US embassy cable - 90KUWAIT858

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 00858 
 
ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12356:  DECL:OADR 
TAGS:  PREL, IR, KU 
SUBJECT:  KUWAIT MFA OFFICIAL ON IRAN 
 
1.  SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT. 
 
2.  SUMMARY.  MFA UNDER SECRETARY SULAIMAN MAJED 
AL-SHAHEEN FEBRUARY 4 TOLD STATE/CENTCOM BRIEFING TEAM 
IRAN NO LONGER SHOWED OPEN INTEREST IN SHIA ON THE ARAB 
SIDE OF THE GULF, BUT MAINTAINED ITS CONTACTS THROUGH 
"OTHER ORGANIZATIONS".  KUWAIT HAS ACCEPTED AN IRANIAN 
ENVOY, BUT IS RELUCTANT TO RESTORE AIR LINKS.  SHAHEEN 
SAID IRAN STILL HOLDS ABOUT 92 KUWAITI SMALL CRAFT 
SEIZED FROM FISHERMEN AND PLEASURE BOATERS.  HE HOPES 
FOR NORMALIZATION OF SAUDI-IRANIAN RELATIONS, BUT SAID 
THE EXECUTION OF 16 KUWAITI SHIA AFTER LAST YEAR'S 
MECCA BOMBINGS HAD HAD A NEGATIVE EFFECT BECAUSE TEHRAN 
STILL HELD ITSELF RESPONSIBLE FOR "SHIA BLOOD".  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
3.  STATE/CENTCOM BRIEFING TEAM LED BY BRIG. GEN. 
DREWFS FEBRUARY 4 PROVIDED BRIEFING ON IRAN TO MFA 
UNDER SECRETARY SULAIMAN MAJED AL-SHAHEEN.  THE MEETING 
WAS ALSO ATTENDED BY MFA AMERICAS DEPARTMENT CHIEF DR. 
SUHAIL SHUHAIBER, TWO OTHER MFA STAFFERS, DCM, CHUSLOK, 
AND POLCHIEF.  SHAHEEN LISTENED CAREFULLY, ASKED A 
NUMBER OF QUESTIONS, AND AT THE CONCLUSION EXPRESSED 
APPRECIATION FOR THE BRIEFING.  HE TERMED IT A "SIGN OF 
THE FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN KUWAIT AND THE US" AND ASSURED 
THE BRIEFERS THAT "THE MAIN POINTS WILL FIND THEIR WAY 
TO HIGHER AUTHORITIES, INCLUDING THE DEPUTY PRIME 
MINISTER (SHAIKH SABAH AL-AHMED, WHO DOUBLES AS FOREIGN 
MINISTER)". 
 
4.  SHAHEEN OFFERED THE TEAM KUWAIT'S PERSPECTIVE ON 
IRANIAN DEVELOPMENTS AS WELL.  COMMENTING ON 
RAFSANJANI'S HOLD ON POWER, HE SAID IT WAS DIFFICULT TO 
TELL IF RAFSANJANI WAS STRONG OR HIS OPPONENTS WERE 
WEAK.  AHMED KHOMEINI CLEARLY HAD LITTLE REAL POWER 
EXCEPT THE REFLECTED INFLUENCE OF HIS NAME, AND 
APPEARED TO BE CONCENTRATING NOW ON RELIGIOUS ISSUES 
(SUCH AS BUILDING HIS FATHER'S SHRINE) RATHER THAN 
POLITICAL ISSUES. 
 
