAQ AND THE JORDANIAN POPULACE'S MOOD DOMINATE 
AMBASSADOR'S COURTESY CALL ON FORMER PM MUDAR BADRAN 
 
REF: AMMAN 03620 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR EDWARD W. GNEHM  REASONS: 1.5 (B) and (D) 
 
1.(C) SUMMARY.  On July 23 Ambassador paid a courtesy call on 
former PM Mudar Badran at his residence in Abdoun.  The 
substantive issues dominating the meeting were Iraq, the 
Jordanian economy, the ongoing violence in the West Bank, and 
the linkage between the three.  Badran was clear in his 
opinion that, in the face of the economic conditions here and 
the ongoing violence in the West Bank, any effort by the US 
military to remove Saddam Hussein could dangerously enrage 
the Jordanian populace.  In this context, Badran made 
references to the events of 1970 and the potential for such 
instability to be revisited.  Badran is not connected in any 
way with the current regime in Jordan and is neither 
consulted nor informed by the GOJ with regard to current 
events.  That said, his long view of local and regional 
history make his opinions notable.  END SUMMARY 
 
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BACKGROUND 
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2. (SBU)  Mudar Badran is an East Banker whose government 
service spanned from 1958 (when he began his career as a 
legal adviser to the Jordanian Armed Forces) to 1991, when he 
completed his fourth stint as PM.  Among other positions, he 
was Director of the General Intelligence Directorate from 
1968 to 1970.  Between 1976 and 1991, Badran was PM for a 
total of eight years, often serving concurrently as Minister 
of Foreign Affairs and/or Defense.  In 1991 he was appointed 
a member of the Senate. 
 
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THE ECONOMY, THE WEST BANK AND IRAQ:  THIS IS NOT 1991 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
3. (C)  Following pleasantries, Badran jumped to the issue of 
Iraq.  He contrasted the current domestic situation in Jordan 
vis a vis 1991, identifying poverty and the local perception 
of a stagnant economy as the key issues currently facing the 
GOJ.  When he was PM in 1991, poverty was not rampant; there 
was hope, and expectations, for a better economy.  Badran 
pointed out that this is not the case today, as Jordanians 
are increasingly disenchanted, and the GOJ is slipping 
towards an adversarial posture with the Jordanian populace. 
In 1991, he said, things between the GOJ and the people were 
not "personal".  Now, increasingly, they are.  After 
illustrating this contrast, Badran commented that the 
domestic situations in Egypt and Saudi Arabia were, in his 
opinion, even more tenuous, largely because those regimes' 
relationships with the USG were irritating their respective 
populaces. 
 
4. (C)  Badran said that most Jordanians do not like Saddam 
Hussein and recognize him as an unjust ruler.  However, the 
perception among Jordanians is that the economy will suffer 
from a USG strike against Iraq, putting into jeopardy their 
oil supply.  Further, Jordanian-Palestinians in particular 
view the 12 year isolation of Iraq, at the hand of the USG, 
as unjust.  The strength of Saddam, Badran said, is his 
adversarial relationship with the US; in the third world, 
leaders often need to be able to point a finger at an outside 
force in order to survive.  Badran said that Saddam has, 
unfortunately, been provided with this by the USG.  The Iraqi 
people, and many Arabs in the region, Badran asserted, hold 
the USG responsible for everything and anything bad that 
happens in Iraq. 
 
5. (C)  Ambassador asked Badran what would happen in Jordan 
if the USG did move against the Iraqi regime.  Badran said 
that there is much uncertainty, and this in itself is not 
good.  He cautioned that the security forces and 
infrastructure surrounding Saddam were in his direct control 
and "complex".  Within Jordan, Badran said that he is 
convinced that the GOJ is "not at all able to face this 
problem".  Ambassador asked if Badran believed that, in a 
worst case scenario, the GOJ would be able to maintain 
domestic stability.  Badran replied, "I doubt it".  The 
economy is a very serious issue now, Badran continued.  He 
mentioned his experience as GID Director during Black 
September in 1970, and salted the discussion with some 
allusions to the domestic conditions at that time.  Note: 
Badran did not discuss the potential benefits that a 
Saddam-free region could have in creating greater economic 
opportunities in Jordan. 
 
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"WHAT HAPPENED TO US"? 
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6. (C)  Badran was not pleased with some of the recent 
tactics of the current GOJ regime.  He became visibly upset 
as he discussed the recent case of Toujan Faisal (reftel). 
"What happened to us"?, he asked, referring presumably to the 
GOJ.  The current PM is a friend, Badran said, "but what is 
the government doing chasing down a former Member of 
Parliament because she criticized it"?  This had only made 
her allegations more visible, he said. He concluded that 
previous regimes would not have wasted their time with such 
matters. 
 
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COMMENT 
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7 (C)  Badran is an elderly former PM, disconnected from the 
current regime.  This may well color his attitudes and 
appraisals.  However, he was directly involved in the GOJ 
leadership from 1970 through the Gulf War, and with this 
experience is able to offer a valuable perspective.  His 
major point: pessimism over limited economic opportunities 
for the average Jordanian and the ongoing violence across the 
river will add fuel to an angry popular rejection of any move 
against Iraq.  He sees this as potentially a genuine 
challenge to the security forces ability to keep order in the 
event of a crises with Iraq. 
 
Gnehm