5.  THE UNDER SECRETARY SAID KUWAIT HAD INFORMATION 
THAT THE IRANIANS HAD BEGUN A CAMPAIGN (NOT WITH 
SUCCESS TO DATE) TO CONVINCE IRANIAN INTELLECTUALS AND 
TECHNOCRATS IN EUROPE AND THE US TO RETURN.  ON IRAN'S 
ATTITUDE TOWARDS ITS GULF NEIGHBORS, HE SAID ALTHOUGH 
TEHRAN NO LONGER OPENLY SHOWED INTEREST IN THE SHIA OF 
THE GULF, IT LIKELY WAS WORKING THROUGH "OTHER 
ORGANIZATIONS" TO KEEP TIES WITH THE SHIA ON THE ARAB 
SIDE OF THE GULF.  ON SAUDI-IRANIAN TIES, HE SAID 
KUWAIT HOPED RELATIONS WOULD BE NORMALIZED BETWEEN THE 
TWO COUNTRIES.  HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE IRANIANS 
"STILL HOLD THEMSELVES RESPONSIBLE FOR SHIA BLOOD" AND 
SAID THE SAUDIS' EXECUTION OF 16 KUWAITI SHIA AFTER THE 
MECCA BOMBINGS LAST JULY HAD AFFECTED SAUDI-IRANIAN 
RELATIONS.  HE CITED THE KILLING OF THREE SAUDI 
DIPLOMATS IN THAILAND IN THIS REGARD. 
 
6.  ON KUWAIT'S OWN RELATIONS WITH IRAN, HE RECALLED 
THAT AN IRANIAN AMBASSADOR HAD RECENTLY TAKEN UP HIS 
POSITION IN KUWAIT AND THAT KUWAIT HAD A CHARGE IN 
TEHRAN.  HE DID NOT DIRECTLY ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF 
WHETHER/WHEN A KUWAITI AMBASSADOR MIGHT GO TO IRAN. 
SHAHEEN SAID THE TWO COUNTRIES WERE "STILL TALKING" ON 
THE ISSUE OF AIR LINKS, BUT THE GOK FEELS "THE AIRSPACE 
IS STILL NOT CLEAR".  THERE WERE OTHER QUESTIONS AS 
WELL ON WHICH THE GOK HAD NOT HAD A CLEAR ANSWER FROM 
TEHRAN.  HE SAID THE IRANIANS WERE HOLDING ABOUT 92 
SMALL BOATS, INCLUDING FISHING BOATS AND SPEEDBOATS. 
OFTEN, HE SAID, THE BOAT WOULD BE SEIZED AND THE 
FISHERMEN, USUALLY EGYPTIANS, RELEASED.  SHAHEEN SAID 
THE TEHRAN GOVERNMENT SAYS IT DOESN'T KNOW ABOUT THE 
BOAT SEIZURES "AND WE BELIEVE THEM".  HE SAID THE 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT LIKELY DID NOT CONTROL THE ACTIONS 
OF LOCAL COAST GUARD COMMANDERS.  THIS EVIDENT LACK OF 
CENTRAL AUTHORITY WAS ITSELF A VERY WORRYING SIGN OF 
RAFSANJANI'S ABILITY, OR LACK THEREOF, TO ESTABLISH 
AUTHORITY. 
 
7.  COMMENT.  SHAHEEN'S REMARK ABOUT IRAN MAINTAINING 
ITS TIES TO SHIA THROUGH "OTHER ORGANIZATIONS" BETRAYS 
CONTINUING GOK CONCERN ABOUT TEHRAN'S MISCHIEF-MAKING 
ABILITY, DESPITE A THAW IN BILATERAL RELATIONS.  "OTHER 
ORGANIZATIONS" LIKELY MEANS CLANDESTINE SHIA 
ORGANIZATIONS.  THE REFERENCE TO THE 16 KUWAITI SHIA 
ALSO REFLECTS THE GOVERNMENT'S KEEN AWARENESS THAT THE 
UPS AND DOWNS IN SAUDI-IRANIAN TIES HAVE AN IMPACT 
HERE.  AS LONG AS THAT RELATIONSHIP IS POOR, IT WILL 
LIMIT TO SOME EXTENT THE SPEED WITH WHICH KUWAIT CAN 
IMPROVE ITS OWN RELATIONS WITH TEHRAN -- WHICH, ALL 
THINGS BEING EQUAL, KUWAIT WOULD LIKE TO DO.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
 
HOWELL